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2ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the participation of China's established intellectuals 
in political campaigns during the period 1949-1976.This involves a 
sociological analysis of the historical background and current situation of 
China's established intellectuals, a systematic examination of the whole 
process of the continual campaigns launched by the CCP and Mao Ze­
dong to criticise intellectuals or their works, and some detailed case 
studies of four distinguished established intellectuals. Based on these, the 
thesis attempts to show that
(1) China's established intellectuals do not belong to a specific class, nor 
do they form an independent stratum, but instead, they are members of 
different classes or strata;
(2) which classes and strata they are members of hinges more on their 
social position and political experience than on their own choices;
(3) under the specific system operating in China, intellectuals have to be 
passive if they do not obtain high posts in the state/Party organs. The 
higher and more numerous posts they occupy, the more active and 
influential they are; and
(4) intellectuals within the establishment essentially cannot avoid conflicts 
between the roles of the intellectual and the official.
In brief, like other members of society, intellectuals are greatly tied to the 
social relations in which they are living and working, and their roles are 
largely decided by the social positions they obtain. In China, the fate of the 
intellectual in future will depend upon the development of society and 
changing social relations.
The method used in this research is mainly documentary analysis.
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9NOTES ON TRANSLATIONS
(1). In this thesis, all the translations of materials from original Chinese 
into English are my own, except where otherwise noted;
(2). I use Pingying System to translate names of provinces, cities, and 
places, except Peking, Hong Kong ,and Canton;
(3). I also translate persons' names according to Pingying System, but, 
because every character in Chinese has its special meaning, I write them 
like "Zhou En-lai" rather than "Zhou Enlai". Exceptionally, "Dr Sun 
Yet-sen" and "Chiang Kai-shek" remain as they were. The names of 
those persons who have published works in English will still be translated 
according to Pingying System while being noted, for instance, Mao's 
name is read as "Mao Ze-dong", and noted as "i.e., Mao Tse-tung" in 
Bibliography.
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CHAPTER 1 I NTRODUCTION
The definitions of the "intellectual” are different, the theories of 
intellectuals are various, but the problems of intellectuals, which 
sociologists have been interested in and have debated for at least sixty 
years since Karl Mannheim published his Ideologie und Utopie in 1929, 
are more or less the same. These are: (l).Where are the social locations of 
the intellectual? (2).What is the relationship between their social locations 
and their political ideas? (3).Do they form a special class, or an 
independent classless stratum, or rather, do they belong to various 
classes? (4).Do their political ideas express or represent their own 
interests, or the interests of other classes separately, or rather, a complex 
of the interests of various classes?
Taking China as an example, this thesis will examine such problems by 
focussing on the participation of China's established intellectuals in the 
continual political campaigns from 1949 to 1976, launched by Mao Ze­
dong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to criticise either some of 
these established intellectuals or some of their intellectual works. This 
will not only, for the first time, show the whole process of the political 
campaigns systematically, but also, more significantly, continue to
explore the way of resolving the sociological problem of intellectuals 
c
through an emp jrial study.
I. Concepts of Intellectual and Intelligentsia
(1). Intellectual
Terminologically, intellectual has been a widely-used but universally 
ambiguous concept, while sociologists have their own definitions and 
usages which are nevertheless various. Amongst these Edward Shils' 
statement is well-known:
Intellectuals are the aggregate of persons in any society who employ in their 
communication and expression, and with relatively higher frequency than 
most other members of their society, symbols of general scope and abstract 
reference, concerning man, society, nature, and the cosmos.1
According to Shils, not only those who produce intellectual works, who 
engage in their interpretation and transmission, who teach, annotate, or 
expound the contents of works, but also those who only "consume", for 
example, read intellectual works in large quantities, and who concern 
themselves receptively with works, are intellectuals. What is more, not 
only those engaged in the creation and reception of works of science, 
scholarship, philosophy, theology, literature, and art, but those involved 
in intellectual-executive roles as well are intellectuals.2
Shils' understanding of "intellectual" seems so wide that some other 
sociologists prefer to narrow down their definitions. For instance, Brym, 
following Lipset (who defines "intellectuals" as those who create, 
distribute, and apply culture, that is, the symbolic worlds of man, 
including art, science, and religion3), confers the title upon those people
1 E. Shils, 1973:22.
2 E. Shils, 1968: 399; Cf., S. M. Lipset and A. Basu, 1976: 119.
3 S.M. Lipset, 1960:311; 1976:119.
who get occupationally involved in the production of ideas, including 
’’scholars, artists, reporters, performers in the arts, sciences, etc., as well 
as students in post-secondary institutions, who are apprentices to these 
occupational roles".4
Other sociologists further emphasise that intellectuals should be more 
outstanding than ordinary educated people. In this sense, neither all 
academic persons nor all members of the professions are intellectuals. 
Max Weber limits them to those "who by virtue of their peculiarity have 
special access to certain achievements considered to be 'culture value', and 
who, therefore, usurp the leadership of a community."5
Weber's argument, however, is not beyond criticism. Since there have 
always been at least two kinds of outstanding cultural men, i.e. , the 
defenders of the status quo and the malcontents, and the latter could be 
frustrated with so-called 'culture value1 and therefore be outside, or even 
at adds with, their contemporary cultural setting, should we treat these 
two similarly under the title of "intellectuals", or reserve the title only for 
those with a critical spirit? Coser claims that intellectuals, seeming never 
satisfied with things as they are, "question the truth of the moment in 
terms of higher and wider truth; they counter appeals to factuality by 
invoking the 'impractical ought'." In a word, "intellectuals live for 
rather than off ideas."6
But Coser's definition has, as Coser himself recognises, a tendency to 
idealise the portrait of intellectuals he draws. The same problem actually
4 R.J. Brym, 1980: 12.
5 M. Weber, 1946: 17.
6 Coser, 1965: VIII.
exists to some degree in many definitions of intellectuals. One example is 
Neumann's description, which is read as following: "The intellectual is, or 
ought to be, the critical conscience in each of its historical periods."7 It is 
reasonable: the people who define or describe intellectuals are at the same 
time the intellectuals themselves, or more strictly, are considering 
themselves intellectuals. As Bauman points out, definitions of 
intellectuals, which are many and diverse, have one trait in common: they 
are all self-definitions.8
More important is the problem that if we construct a definition of 
"intellectuals" based merely on their psychological characteristics without 
taking account of their social positions within society we would be in 
danger of confusion. Can we simply name a manual worker with critical 
spirits a members of intellectual? Or should we say that all intellectuals 
must be critical while not all men with critical spirits are intellectuals? 
Theoretically and historically, the same or similar characteristics could be 
always found amongst various social members whilst the opposite ones 
would appear amongst the members from the same social class or stratum, 
thus we cannot find persons' social location merely according to their 
psychological characteristics.
To understand "intellectual" better, it is necessary to survey the origin and 
shift of the term. "Intellectual" was first used by Clemenceau in an article 
in L'Aurore on 23 January, 1898. As a consequence of the Manifeste des 
Intellectuals evoked by the Dreyfus Case, it was widely used then in 
France. The Right-wing anti-Dreyfusards satirised the cafe-
? F. L. Neumann, 1976 : 423.
8 Z. Bauman, 1987 : 8.
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revolutionaries as ’'intellectuals". For example, Brunetiere used it 
derisively, referring to those artists, scientists and professors who 
presumed to represent the nation's conscience on basic political questions. 
To him it was quite illogical to deduce that an educated person who is 
remarkable in some specific subject, for instance, mathematics, or 
literature, should thus be justified to be the representative of a nation's 
conscience. Gradually in France the term of "intellectual" came to mean 
those educated people, for instance, artists, literary writers, who had 
broken with tradition, order, and the wisdom of the ages, and who 
exhibited strong political aspirations by directly seeking to be state rulers 
or indirectly influencing decision-making.9
In the United States, the first usage of "intellectual" in the 1890s was 
interestingly similar: it was a pejorative rather than honorific term. An 
intellectual at that time was regarded as a misfit of the d£class£ : a working 
man who read more than a university graduate, or a gentleman who came 
from an upper class family but rejected his origin, or an educated person 
who failed to complete his study, who lacked discipline, who had intellect 
but not character, and so on. The scorned position of intellectuals did not 
change until the 1930s when social economists seemed to have the 
capability to lift American society out of the Great Depression. 
"Intellectual" became a rather positive word and was given to those social 
scientists, especially economists.10
In Britain, the situation was very different. Here educated persons 
historically conformed rather than criticised the social establishment.
9 Cf., R. Hofsadter, 1963 : 38-39; Kirk, 1960; and W. Martin, 1987: 65.
1° Feuer, 1976: 48-52.
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Swingewood points out that the peculiarities of English society and 
culture, such as profound conservatism, intellectual retardation, and 
hostility to social change, have effectively "created the conditions in 
which intellectuals function through the dominant discourses of the 
political and social structure."11 British graduates not only prided 
themselves on their Oxbridge background which nurtured their minds 
with conservative attitudes towards reality, but also enjoyed special 
privileges. For example, they had the right to elect twelve members of 
Parliament, which continued until the 1950s. Because of the lack of 
critical spirits amongst them, many British graduates, who were nurtured 
on Plato and Aristotle, and who went out to work in the colonial service, 
to rule an empire as philosopher-kings, were scarcely to be regarded as 
"intellectuals", nor did they see themselves as such.12
According to Shils, who insists that every society, including primitive 
ones, contains intellectuals, however, there were intellectuals in Britain in 
the mid-1950s who fundamentally approved their own society. "Never 
has an intellectual class found its society and its culture so much to its 
satisfaction."13 It seems that whether educated people are critical or not 
depends more on their traditional culture and their current conditions 
than on their intellectual levels.
Anderson, a Marxist who has written on intellectuals, argues that "a 
peculiarity of English history has been the tradition of a body of
11 A. Swingewood, 1987 : 87-90.
12 For example, Bertrand Russell declared:" I have never called myself an intellectual, 
and nobody has ever dared to call me one in my presence." Cf., Kirk, 1960; and Feuer, 
1976: 49-50.
13 E. Shils, 1955: 6; 1968: 401; 1972: 3-4.
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intellectuals which was at once homogeneous and cohesive and yet not a 
true intelligentsia."14 This raises two questions: (l).Is there such a thing as 
"a true intelligentsia"? and (2). If there is, what is it?
(2). Intelligentsia
As a term intelligentsia appeared first in the middle of the nineteenth 
century. It denoted "free professions". People remember that it was V.G. 
Belinsky and Peter Boborykin who first introduced the term 
"intelligentsia" into Russian literature in 1846 and 1860, but Aleksander 
Gella finds that the first reference had been made by the Poles Bronislaw 
Trentowski and Karol Libelt in 1844.15 More importantly, social 
scientists have concerned themselves more with the social phenomenon 
itself than the concept of such a phenomenon, for "the coining of a new 
term by itself does not determine the existence of a new social stratum." 
They are more interested in knowing "when, where, and why the 
intelligentsia appeared".16 They are generally in agreement that the 
classical "intelligentsia" appeared in late nineteen-century Russia and 
Poland. It included those educated people without or with little property, 
who received Western ideas, for example, liberalism, nationalism, and 
socialism, but who were isolated not only from the mass, but also, perhaps 
more profoundly, from the political and social regime. Their education 
would not necessarily give them great careers, they were educated but 
distinct from other educated members of the upper classes. And more 
significantly, they sought radical changes to their social and political 
structure, or at least had a critical attitude towards the established social 
system, hoping certain kind of social reform happening. They could be
14 P. Anderson, 1964: 42-43.
15 A. Gella, 1976: 12, 20; and 1987a Cf., M.E. Malia, 1961: 1.
16 Gella, 1987a.
either Belinsky's "enlightened individuals", or Lavrov's "critically 
thinking individuals", or Lenin's "tribunes of the people". The 
intelligentsia could contain both admirers and critics of the West, both 
revolutionaries and reformers, but by no means an educated vested 
interest group or individual defenders of the established order, though 
most of them came from the families of the nobility and the urban 
bourgeoisie.17 It was a special, or probably unique, phenomenon in the 
economically backward societies, like Russia in the nineteenth century, 
where Western ideas had already influenced some educated people who, 
however, were still mled by totalitarian regimes.
This "true intelligentsia", however, had never constituted the majority of 
the educated people in Russian society, nor in others, but because of the 
classical usage of the term, many social scientists nowadays still 
differentiate intelligentsia from intellectuals. They used "intelligentsia" 
to cover those self-conscious educated people who are alienated from, or 
have even revolted against, the established order, and "intellectual" to 
classify educated individual who might be either critically opposed to, or 
conservatively in favour of, the establishment.18
The unresolved question is: if the intelligentsia or the "true intelligentsia" 
were united neither by an economic standard of life and income, nor by 
their education and professional competence, nor even by their 
intellectual accomplishment, but mainly by their common ideological 
bounds, i.e., by their critical attitude towards the given society,19 how
17 Cf., Gella, 1976: 9-27; 1987b; Malia, 1961: 1-18; Nahimy, 1983: 3-18; Seton- 
Watson, 1960; and W. Martin, 1987: 64-66.
18 Cf., Gagnon, 1987: 5.
19 Gella, 1976: 13; Nahimy, 1983: 8, 16.
should we explain such a social group? Should we treat intelligentsia a 
specific kind of intellectuals, instead of a class or a stratum? "No 
recognised system of social analysis, either those known to the 
intelligentsia itself or those elaborated since by modem sociology, makes 
provision for a 'class' held together only by the bond of 'consciousness', 
'critical thought', or moral passion."20
Not all social scientists would adopt such differentiation in the usage of the 
term "intelligentsia" and "intellectual". Robert Michels for one makes no 
separation between the two terms; another example is Lipset, who makes 
a differentiation by taking "intelligentsia" to mean creators and 
distributors of culture, while "intellectuals" were a wider group including 
not only these creators and distributors, but the appliers of culture as well. 
Moreover, Mannheim considers the intelligentsia a "thoroughly organised 
stratum of intellectuals"; while on the contrary, Gouldner defines 
intellectuals as those whose intellectual interests "are primarily critical, 
emancipatory, hermetic and hence often political" but intelligentsia "are 
fundamentally 'technical'."21
It is inevitable that much controversy is generated by the lack of 
agreement about the definitions of the terms "intellectual" and 
"intelligentsia". It would be naive , however, as Coser says, to believe that 
once the terms have been properly defined and clarified, all differences 
will be automatically eliminated.22
20 Malia, 1961:5.
21 R. Michels, 1932:118-126; Lipset, 1981: 333; Mannheim, 1940:11; and Gouldner, 
1979: 48.
22 Coser, 1965: 248.
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II. Sociological Approaches to the Problem of the Intellectual
Intellectual and intelligentsia cannot be merely interpreted as concepts 
through exploring the origins and usages of them. As mentioned above, 
social scientists are more interested in understanding social phenomena than 
playing with words. To understand the phenomena of intellectuals and 
intelligentsia, several theoretical models have been set up, which will be 
summarily analysed here.
(1). K arl Mannheim’s ”Free-floating Intellectuals”
First is that employed by those who maintain that intellectuals are capable of 
distancing themselves from, or transcending, social relations and practical 
lives, and can thus be, at least relatively, free to think, choose, move, and 
locate. Parsons claims that intellectuals put cultural considerations before 
social ones; Shils asserts that intellectuals are those "persons with an unusual 
sensitivity to the sacred, an uncommon reflectiveness about the nature of 
their universe, and the rules which govern their society."23 Yet it is K arl 
M annheim who elaborates why and how intellectuals could be socially 
classless, or at least relatively so. In his various writings Mannheim 
constantly used the words "free-floating intelligentsia"(freischwebende 
Intelligenz),24 an expression borrowed from Albert Weber, to describe 
intellectuals' peculiarity. Mannheim maintains that intellectuals form "a 
social stratum which is to a large degree unattached to any social class." In
23 T. Parsons, 1969: 4; E. Shils, 1969: 25-26.
24 Mannheim, 1982: 269; 1979: 137; 1956: 106.
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other words, they form "a stratum with no roots, or at least few roots, to 
which no position of class or rank can be precisely imputed.”25
Two significant characteristics of Mannheim's intellectuals can be seen in his 
Ideology and Utopia. One is political heterogeneity. Mannheim finds that 
intellectuals are politically heterogeneous to such a degree that they can find 
arguments in favour of any political cause they may happen to serve. Another 
is their homogeneity, for they are all educated people. Mannheim treats 
education as a unifying sociological bond between all groups of intellectuals 
which ties them together in a striking way and gives them the ability or 
power to attune or dynamically synthesize almost all political perspectives of 
various classes.
Mannheim's argumentation and exposition are so inspiring and 
controversial, that sociologists have been debating the problems he raised 
and advanced for sixty years, and Mannheim is therefore regarded as a 
pathbreaker in the sociology of intellectuals. There is, however, a 
contradiction of logic in Mannheim's argumentation, as Brym exposes: the 
combination of heterogeneity and homogeneity. Mannheim emphasizes that 
intellectuals are too heterogeneous in their political views to form a class by 
themselves, but at the same time he stresses their capacity to arrive at a 
relatively homogeneous synthesis of almost all viewpoints of various classes. 
"It clearly cannot be the case that the political attitudes of intellectuals are 
simultaneously heterogeneous and homogeneous.”26
25 Mannheim, 1979: 139; 1953: 127.
26 Brym, 1980: 56.
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In reality it is not possible for us to find Mannheim’s political homogeneity 
amongst intellectuals. In 1929, for instance, when Ideology and Utopia was 
first published, there were many academics who supported the Nazis. Other 
radical intellectuals at Frankfurt's Institut fur Sozialforschung were 
Marxists while some in Berlin's Deutsche Hochschule fiir Politik were 
liberals. It is reasonable to assume that Mannheim’s total synthesis of political 
perspectives by intellectuals is more a task that intellectuals ought to aim to 
fulfil than an accomplishment they have already achieved, more a hope than a 
fact, more an ideal than a reality. Mannheim really wishes that intellectuals, 
especially their’felites", could put themselves in a position to develop a total 
orientation and synthesis. But such a synthesis has not come to pass. On the 
contrary, as Bottomore points out, "the intellectual elites, in most countries 
and at most times, is one of the least homogeneous or cohesive of elites, and 
displays a considerable variety of opinion on cultural and political 
questions."27
As far as the heterogeneity of intellectuals is concerned, Mannheim thinks 
that intellectuals could voluntarily affiliate themselves with one or the other 
of the various antagonistic classes, for in fact intellectuals are to be found in 
the course of history in all camps. From here Mannheim correctly points out 
that intellectuals are politically heterogeneous. The question is: how could we 
draw the conclusion from such heterogeneity that intellectuals are thus 
socially free-floating? According to Mannheim, there are several possible 
reasons: first, intellectuals are "recruited from an increasingly inclusive area
2? T. B. Bottmore, 1966: 75.
22
of social life"; second, they can ’’attach themselves to classes to which they 
originally did not belong"; and third, unlike workers and entrepreneurs, who 
participate directly in the process of production and therefore are 
immediately bound by class affiliations, intellectuals "can adapt themselves to 
any viewpoint" and they alone are "in a position to choose their affiliation."28
At least two questionable points are left here. The first is: the term of class 
basically means less the family backgrounds people originally have than the 
social positions they are economically given. Though the former strongly 
influences the later in many cases, theoretically they can not be simply or 
confusedly mixed up. It does not matter whether a worker comes from an 
impoverished peasant family, or a bankrupt landlord family, or even a noble 
family, he is a worker if and only if he is employed by his employer in a 
capitalist society. Furthermore, neither his family background, nor his own 
experiences can entirely determine his current class position in theory. A 
magnate could have been a pedlar or a handicraftsman. Historically and 
logically each first generation of classes is recruited from others. It would be 
much clearer if we focus our attention on modem advanced society in which 
social mobility is getting more and more frequent. As a result, not only 
intellectuals but also the members of other groups may have their origins 
elsewhere. Thus neither the recruitment of intellectuals from an increasingly 
large area of social life, nor their affiliation to classes they originally did not 
belong to, can make intellectuals be exclusively privileged members of a 
free-floating stratum.
28 Mannheim, 1979: 138, 141.
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The second point is: within the social structure, there are two kinds of 
people, i.e., those who directly participate in the process of production and 
therefore form the basic socio-economic classes, and those who do not. The 
latter consists of not only Mannheim's intellectuals but also others, for 
instance, governmental ministers and bureaucrats, army officers and 
soldiers, policemen and judges. Why do intellectuals alone enjoy the 
privilege to be in a position to choose their affiliation? Mannheim argued 
that education here plays a significant part. Education is emphasized by 
Mannheim to such an extent that intellectuals'
participation in a common educational heritage progressively tends to suppress 
differences of birth, status, profession, and wealth, and to unite the individual 
educated people on the basis of education they received.29
The problem remains, however, since not only Mannheim's intellectuals, but 
politicians, army officers, judges, and many others are often highly educated 
as well. Further, not only those who do not participate in production, but also 
some of those who do participate in it, such as entrepreneurs and engineers, 
are in diverse degrees educated. Why, then, can intellectuals alone raise 
themselves above the attachment of class relations and float freely over 
society?
Mannheim himself recognises such problems, for he always uses "relatively" 
in italics to modify his term of "free-floating intellectuals". Unfortunately, 
we are never told the exact meaning of "relatively". Mannheim, too, finds it 
difficult to discover a concrete social group which correlates with his
29 Mannheim, 1979: 138.
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conception of "free-floating intellectuals", and feels the necessity of 
analysing the relationship between their ideological orientations and patterns 
of social mobility only a few years after publishing hisIdeology and Utopia. 
This can be clearly seen in Mannheim's Essays on the Sociology o f Culture.30
(2). Alvin Gouldnerfs "New Class": Cultural Bourgeoisie
The second approach toward locating social position of intellectuals is that 
shared by those sociologists who treat intellectuals as an independent class, 
although diverging from one another on their exact placing of intellectuals 
within the social structure. Generally there are two variants of this approach. 
One claims that intellectuals, especially the Western-educated radicals in 
economically underdeveloped or developing countries, form a "ruling class". 
The other asserts that in both the West and the East intellectuals are forming 
a "new class".31
The first variant, influenced by elite theorists such as Pareto and Robert 
Michels, declares that in economically underdeveloped or developing 
countries, twentieth-century Russia and China for example, the social 
upheavals that have been defined as revolutions were actually coups , and the 
Western-educated radical intellectuals and their elites became members of 
the ruling class after these so-called "intellectual coups d'etat ",32
This is a more historical than theoretical approach. No matter whether the 
so-called "revolution" in those underdeveloped societies are in fact
30 Mannheim, 1956: 142-149. Cf., Brym, 1980: 57; Remmling, 1975: 73.
31 Cf., Gagnon, 1987: 7.
32 H. Lasswell & D. Lemer, 1965: 80.
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"intellectual coups" or not, it is necessary to remember that first, not all 
leaders of developing countries are intellectuals; and second, in countries 
such as Russia and China, where the leaders of revolution/"coup" are 
considered to be overwhelmingly intellectuals, what really happened is more 
complicated. Just as Kamal Sheel claims, a revolution "cannot be understood 
in terms of the wisdom of intellectuals only."33 To a large degree we could 
say that, it is not the intellectuals who brought revolution/"coup" into being, 
but rather, it is the increasing social conflicts between various classes and 
political forces which resulted in the upheavals, and it is these social 
upheavals which created its own intellectual leaders. As Barrington Moore 
points out, intellectuals who, in spite of urban education and commitment to 
Marxism, were not totally alienated from their own traditional environment, 
"can do little unless they attach themselves to a massive form of discontent."34
This can be shown by taking top leaders of Russia and China as an example. 
Before they became professional revolutionaries, these individuals either did 
not go to university (Stalin and Mao, for instance), or could not complete 
their undergraduate studies (for example, Lenin and Zhou En-lai). Only 
after they joined in the masses of workers, peasants and discontented 
intellectuals in the long-term political and military struggle, did they leam to 
propagandise, mobilise, and organise the masses, and then gradually occupy 
the prominent leadership positions and became generally acknowledged.35
33 K. Sheel, 1989: XIV.
34 B. Moore, 1966: 480.
35 There will be more detailed discussions about China's intellectuals as leaders of the 
Revolution in following chapters. As far as Mao's early intellectual and revolutionary 
career is concerned, it is worthy here to mention L. N. Shaffer's Mao Tse-tung and the
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Lacking such experience, the "real scholars" Plekhanov and Chen Du-xiu, 
the first leaders of the Communist Parties of both Russia and China, had to be 
transient figures in the political arena.
More generally, there are plenty of Western-educated men and women in the 
underdeveloped societies who are not revolutionary, but liberal or even 
conservative. In terms of their educational background, interestingly, those 
persons usually hold higher degrees than the revolutionaries. Should we thus 
strictly modify the statement to read "the intellectuals who hold relatively 
lower education degree in the underdeveloped countries become 
revolutionary, and then after the revolution/coup, form the ruling class, 
while the higher-degree-holders do not"? Supposing that all leaders of all 
underdeveloped countries were intellectuals, and there were no other kind of 
intellectuals at all, that is to say, all leaders were intellectuals, and all 
intellectuals were revolutionary, should we thus say intellectuals in these 
countries formed the ruling class?
The identification of the members of a class is carried out according to their 
common relationship with the means of production rather than their 
educational background or their ideological orientation. It is possible in any 
society at any time in general, and in modem society, developed or 
underdeveloped, at the present time in particular, that the members of the 
ruling class are all or almost all educated people. But we can not thus say that
Hunan Labor Movement, and Li Rui's The Early Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Mao 
Tse-tung.
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educated people or intellectuals, or their "elites", form the ruling class. 
There is no causality here.
The second variant of the approach to intellectuals, which sees them as an 
independent class, is elaborated by Alvin Gouldner in his The Future of 
Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class. Gouldner claims that in both the 
West and the East intellectuals are forming a New Class, which he labels the 
"cultural bourgeoisie", because they have the same relationship with the 
means of production, and share a common cultural background.36
Let us examine the common cultural background first. The common cultural 
background is, according to Gouldner, the culture of critical discourse 
(CCD). The CCD is "a historically evolved set of rules, a grammar of 
discourse which (1) is concerned to justify its assertions, but (2) whose mode 
of justification does not proceed by invoking authorities, and (3) prefers to 
elicit the voluntary consent of those addressed solely on the basis of 
arguments adduced." In a word, CCD "is centred on a specific speech act: 
justification."37 The CCD as the deep structure of the common ideology of 
discourse, Gouldner claims, is shared by both humanistic intellectuals and 
technical intelligentsia through education, or to be precise, through public 
school. This kind of education in public school proceeds at a distance from 
close parental supervision, and through the medium of a special group— 
"teachers", who train their students to believe that the value of their discourse 
does not depend upon their differing class origins. "All public schools
36 A. Gouldner, 1979. Also A. Gouldner, 1985.
37 Gouldner, 1979: 28.
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therefore are schools for a linguistic conversion, moving their charges away 
from the ordinary languages of their everyday life and moving them towards 
the CCD."3*
Secondly, let us explore intellectuals' common relationship with the means of 
production. Gouldner asserts that this common relationship is determined by 
the fact that, intellectuals as a whole, integrated by sharing the CCD, control 
the production and distribution of "cultural capital". Unlike money capital, 
cultural capital is not material but symbolic; but like money capital, can be 
used to command income, status, and power. According to Gouldner, 
classical capital, or the 'capital' defined by classical political economists, is 
actually merely one kind of capital. More abstractly speaking, capital should 
be
any produced object used to make saleable utilities, thus providing its processor 
with incomes, or claims to incomes defined as legitimate because of their 
imputed contribution to economic productivity; these claims to income are 
enforced normally by withholding, or threatening to withhold, the capital 
object.39
Because of this, Gouldner insists that anything can be defined as capital when 
it serves as the basis of enforceable claims to the private appropriation of 
incomes which are legitimated by their contribution to the production of 
economic valuables and wealth. From this Gouldner concludes that education 
is capital
38 Gouldner, 1979: 44. Cf., Gouldner, 1985: 30-33, 37-38.
39 Gouldner, 1979: 21.
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"simply because it provides incomes, because these incomes are enforceable, 
and because they are legitimated intrinsically, depending on the continued 
availability or withholding of their services and activities."40
Now, humanistic intellectuals and technical intelligentsia form one class. It is 
a class which, like other classes, uses its special culture, language, and 
technique to advance its own interests and power, and to control its own work 
situation. But it is also a specific class, a "cultural bourgeoisie", which 
privately appropriates the advantages of a historically and collectively 
produced cultural capital.
It seems to me that the importance of education in the process of teachers' 
imbuing students with the CCD and thus forming a New Class, is over­
exaggerated by Gouldner. In order for this to take place, if it indeed takes 
place, first, there should be a prior autonomous, or at least semi-autonomous, 
group of teachers who take the standpoint of the collectivity as a whole and 
speak in the name of the nation or even the universe without any obligation to 
preserve specific class privileges in the new public education system. 
Second, if this was so, when children went to school, their and their parents' 
ideologies would begin to grow more divergent, and their parents would no 
longer be able to reproduce the values of their own class in their own 
children. And third, following Gouldner's logic, as soon as these children 
received the CCD "in one word, one meaning," it would be efficacious "for 
every one and forever."
40 Gouldner, 1979: 23.
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Yet, all these three factors have not existed, and we cannot find such an 
education in reality. It has not happened that both teachers and students have 
been able to isolate themselves from the society and then transcend it. 
Moreover, and not surprisingly, teachers and students from the same school 
could simultaneously divide ideologically or politically into diverse sub­
groups. Gouldner's emphasis on education in forming a cultural bourgeoisie 
can hardly approved.
The more heated argument is centred on Gouldner's conceptions of capital 
and cultural capital. Firstly, as we have showed, the key to his capital is that it 
is the source of income. Gouldner asserted that "any produced objects used 
with the intention of augmenting utilities or wealth whether hardware or 
skills may be capital."41 In this sense both money and education can be used 
as capital. But unlike money capital or economic capital, Gouldner's cultural 
capital, as Martin and Szelenyi point out, cannot be detached from the 
individual who owns it. Does this mean that the owner of cultural capital 
must thus put his capital into action himself each time when it is used in the 
process of production? If so, how can his cultural capital be used as the 
"means of production" by others?42
Secondly and more problematically, cultural capital, unlike economic 
capital, is inconvertible: it is unlike economic capital which can be converted 
into money or its equivalent and therefore used in the process of 
accumulation which makes such valuation and convertibility of capital goods
41 Gouldner, 1979:23.
42 B. Martin & I. Szelenyi, 1987: 34-36.
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possible. A holder of economic capital could, of course, convert his capital 
by using money primarily invested in a shoe factory to a cap factory, for 
instance, whereas a holder of an engineering degree could hardly use his 
cultural capital in the field of political sociology of intellectuals. Should we 
still treat this degree as capital?
Thirdly, as Gouldner himself said, all classes possess cultural capital in some 
degree. Then the problem is: how does the New Class differ from others? 
Gouldner thought that the New Class could be differentiated in two ways: 
quantitatively, it possesses a relatively greater stock of cultural capital, and a 
relatively larger part of its income derives from it; qualitatively, its culture is 
a special one, that is, the CCD.
There are some problems here. The first is Gouldner's "quantitatively 
greater stock of cultural capital". It seems that Gouldner forgot that 
quantitatively we can only stratify people into different strata rather than 
differentiate them into various classes. The difference between a capitalist 
and a worker is that the former possesses economic capital but the latter does 
not. Thus quantitatively we cannot differentiate a class from others. The 
second problem is, we do not know how much cultural capital can be 
calculated as "relatively greater stock". Should we say that a man who 
receives higher education possesses a relatively greater stock of cultural 
capital? If so, how should we treat those great intellectuals, for instance, 
some literary writers, who either never went to university or did not finish 
their studies at college? The final problem is, qualitatively, Gouldner did not 
show enough evidence that only the members of his New Class, i.e., 
humanistic intellectuals and technical intelligentsia, possess CCD. As we have
32
argued, while some members of other classes may also have critical 
discourse, some members of humanistic intellectuals and technical 
intelligentsia may not necessarily possess it.
Gouldner really realises that things like science, knowledge, technology, etc., 
are becoming central to production in contemporary societies. However, we 
cannot conclude because of this that humanistic intellectuals and technical 
intelligentsia who specialise in the creation and sustaining of such things will 
thereby eventually become dominant. Gouldner's theory does not elaborate 
why and how intellectuals could appropriate and dominate the rest of society 
by using their "cultural capital".
As far as intellectuals in the so-called "Communist" societies are concerned, 
we must recognise that here the social system causes a fundamental 
difference. There will be further discussions on this later in this chapter and 
in the following chapters when taking China's established intellectuals as an 
example, but here a few words from A. Giddens are necessary and 
pertinent:
Rather than being based primarily upon control of the means of production, the 
Party in such societies seem to derive their preeminent position much more from 
bureaucratic power. ... Yet power which derives from participation in a 
governmental apparatus is clearly not market power and the notion of 'fcultural 
capital" seems largely irrelevant to it. 43
43 A. Giddens, 1987: 272-273.
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(3). Antonio Gramsci's Organic and Traditional Intellectuals
The third kind of approach towards identifying the social position of 
intellectuals' social locations and their political ideas is originally found in 
The Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. He deals with the problem 
idiosyncratically while the questions he asks at the beginning of the essay on 
intellectuals are more or less the same. That is: "Are intellectuals an 
autonomous and independent social class, or does every social class have its 
own particular specialised category of intellectuals?"44
Gramsci notes that there is a widespread error among social scientists. They 
define intellectuals by emphasising the intrinsic nature of intellectual 
activities rather than the ensemble of the system of relations. But, Gramsci 
argues, it is in the ensemble of social system intellectual activities, and 
therefore the intellectual groups who personify them, have their place. As a 
matter of fact, in any physical work, even the most degraded and mechanical, 
there exists a minimum of creative intellectual activity. In this sense, we 
could thereby declare:"all men are intellectuals." However, as Gramsci 
points out, not all men have the function of intellectuals in society. The 
function of intellectuals, according to Gramsci, should not be limited simply 
to the field of culture, and thus the term "intellectuals" should not be 
understood to apply to those strata commonly described by this term, but 
more generally, to the entire social stratum which exercises an organisational 
function in the widest sense-not only in the field of culture, but also in the 
fields of political administration and production.
44 A. Gramsci, 1971: 5.
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The question is not who and how many kinds of professional people should be 
listed under the name of intellectuals. But rather, according to Gramsci, the 
questions should be: what is their organisational function? And accordingly, 
what is the relationship between these intellectuals and social classes? "Do 
they have a 'paternalistic' attitude towards the instrumental classes? Or do 
they think they are an organic expression of them? Do they have a 'servile' 
attitude towards the ruling classes, or do they think that they themselves are 
leaders, an integral part of the ruling classes?"45
Gramsci recognises that the reality of intellectuals in the real historical 
process is complex: there are different categories of intellectuals. Or strictly 
speaking, every class,
coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world 
of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more 
strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own 
function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields.46
Gramsci names such a kind of intellectuals "organic intellectuals". In other 
words, organic intellectuals are directly related to the economic and political 
structure and therefore closely tied themselves to the class they represent. 
Obviously, they are by no means an autonomous classless stratum.
There is another category of intellectuals, however. Gramsci calls them 
"traditional intellectuals". This category consists further of two elements: (1) 
the creative artists and scholars, men of letters, who are traditionally
45 Gramsci, 1971: 97.
46 Gramsci, 1971: 5.
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regarded as "true intellectuals"; and (2) the vestiges of the former organic 
intellectuals, who used to belong to a previous social formation. They are 
together called "traditional intellectuals" because they experience through an 
esprit de corps, an uninterrupted historical continuity and a special 
qualification. These traditional intellectuals presume that they themselves are 
autonomous and independent of the dominant social class.
Here exists a ’novel' relationship which has not been discussed before: the 
relationship between "organic intellectuals" and "traditional intellectuals". It 
in fact results from the relationship between the dominant class and 
traditional intellectuals. The dominant class does not willingly let these 
traditional intellectuals run their own course. Any class that is developing 
towards dominance tries to assimilate and "ideologically" conquer the 
traditional intellectuals. Furthermore, the quicker and more efficacious this 
assimilation and conquest, the more the class in question succeeds in 
simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals.
According to Gramsci, on the one hand, traditional intellectuals, or at least 
some of them, used to be members, as organic intellectuals, of the former 
ruling class. On the other hand, organic intellectuals, or at least some of 
them, are assimilated from traditional ones. From this, Gramsci really opens 
up a new path towards the sociological understanding of intellectuals by 
examining their patterns of historically shifting positions.
This process cannot be thoroughly understood without studying political 
parties. It is the political party which, Gramsci points out, elaborates its own 
component parts and turns them into qualified political intellectuals, and it is
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the political party as well which welds together the organic and the 
traditional intellectuals. As far as the process of the transition to socialism is 
concerned, the political party is the most important and crucial factor. Its 
members as ’’collective intellectuals" are leaders and organisers of all the 
activities and functions inherent in the organic development of an integral 
society, both civil and political.
Like Mannheim and Gouldner, Gramsci also discusses education and the 
school. But for him, school is not a fictitious land apart from society. For 
instance, he claims that the traditional school is oligarchic, because it is 
intended to train the new generation of the ruling class, destined to rule in its 
turn. However, there is another kind of school—the vocational establishment, 
in which the labourer could become a skilled worker, the peasant a surveyor. 
"It gives the impression of being democratic in tendency". But in fact, 
Gramsci argues, it is just an illusion, because democracy cannot mean merely 
that an unskilled worker can become skilled, and because the vocational 
school restricts recruitment to the technically qualified governing stratum. 
The key to such schools is not their curicula, nor their teachers, but the entire 
social complex.47
It is impossible to agree with Gramsci completely. For example, his 
denotation of intellectuals seems too wide, and maybe the classification of 
intellectuals into two kinds is still too simple. R. Simon even thinks that the 
'traditional intellectuals' as a term is unnecessary 48
47 Gramsci, 1971: 36-41.
48 R. Simon, 1985: 97-98.
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Nevertheless, Gramsci's theory of intellectuals is regarded as one of his 
most significant contributions to modem sociology and he is considered to 
have been the first to recognise and analyse the complexity and 
malleability of intellectuals' social-structural ties and the way that these 
ties influence their ideological outlooks.49
III. Intellectuals in "Communist" Societies
Gramsci did not have the opportunity to conduct empirical research into 
the complex relation between intellectuals and social structure, nor could 
he see the socialist societies in which, he thought, that a new kind of 
intellectuals would play a great part, and a new relationship between 
intellectuals and the masses of the people would replace the old one. 
According to Gramsci, the mode of being of the new intellectual can no 
longer consist in eloquence, "but in active participation in practical life, as 
constmctor, organiser, 'permanent persuader', and not just a simple 
orator". He supposed that in a socialist society, all members of the 
Communist party would be organic intellectuals {i.e., organisers and 
leaders of the people) functionally. They would not only win the 
traditional intellectuals over, but also feel the elementary passions of the 
masses of the people, understand them, and therefore, explain and justify 
them in the particular situation, and connect them to "knowledge".50
Gramsci's work, including his notes on intellectuals, as he himself said, is 
based on the following fundamental principles:
49 Cf., A. Swingewood, 1984: 211; Brym, 1987: 204-205.
50 Gramsci, 1971: 10, 16,418.
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"1. that no social formation disappears as long as the productive forces 
which have developed within it still find room for further forward 
movement; 2. that a society does not set itself tasks for whose solution the 
necessary conditions have not already been incubated, etc."51
(1). Soviet-type "Communist" Societies
The historical praxis, ironically, is that nearly all the "Communist" 
societies, from Soviet Union to China, did not develop from industrial 
capitalism, but rather, they came from so-called "Asiatic society"(for 
instance, China) or "Semi-Asiatic society"(Russia, for example).52 These 
societies are called "Communist societies" not because they have already 
reached the Communist stage, but because the founders of these societies 
were considered to be Communists rather than "Social Democrats". In 
this thesis, I continue to call them "Communist", or "Soviet-type 
Communist", to describe those societies established following the model 
of the Soviet Union, although the authorities of these societies usually 
claimed that their societies were "Socialist".
Before the Communist revolution, in these societies, the centralising 
power of government had played a commanding role, which had 
interfered in both social and economic life since ancient time. State 
officials, bureaucrats, military officers, and mandarins, constituted a vast 
privileged hierarchical ruling and exploiting group. Of course, there are 
many traditional and cultural differences between these societies. For 
instance, unlike Russia, China had for a long time been a society without 
native religion while Confucianism became orthodox ideology. Even 
geographically and economically, we can easily point out some
51 Gramsci, 1971: 106.
52 Cf., Umberto Melotti: 1982, esp., chapters 14, 17.
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differences, for example, the variety of population, although both Russia 
and China were huge countries whose production was mainly agriculture. 
Whatever the differences, before their revolutions, these societies were 
economically undeveloped, and accordingly, both the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat were qualitatively weaker and quantitatively fewer than those 
in the West.
The revolution in these societies resulted more from the conflict between 
the people in general and their rulers, and the conflict with Western 
imperialist countries. However unavoidable and justified, it was not the 
revolution based on the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat, and the conflict between the high-speed developing forces of 
production and the existing relations of production, though there were 
short-lasting period of bourgeois government in both Russia and China.
The revolution in these societies went through a very similar process. 
Generally speaking, (1) some radical members of intelligentsia believed 
in Marxism, (2) they formed a Leninist party, (3) which established its 
own army recruited from workers and peasants, and (4) finally took 
power after severe military battles with both alien and home forces.
After the revolution, even before basic means of production were 
nationalised or collectivised, a one-party state was established in the name 
of the "dictatorship of the proletariat". Three characteristics could be 
generally summarised as: (1) state or collective ownership under which 
not only the means of production, but also labourers themselves become 
parts of the state or collective; (2) the dictatorship of the Communist party 
which controls not only state organs, but also social and individual lives; 
and (3) official ideology (Stalinism, or Mao Ze-dong Thought, for
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instance) becomes the one and the only one ideology which can be 
exclusively elaborated and developed by the authorities, but can never be 
criticised or argued against by others.53
One of the main questions we may ask from Gramsci's theory and the 
praxis in these "Communist" societies is, as Swingewood points out, how a 
"Soviet-type Communist" society, based on state-ownership, centralised 
power, and collectivist ideology, can retain an independent civil society 
and thus autonomous intellectuals.54 As a matter of fact, the relationships 
between organic and traditional intellectuals, between the intellectual and 
the Communist party, between intellectuals and the masses of the people, 
which Gramsci thought would be totally new in a socialist society, become 
real "new" problems.
After the revolution, both organic and traditional intellectuals should no 
longer be considered to belong to the "free professionals". The majority 
of the former traditional intellectuals, especially those scientists and 
technicians, were recruited by the state as salary-earning scientific 
workers, while politically and ideologically, according to the Communist 
party, they had been serving the old regime, and were still holding 
conservative and reactionary views to varied extents. As to the minority 
of the traditional intellectuals, for instance, some famous scientists, 
artists, and writers, although their "bourgeois background" was by no 
means less obvious and important, they were given the privileged 
positions and living conditions for the sake of pragmatic purpose of 
"construction".55
53 Cf., M. Djilas, 1957: 164-172.
54 A. Swingewood, 1984: 214-215.
55 Cf., Nicholas Lampert, 1979.
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At the same time, though the term "intelligentsia" remained in official 
vocabulary, and some of the former revolutionary intelligentsia remained 
to be critical towards the status quo, the classical intelligentsia as a social 
group disappeared, and its function, i.e., the function of being critics of 
the current time and independent spiritual leaders of the nation, was gone. 
This was simply because most members of the former revolutionary 
intelligentsia now became officials, or "cadres", of the ruling party and 
the state. In name and in reality, the Communist party insisted that the 
classical intelligentsia should be replaced by the party's "new intellectual 
working men", who could be still critical, but, according to the party, 
only towards the past and the West.56
And more significantly, beyond Gramsci's expectation, not all the 
Communist party members are the organisers or leaders of the masses, 
nor should all of them be considered as intellectuals. But instead, they 
were the core elements of officialdom, more or less bureaucratised and 
privileged, and even in conflict with the people in many cases. In both the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, many of them were 
actually anti-intellectualist.
(2). Djilas and 11 New Class"
Nearly all these "Communist" societies thus faced a new serious problem: 
the bureaucratisation of the former revolutionaries. Interestingly, like 
Gouldner, Milo van Djilas also tried to develop the concept of a "new 
class". According to Djilas, this "new class" was different from earlier 
ones because it did not come to power to complete a new economic order
56 Cf., Gella, 1987a.
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but to establish its own, because it was formed only after it attained 
power, and because it could only be created in an organisation of a special 
type, the Bolshevik type. It is a special class which is "made up of those 
who have special privileges and economic preference because of the 
administrative monopoly they hold."57
But unlike Gouldner, Djilas claimed that it was not a cultural bourgeoisie, 
but a political bureaucracy. In other words, instead of intellectuals, it was 
political bureaucratic officials who formed the "new class" in these 
Communist societies. Djilas asserted that the social origin of his "new 
class" lies in the proletariat which, in economically underdeveloped 
countries, being backward, constitutes the raw material from which the 
new class arises. However, when the new class establishes its power and 
authority, it is interested in the proletariat only to the extent necessary for 
developing production, and "the monopoly which the new class establishes 
in the name of the working class over the whole of society is, primarily, a 
monopoly over the working class itself".58
Djilas considered it a class because in this "Soviet-type Communist" 
system the political bureaucracy uses, enjoys, and disposes of nationalised 
property. In the name of the nation and society, it distributes the national 
income, sets wages, directs economic development.59 It is called the "new 
class" not only because it is newly bom after the revolution, but also 
because it is a new type of class. In the name of the ownership of all of the 
people, the political bureaucracy actually enjoys the ownership privilege, 
which grants itself both an exclusive right to use and dispose of
57 Djilas, 1957: 37-41.
58 Ibid., pp.41-43.
59 Ibid., pp. 44-47.
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nationalised property, and an absolute power to dictate state organs, 
control social life, and oppress human mind.
According to Djilas, the core and the basis of the new class is created in 
the party and at its top, as well as in the state organs. Djilas further 
claimed that in these "Communist" societies the party in fact replaced the 
state functionally. In other words, in such a society, the government is a 
party government, the army is a party army, and the state is a party 
state.60 Djilas asserted that under such a party state, every action depends 
on the party, which makes independent thinking impossible.
Djilas' analysis of political bureaucracy in "Soviet-type Communist" 
societies is mainly based on his own experience in, and observation of, 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Though he did pay attention to 
ownership, he did not carefully examine the differences between control, 
use, and ownership, and he emphasised aspects of the central control and 
power of the party rather than ownership. The problem remains 
unresolved when he said that to be an owner of the nationalised property 
in a "Communist" system "means that one enters the ranks of the ruling 
political bureaucracy and nothing else". Also he did not explain why "not 
every member of the party is a member of the new class", and why "only a 
special stratum of bureaucrats, those who are not administrative officials, 
make up the core of new class. Other officials are only the apparatus 
under the control of the new class".61 How can a person be an owner of 
the nationalised property when he/she joins the rank of the political 
bureaucracy? Why are certain party members of the new class while
60 Djilas, 1957: 39-41, 70-72.
61 Ibid., pp. 40, 43, 61.
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others are not? why do political bureaucrats belong to the new class while 
administrative bureaucrats do not?
Michael Lustig correctly points out that Djilas* analysis would have made 
a lot more sense if he had claimed merely that the bureaucracy in the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has unrestrained control over the economic 
life. "He could not stop at this point, however, because of his ideologically 
imposed task of demonstrating that the new elite was a new class."62 In 
spite of this, however, Djilas is one of the first generation who critically 
analysed the problem of bureaucracy in "Communist" societies and many 
of his criticisims turn out to be valid.
For instance, Djilas found that great scientific discovery in this kind of 
"Communist" society is difficult, and the main reasons for this are not 
technical, but social. If there is any scientific achievement, it would be 
declared as a result of the correct leadership of the party, and of the 
changed view of the world in the mind of the discoverer under such a 
leadership. Thus scientists must make discoveries "confirming" the 
formulas of official ideology. What can the unfortunate biologists do if 
plants do not behave according to the Lysenko-Stalinist biological theory? 
They have to be
"in a constant dilemma as to whether their ideas and discoveries will injure 
official dogma. They are therefore forced into opportunism and 
compromises with regard to science."63
Comparatively, there is lesser control over the fields of natural sciences 
and technology than over the fields of humanities and social sciences, for
62 m .M. Lustig, 1989: 128.
63 Djilas, 1957: 129-130
4 5
it is clear to the leaders of the ruling party that industrialisation cannot be 
accomplished without the scientists and technicians. As far as literature 
and art are concerned, the situation is much worse. And "of all the 
sciences and all thought, social sciences and the consideration of social 
problems fare the worst; they scarcely manage to exist."64 And if there is 
social science, it must be expressed through very indirect ways, usually 
by the way of literature and certain forms of art.
More significantly, in a "Communist" society, all newspapers and other 
media are official in the final analysis, and journalists, ideologists, paid 
writers, are all enlisted and engaged in "uplifting of socialism". As a 
result, people's thinking has two faces: one is for themselves, for their 
own private purpose; the other is for the public, for official purpose.65
The reality of these "Soviet-type Communist" societies is, of course, more 
complicated than any theoretical generalisation. As we have said, Djilas' 
analysis is mainly based on his own experience. Nowadays, it is easy to tell 
the differences between different "Communist" societies in different 
periods. For instance, the post-Stalin Era is different from Stalinist Era, 
and China is different from the USSR. Moreover, intellectuals in 
"Communist" societies, either Soviet-type or Chinese-type, are not just 
passively and totally controlled by the party, but instead, they are still 
playing different intellectual roles in various fields to varied degrees.66
64 Djilas, 1957: 134-136.
65 Ibid., p. 133.
66 Intellectuals' various roles in the Soviet Union have been studied by scholars like 
L.G. Churchward (1973). And I shall discuss the roles of China's different 
intellectuals in this thesis.
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(3). Do Intellectuals and Bureaucrats Combine into One?
Noticeably, many critics of ’’Communist" societies are from these 
societies. These include former leaders Trotsky, Djilas, scientists 
Sarkharov, Fang Li-zhi, and literary writers Solzhenitsyn, Liu Bin-yan. 
Amongst their numerous criticisms, the book The Intellectuals on the 
Road to Class Power , written by the Hungarian sociologists G. Konrad 
and I. Szelenyi, is directly relevant to our interest.
Konrad and Szelenyi claimed that in "Soviet-type Communist" societies, 
or in their own term, in "Eastern European state socialist" societies, since 
the 1960s, "the difference between intellectuals and bureaucrats were 
gradually disappearing", and, as a result, a new dominant class "has been 
composed of the intelligentsia as a whole rather than just the bureaucracy 
narrowly defined."67
Konrad's and Szelenyi's approach to intellectuals is interesting, though 
they did not differentiate intellectual from intelligentsia very clearly. 
Firstly, it was not automatically acceptable that an intellectual could be 
anyone who had a defined store of knowledge and engaged in one of a 
number of defined occupations, for it is always difficult to know how 
much knowledge is necessary for someone to be an intellectual, and what 
sort of occupations are considered to be intellectual jobs. According to 
them, "intellectuals" should be understood both generically and 
genetically, both functionally and structurally. That is to say, a man was 
treated as an intellectual in his time not because he had some general 
knowledge, but because he had certain specific knowledge, which was
67 G. Konrad and I Szelenyi, 1979: XIV-XV, 3.
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widely recognised necessary for an intellectual at that time, and by which 
he obtains his status.68
Secondly, like Gramsci, they claimed that everybody has certain 
knowledge, but not everyone should be thus considered an intellectual. A 
king probably needs to know a great deal to occupy his throne, a capitalist 
may need advanced economic, legal, and technical knowledge to run his 
enterprise, yet they are not intellectuals. "It is not merely knowledge 
which makes someone an intellectual, but the fact that he has no other title 
to his status except for his knowledge."69 Therefore a man should not be 
an intellectual if he obtains his status because of his money capital 
however much knowledge he has.
Obviously it is true that different societies define intellectual knowledge 
in different ways. The question is:why was the intellectual knowledge so 
different and important that it made those who possess it a dominant class 
under "Eastern European state socialism" in the 1960s? The authors of 
The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power thought that the most 
important reason is the changing society itself. They agreed that in market 
economies intellectuals did not form an independent class, but a stratum 
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. However, when capitalism 
developed into state-monoply capitalism, intellectuals started being 
polarised, and even before the "Soviet-type Communist" state was 
established, intellectuals began to seek power.70 But all of these did not 
make intellectuals form a class. The social basis of the emergence of a new
68 Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979: 24-25, 29-32.
69 ibid., pp.28-29.
?0 Ibid., pp. 63-85.
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intellectual class in Eastern European socialist societies is: "rational 
redistribution".
In such a redistributive system, it is the rationality of the redistributors' 
activity which legitimates their authority. Konrad and Szelenyi claimed 
that, unlike bureaucracy in market economy, "there is no longer any 
distinction between the political and economic spheres (or any division of 
power spheres at all), no dualism of policy making and execution, no 
pluralism ends" under rational redistribution. Under this condition "there 
appears the circulation of the bureaucratic elite, an important indication 
that the intelligentsia is being formed into a class."71
Here again, like Mannheim and Gouldner, they thought that education 
diplomas make intellectuals homogeneous and their intellectual 
knowledge easily convertible, which is thus "almost as neutral as capital 
itself."72 When we examined Mannheim's and Gouldner's theories, we 
already pointed out that, unlike money capital, education degrees or so- 
called "cultural capital" cannot be converted in the market, and unlike 
property, education does not make those who received it socio­
economically homogeneous to such a extent that they form a specific class. 
As a matter of fact, Szelenyi realised this problem when analysing 
Gouldner’s "cultural capital", and clearly claimed that education degree is 
inconvertible more than ten years later.73 Logically, we may ask: if 
education had indeed played such a important part in forming an 
intellectual class, why would this class not have emerged before the 
"Communist" period?
71 Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979: 147-150.
72 ibid., pp. 150-151.
73 Martin and Szelenyi, 1987.
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Another problem is that Konrad and Szelenyi, like Djilas again, did not 
explain why all the members of the intelligentsia should be seen as 
members of the intellectual class when "the functions of central 
redistribution in the strict sense are carried out not by the intelligentsia as 
a whole but by a narrower segment of it—the state and party 
bureaucracy", and this party bureaucracy could even carry out "the vast, 
bloody purges" of intellectuals. Are these purges necessary in order to 
"make the intellectuals understand that early socialism did not mean their 
direct class rule"?74
Also like Djilas, they found that in these "Soviet-type Communist" 
societies, the ruling Communist party is not just one factor, for example, 
the most important factor, in the political mechanism, but rather, it is the 
political mechanism. Furthermore, they correctly pointed out that, 
though there are conflicts between individual bureaucrats, collectively 
they share a common interest, and the apex of the bureaucracy represents 
this collective interest.75 This is very clear when it is pointed out that a 
"Communist" state is a one-party state in which the ruling party enjoys 
totalitarian authority, and all important political and economic decisions 
are made on the upper level of the party bureaucracy.
In contrast, it is not clear at all to say that thus the party members and 
cadres, that is, the party bureaucrats, consist of intellectuals who, 
accordingly, form the class basis of the party, and those upper-level
74 K o n r a d  and Szelenyi, 1979: 147, 185-186.
7 5  ib id . ,  pp. 152-163.
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positions must be occupied by intellectual-officials.76 Even following 
Konrad's and Szelenyi's own definition, namely, a man is an intellectual 
only if "he has no other title to his status except for his intellectual 
knowledge", we cannot reach such a conclusion, because in those "Soviet- 
type Communist" societies, including the Eastern European countries in 
the 1960s, it is not merely intellectual knowledge which makes party 
officials be elite bureaucrats on the upper level. Revolutionary 
experiences before the party took power, political achievements before 
and after that, official positions in the power structure, and even personal 
relations to the top leadership, are all considerably significant factors.
In spite of some rash generalisations and conclusions, Konrad and 
Szelenyi did find many specific political-intellectual phenomena in those 
"Soviet-type Communist" societies. For instance, they found that most 
intellectuals in fact never join the party, and of those who do turn up in the 
party many remain to be critical. They also pointed out that, under such a 
"Communist" system, intellectuals with party membership are privileged 
and receive advantages, while non-party intellectuals are underprivileged. 
And therefore, those "intellectuals join the party not in order to advance 
with it, but in order to acquire (or keep) the status which their 
professional achievements entitle them to and which in any non-political 
competition they would attain in any case."77
76 it is even more misleading to say that the Communist party should be considered a 
mass party of the intellectual class and at the same time a cadre party of the working 
class. Is this because intellectuals make up a higher percentage of the party membership 
than workers while the proportion of officials who were once workers or whose 
parents were workers is much higher? Cf., Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979: 147, 179-180.
77 Ibid., pp. 180, 190.
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More significantly, they systematically demonstrated the differences 
between the Stalinist and post-Stalinist eras, and showed us that, after 
Stalin's death, the leadership of the party had to realise if it wished to 
stabilise its power it must reach a compromise with the intellectuals.78
IV.Intellectuals and Social Class: Theory and Method
It seems to me that all the above theoretical approaches to the problem of 
intellectuals and intelligentsia, except Gramsci's perhaps, share one thing 
in common: simplistic generalisation. Intellectuals/intelligentsia were 
either considered "free-floating stratum", "cultural bourgeoisie", or "new 
ruling bureaucrats". Whatever differences, various kinds of intellectuals 
were put into one certain specific social place.
My own approach towards intellectuals will be different. To focus more 
on their social positions within a complex of economically and historically 
given social relations in a certain period of each society than on any other 
factors, I would argue that intellectuals should not be treated as members 
of a specific social class or stratum, but instead, they are varied in both 
socio-economic positions and political/ideological orientations.
The general definition of intellectuals can be briefly stated as: all men 
and women who are occupationally and functionally producers of the 
ideas concerning nature, society, human beings, and cosmos, by virtue of 
any types of symbols in every given society. Accordingly, any person 
could be regarded to be an intellectual if she or he is a member of such a
78 Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979: 186-187, 192-200.
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category, regardless of whether she/he has received higher education or 
obtained a degree, and irrespective of her/his family background. 
Intellectuals can be either conservative, or liberal, or radical, or critical; 
whatever ideological orientation one prefers, it is not entirely a matter of 
free choice, but rather, it is conditioned by the position in the given social 
structure. In addition, of course, political orientation is more or less 
influenced by relations from one's past, such as social origin, educational 
background and work experience. What is more, social relations, to 
which intellectuals as well as others actually connect, are always changing. 
And, as a result, the various ideological or political outlooks of different 
intellectuals are not always immutable and invariable.
Intelligentsia, in contrast, may still be defined in the classical sense. It 
is a specific kind of intellectuals, whose members are always critical 
towards the status quo, feeling a responsibility to change, or at least 
politically influence, the minds of the leaders and citizens of their society 
and hence their society itself. Such an intelligentsia does not necessarily 
exist in every society in every period. And if it does, it is just a minority 
of intellectuals. How and why its members are critical results greatly 
from their particular social and cultural surroundings and their specific 
intellectual and political experiences. However critical, they are not 
innately so.79
79 To avoid confusion of this intelligentsia with others, especially with widely-called 
"technical intelligentsia" (which covers those scientific or technical experts who apply 
knowledge into practice), I will in this thesis call it either classical intelligentsia, or 
critical intelligentsia, or simply intelligentsia.
53
Intellectuals in different societies during different historical periods can 
be different to such an extent that we cannot sociologically treat them as 
the same by only using a general definition or description. On the other 
hand, however great the differences amongst various intellectuals, they 
are all conditioned or bound by their social relations. Intellectuals are not 
privileged free-floating members of a special social stratum,nor do they 
form a specific independent class.
Based on this hypothesis, this research examines the participation of 
China's established intellectuals in the continual political campaigns from 
1949 to 1976. "Established intellectuals" mean those intellectuals who are 
well-known because of both their professional achievements in natural 
and social sciences, literature and art, philosophy,etc., and their social 
involvement in politics. These established intellectuals can be either 
Gramsci's "organic intellectuals" of the establishment or "traditional 
intellectuals", either members of intelligentsia or individual intellectuals 
from other social groups. By "political campaigns", I mean those the CCP 
and Mao launched to criticise intellectuals or their works from 1949 to 
1976, no matter whether they were called "political campaigns" by the 
CCP at that time. I shall not pay much attention to those so-called 
"political campaigns", for example, Aid-Korean Campaign (1950), which 
have little to do with intellectuals. The period of 1949-1976 is the time 
from Mao’s taking power over China to his death.
Based on this examination of the participation of China's established 
intellectuals in political campaigns, the relations between their political 
roles and their social positions, and between the Chinese Communist Party 
and various kinds of established intellectuals, will be analysed. The major 
hypothesis of this thesis is: the more posts intellectuals hold in the socio­
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political structure, the less choices (or "freedoms") they enjoy in political 
campaigns.
This work will be a piece of sociological research and thus should not be 
read as a historical record of the People’s Republic under Mao Ze-dong. 
However, this will be the first systematic sociological research on China's 
established intellectuals in political campaigns both in the West and in 
China, which at the same time includes a careful historical survey and 
detailed documentary analysis of the whole process of those political 
campaigns. But unless it is impossible to ignore them, factors beyond the 
written words, for instance, economic development, and international 
relations, will not be detailed.
The methods I shall use will be mainly documentary analysis. The 
documents and materials I shall use are mainly selected from the articles 
concerning socio-political affairs written by these established intellectuals 
themselves during the period of 1949-1976. Of course, their professional 
works before 1949, and those recollections, memoirs, biographies, and 
autobiographies by either these established intellectuals themselves or 
their friends, students, and relatives after 1976, will not be ignored. I 
shall also refer to official papers and other sources, including the 
academic research outside China.
People may reasonably question the reliability of these articles published 
in the official press within the periods of political campaigns. My answer 
is that, firstly, and most importantly, my interest is not what intellectuals 
really felt when they wrote these articles, but the fact that they did write 
them. From here we will get a picture of how intellectuals under the 
"Communist" system behave, willingly or unwillingly.
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Secondly, I choose these articles as the first hand materials because the 
official media were the only channels through which intellectuals could 
express their opinions to the public, and these articles are the only original 
records of their public show during those years. When I say that they 
were the only channels and the only original records, I do not deny that 
literary works may be perhaps seen as exceptions which also could be 
considered as channels and records. However, literary works too had no 
way to be made known without going through the official censorship and 
printing by the official publishing houses.
As to those unofficial publications or "underground press", I must point 
out, firstly, unlike in the Soviet Union, hardly have we heard of such 
things in China under Mao even if they existed; secondly, even after Mao, 
for instance, on 1979's "Democratic Wall" in Peking, we could rarely 
find big-character posters written by any established intellectuals who are 
the subjects of this thesis; and thirdly, there were indeed some intellectual 
dissidents from China in the West who wrote certain numbers of works 
since 1949, and especially after 1980, but their publications are not 
sufficient for this research, though I will not ignore them entirely.
Another question that may be asked is: should we consider these articles in 
the official press reflections of the social reality or just "carefully-painted 
pictures" of society by the authorities? The answer is not simply yes or no, 
because, as we have said, in a "Communist" society all the media are 
official. I would rather say it is both. Firstly, these articles will tell us how 
the CCP controls intellectuals’ social involvement in political campaigns, 
for it is the CCP which decides who can publish articles in the official
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press, what kind of articles can be published, and which page/how many 
pages will be given to these articles.
Secondly, from these articles we are also able to know how intellectuals 
get involved in political campaigns, for intellectuals in a ’'Communist" 
society have no way to participate in socio-political development except 
this kind of involvement with the permission of the ruling party. 
Therefore intellectuals' activities under the control of the ruling party is 
the real picture of intellectuals' activities in a "Communist" one-party 
state, and the official press indeed reflects the social reality of such a 
control and of such intellectual activities. Since my interest is intellectuals' 
participation in politics under the "Communist" system, to look into their 
articles in official press in detail for me is not only necessary, but also 
exciting, and, moreover, meaningful.
By looking through these articles we can know their different political 
performances and voices, no matter whether they willingly or rather 
unwillingly did/thought so. It does not mean, however, that their complex 
feelings can be simply forgotten. On the contrary, despite the fact that it is 
by no means a psychological search for their inner world, the thesis will 
reveal their personal experiences.
Chapter Two will briefly give a necessary historical background of 
China’s intellectuals since Confucius. It will also generally outline the 
socio-institutional conditions China’s intellectuals as well as other citizens 
have been living in and by since 1949. In Chapters Three and Four, while 
the whole process of continual political campaigns will be examined 
carefully, the various roles of the established intellectuals in different 
social groups will be analysed. Through such an analysis, the relationship
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between the socio-political posts of China's established intellectuals and 
their ideological functions will be seen clearly. And what is more, the 
question of intellectuals' social location, that is, the question whether they 
are members of a "free-floating stratum", or of an independent class, or 
even of a ruling bourgeoisie or ruling bureaucracy, can be answered as 
far as China's established intellectuals during the period 1949-1976 are 
concerned.
Based on this, Chapters Five and Six will present some further case 
studies, in which four individual established intellectuals have been chosen 
from different groups, according to both their great professional 
achievement and their deep involvement in the political campaigns. From 
these case studies, we will further get a detailed picture indicating that 
different kinds of intellectuals under the "Communist" systems have 
different positions, functions, opinions, and results.
In Chapter Seven, I shall critically analyse Mao Ze-dong’s thought and 
practice on China's intellectuals, and end with my own conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2: China’s Intellectuals & Intelligentsia:
Their Historical Background & Social Conditions
Literati in China, since the Spring-Autumn Annals(722-481B.C.), if not 
earlier, have played significant social, political and economic roles. By 
becoming scholar-officials through the Civil Service Examinations since 
Han Dynasty(206B.C.-A.D.220), they were further to be legalised to 
participate in socio-political development. As time went on to the late Qing 
Dynasty since the 1840s, especially since the beginning of the twentieth 
century, there appeared in the Chinese political arena a new kind of educated 
men, i.e. , the Western-educated intellectuals who, being either liberal or 
radical or even revolutionary, played a so-called "vanguard" role, whilst the 
traditional literati lost their privilege to be officials because of the abolition 
of the Civil Examination System in 1904.
On the other hand, in the historical process of the social transformation of 
China from the imperial society to the current one, it was intellectuals 
themselves, who, as either initiators, advocates, or participants of this 
transformation, suffered psychologically or even physically, many of them 
were severely punished. Why did intellectuals rather than any other social 
group play such an important role? How have they played it? Should we thus 
treat them as an independent stratum? Such questions can not be satisfactorily 
answered without surveying and analysing the background from which they 
came and developed, and the general situations under which they lived and 
worked.
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I. Traditional Literati
In this thesis, I will adopt a basic theoretical approach to Chinese history, 
especially the history since the nineteenth century. Like many other scholars, 
for instance, Benjamin Schwartz, I will consider the socio-political history of 
twentieth-century China as essentially a consequence of the social conflict 
within Chinese society itself. That is to say, the social change in twentieth- 
century China, including the "Communist Revolution" since the 1920s, was 
resulted more from internal development of Chinese society than any other 
external intervention, for instance, the Russian Revolution of 1917, though 
the later played by no means an unimportant part.1
In traditional Chinese society, an educated man was called SHU 
SHENG("scholar") or WEN REN("literatus"), but never ZHI SHI FEN 
ZI("intellectual"). ZHI SHI FEN ZI was translated from the Japanese word 
for intelligentsia or intellectual. Originally there was no word for 
"intelligentsia" or "intellectual" in Chinese. Precisely, ZHI SHI FEN ZI as a 
term in Chinese means "members of the people who know" or "elements of 
the people who have knowledge". Even though every person in some degree 
knows something or has some knowledge, ZHI SHI FEN ZI to common 
Chinese people denote exclusively the men and women who have received 
formal education in schools.
Traditionally, China's scholars or literati were chiefly cultivated by 
Confucianism for most of the two thousand years since the Han Dynasty
1 Cf., B. I. Schwartz, 1951; M. Meisner, 1967; and A. Dirlik, 1989.
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(206 B.C.-A.D.220). Yet Confucianism in Confucius' time (551-479 B.C.) 
was merely one of the "hundred schools of thought". Among these schools 
the other two influential but opposite ones were: Legalist School (FA JIA), 
which insisted that social order should be imposed on a society and its 
people, for human nature was motivated merely by self-interest which could 
destroy the social whole; and Taoist School (DAO JIA), which claimed that 
everything man-made, including government, law, etc., could only create 
confusion, for people, being by nature without these systems, are parts of the 
universe and are harmonious per se . Confucianism stood in the middle of 
these two schools, emphasising that only by the Golden Mean (ZHONG 
YONG ZHI DAO) could human beings successfully deal with social 
disorders and thus achieve harmony. On the one hand, Confucianism asserts 
that a society can never be in order unless people abide by some established 
disciplines which divide people into superior and inferior, noble and lowly 
categories, namely, the rulers and the ruled. It sets such great store by social 
order that loyalty and obedience to the authorities become an overwhelming 
factor. That is to say, for the sake of keeping society in order, it is more 
necessary for a son to be filial to his father; for a wife, obedient to her 
husband; for the younger, faithful to the older; for a subordinate, submissive 
to his ruler; and for all, loyal to the emperor, than to be innovative, creative, 
intellectual and critical.
On the other hand, according to Confucianism, a society cannot be 
harmonious unless the rulers are well-educated and therefore love their 
people. Confucius and his followers divided people into JUN ZI 
("gentlemen") and XIAO REN ("mean persons"). A "gentleman" is one who 
knows the disciplines and rules of the Zhou Dynasty (about 1100-221 B.C.)
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from reading the classics, whereas a "mean person" is one who does not, for 
he cannot read. Gradually, a man was seen in turn as a "gentleman" if he 
could read, but a "mean person" if he could not. However, it is not enough 
for literati to have knowledge or to know how to read. What is more 
important is that they do their best to perfect their conduct. Human beings, 
Confucianism teaches the Chinese, are by nature good; but if a person is not 
educated his nature will deteriorate. Accordingly human beings can be 
moulded into moral perfection only through education including, more 
significantly, self-cultivation. It is education which makes people divergent: 
gentlemen versus mean people. A gentleman is superior to a mean person not 
only because he has the capacity to read and write, but also, more 
importantly, because he puts good conduct above all other considerations. In 
this sense, a gentlemen should know not only things but, more importantly, 
people as well; further, he should not only simply know people, but above all, 
love them, as Confucius said, knowledge means to know people, and 
benevolence means to love them.2 A government which has such gentlemen as 
its officials is a good government, a society ruled by such a government is a 
good society.
Confucianism dominated the minds of the Chinese for thousands of years 
until the end of the last century. Even nowadays the following quotations 
from Mencius (about 372-289 B.C.) are well-known amongst both educated 
and uneducated Chinese: "Some labour with their minds, some labour with 
their strength. Those who labour with their minds govern others, those who
2 Confucius, 1979: 116.
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labour with their strength are governed by others.”3 Although social reality 
is much more complex than Mencius described, one thing is clear: literati 
with knowledge and high moral standards should, according to Mencius, be 
the governors.
For thousands of years China’s scholars, influenced by Confucian ideology, 
took it for granted that no one except themselves had the capacity to run the 
country well, make society peaceful, and bring order to the land. At the same 
time, Chinese society was characterised by the simplicity of the organisation 
of material production in isolated, fragmentary and self-sufficient 
communities in the rural areas. Here the majority of the Chinese people lived 
quietly from generation to generation. Another characteristic of Chinese 
society was the interference of the centralising power of government, with a 
large bureaucracy affecting all social life in urban areas.
As time went on, China's Confucian scholars recognised that their proud 
grasp of the Confucian classics and their superior moral conduct could only 
be socially acknowledged if they occupied certain positions in the 
bureaucratic hierarchy. For an ambitious youth, to be an official meant to 
share actual power, which could be more important to him than being a 
scholar. However, it was still necessary to be a scholar because, as Confucius 
said, only ”a good scholar can make an official”.4 As a result, a special kind of 
group with a double personality came onto the stage: SHI DA FU (scholar- 
officials).
3 Mencius, 1983: 101.
4 Confucius also said that "a good official can make a scholar". For him, a man should be 
both a good scholar and a good official. Confucius, 1979: 155.
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The existence of scholar-officials was justified and legitimatised by the 
establishment of the Civil Service Examination System (KE JU ZHI DU) in 
A.D.585, which lasted more than a thousand years until 1905. Under this 
system, every man, except members of families of slaves, servants, 
prostitutes, entertainers, and so on, could theoretically be recruited as an 
administrator if he showed his mastery of the official classical texts by 
passing the Civil Service Examinations. Consequently, both private and state 
schools were designed specifically to prepare youths to pass the 
examinations. Tutors and teachers taught chiefly ’’the classics and the 
histories" especially the Confucian canon, rather than applied knowledge and 
skills. Meanwhile, both parents and sons, who realised that to pass the 
examinations and thereby fill the requirements of the state was more useful 
than to seek truth and have an independent status, accepted the guidance 
towards an official career. Without doubt, not all scholars could be scholar- 
officials, but for many, being a scholar was just the means to become an 
official. Reading the Confucian classics became the key to open the door of 
officialdom.
It seems that social rank and political position in China were determined 
more by qualifications than by wealth. And it was education and success in 
examinations which determined qualifications. Was it a "real democratic" 
examination system for it offered an equal opportunity to all who wanted to 
enter positions of officialdom? In practice, however, outstanding scholars 
were seldom recruited to be officials purely as a result of their ability. 
Needless to say, poor parents could not afford to give their sons an education
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based on the lengthy study of official texts which was required to pass the 
examinations.
As a matter of fact, education in traditional China was socio-economically 
restricted to the sons of rich families whose patriarches had already been 
scholar-officials in most cases. In a society where agriculture had always 
been the basic and foremost form of material production the rich families 
were of course mainly the landlords. The relations between economic 
property, academic status and political position in traditional Chinese society 
could, as J.K.Fairbank elucidated, be briefly summarised as following: with 
agricultural surplus, landlords could give their sons time and money for 
studying classical texts to become scholars; with a mastery of classical texts, 
scholars could pass the examinations and then become officials; and with the 
perquisites and profits of bureaucratic government, officials could protect 
and increase their landholdings.5 Academic study in traditional China thus 
became the necessary intermediary connecting economic property and 
political power, and the Chinese ruling class was therefore made up of the 
tripod of landlords, scholars, and officials, who were called SHEN SHI (the 
Gentry).
Because of these economic, political and academic advantages, the gentry 
could stand above the majority of the commoners, have recognised political 
power and privileges, and enjoy social prestige. The gentry as the ruling class 
should not be simply understood as a category of individuals; on the
5 J.K. Fairbank, 1979:32-46.
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contrary, they came into social being and played their economic and political 
roles in the form of families, clans, or even larger social groups.
Accordingly, it was not necessary for each member of the gentry to be a 
landlord, a scholar, and an official simultaneously. In practice, a landlord 
might be too lazy to study the classics, a scholar could fail in the 
examinations, and an official might by chance come from a poor peasant 
family. Generally speaking, not all landlords were scholars, and not all 
scholars were officials, but all officials must be "scholars"(/.e., the men who 
passed the Civil Examinations), and all "scholars" must be landlords (i.e., the 
men who had their own pieces of land6).
The gentry as a whole, however, owned the main means of material 
production (land), controlled the production of ideas and governed the state. 
Therefore it was necessary for each family or clan of the gentry to have a 
member who passed the examinations and became a scholar-official. China 
had been a society in which the emperor, whose word was to be said "law", 
theoretically had absolute power. And, as a result, members of other families 
or clans could only be shielded from the unchecked power of the monarch 
when there was at least one member who had a post in the political structure 
and could thereby use his power and privilege to keep the back door always 
open for his relatives. Without a strong man in officialdom, it could never be 
easy to protect the members of a family or clan and their properties. On the 
contrary, as a Chinese saying describes, "if one man rises to officialdom, then
6 Some of them of course could first pass the Examination and then bought their property.
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all his dogs and chickens will be promoted." (YI REN DE DAO, JIQUAN 
SHENG TIAN.)
The price a scholar-official paid for keeping his position was very high: to 
bend his back. He had to be compliant towards the emperor while being 
severe towards the commoners. He was constantly faced by a dilemma: as a 
scholar nurtured by Confucianism he should be straight and honest in 
performing his duties, and kind-hearted and benevolent in his treatment of 
the common people; as an official under the rule of an autocratic monarchy, 
which was justified by Confucianism, he should follow the emperor's whims, 
abide by his authorities, and sometimes he had to give up his beliefs, break his 
promises, and sell out his friends. Obviously "scholar-official" is a 
terminologically self-contradictory concept which describes the double face 
of the Chinese literati in officialdom. The two elements were not always 
balanced, and when scholar-officials had to make the choice between 
rebellion against the established settings and giving up their beliefs, they 
found in most cases that there was no alternative but to be realistic. As Fei 
Xiao-tong said, "since Chinese scholars were never in any sense 
revolutionary, they naturally chose the latter".7
Needless to point out, the social reality is never as simple as any 
generalisation summarises. During the long course of Chinese history, there 
always were some literati who either remained unattached to any office, for 
instance, Buddists and Taoists, or critical towards the status quo because it 
was contrary to their ideals whatever school they belonged to. There were
7 Fei Xiao-tong ,1953:17-74.
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also some realistic Confucian literati who either failed to pass the 
examinations or were frustrated in their ambitions to be promoted to higher 
political positions. Furthermore, there were even some scholar-officials who 
enjoyed success in officialdom but continued to behave as scholars and thus 
were able to keep to their moral code. And finally, there were also many 
non-official literati, for instance, Chinese traditional doctors, some leaders 
of secret societies.8 Because of these circumstances some of the Chinese 
literati could be individually respected as men who lived for truth, or 
considered themselves as the bearers of the homogeneous culture of China.
As far as the social position of China's established literati and/or scholar- 
officials is concerned, however, they were economically tied to their land on 
the one hand, and politically bound to their positions in officialdom on the 
other. Their relationship with office was so close that they cannot be simply 
regarded a relatively independent intellectuals in Western sense.9
II. The Emergence of the Modern Chinese Intelligentsia
For thousands of years China's basic social structure within which the gentry 
dominated social life, ruled the state and controlled the production of ideas 
through scholar-officials, their representatives in office, had never been 
fundamentally shaken by the continual palace coups, the numerous peasant
8 Cf., D. Johnson, et al, 1985: 37-72; E. Shils, 1990: 268-269.
9 Weber in his research even concluded that "the educated stratum of China has never been 
an autonomous status group of scholars,... but rather a stratum of officials and aspirants 
to office." (M.Weber, 1964:122.) Such a conclusion, however, seems a little simplistic.
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uprisings, and the occasional alien invasions or even occupations. A 
successful palace coup without the support of other social classes could only 
change the personnel of the government individually; a peasant uprising 
lacking the necessary development of the economy could not shift basic social 
relations from the old to the new; and occupation by aliens did often result in 
a paradoxical phenomenon: the foreign military invaders in the end might 
themselves be culturally conquered.
However, in the nineteenth century, the situation in China changed 
dramatically. Throughout the nineteenth century, China encountered new 
problems which the Chinese had never met before, and which, in the end, 
brought the Qing Dynasty, the last imperial dynasty of China, to an end.Such 
a predicament resulted from a series of connected factors: peasant migration 
from the land; over-population in urban areas; the unemployment of literati; 
official corruption; local or national rebellions; and Western encroachment. 
Corruption had always existed, but it had become so serious that 
administrative incompetence, moral disintegration, economic recession, and 
social upheaval also erupted. Rebellion alone could never usher in a new 
society but it could, together with other factors, destroy the old one. And 
foreign invaders could hardly impose a new social system onto the conquered 
but might hasten the collapse of the old structure if it was in decline. In 
nineteenth-century China, the social structure seemed unfortunately to be in 
such a state. The Tai-ping Rebellion, the biggest and best-known of the Qing 
Dynasty rebel movement, is a good example of the coming together of these 
factors. This rebellion, called TAI PING TIAN GUO (Heavenly Kingdom of 
Great Peace), led by a failed scholar Hong Xiu-quang (1814-1864), was an 
inevitable outcome of social conflicts within China on the one hand, and
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influence from the West, especially Christianity, on the other.10 The Tai-ping 
Rebellion was eventually put down by the provincial army, Hunan Troops, 
rather than the army of the central government. The rebellion and the way it 
ended signalled the shift of political power from the centre and the challenge 
to the Confucian ideology for which the gentry had stood for centuries. As 
Zeng Guo-fan (1811-1872), one of the Qing Dynasty's most prominent 
Confucian scholar-officials, who financed, organised and led the Hunan 
Troops to suppress the Tai-ping Rebellion, recognised when he began his 
"Ten-year Struggle" to save the declining imperial dynasty: the Tai-ping 
Rebellion marked not merely a crisis for the Qing Dynasty, but rather "an 
unprecedented crisis in the history of Confucian moral principles."11
If the Tai-ping Rebellion showed the crisis of the political and ideological 
authority of the imperial dynasty, the Western invasion from the 1840s 
marked the internal weakness of such authority. To the Qing authorities, both 
the Manchurian princes and the Chinese scholar-officials, nothing was more 
frightening than the West. Economic plunder, military aggression, and 
cultural infiltration from the Western countries, including Britain, France, 
Germany, America, Russia, and Japan, not only forced the Qing Government 
repeatedly to cede territory and pay indemnities, but also caused China's 
gentry and their scholar-officials to lose the psychological confidence and 
feeling of cultural superiority which they had maintained for tens of 
centuries.
10 Cf., V.C. Shih, 1967; S.Y. Teng, 1971; E.P. Boardman, 1972; and Y. Jen, 1973.
11 Cf., J.B.Grieder, 1981: 66.
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As a matter of fact, it took time for the Chinese literati to be taught that 
China was no longer the "Central Kingdom of the World". At the outset they 
looked down on Westerners, seeing them as uncivilised "long haired 
barbarians", but, after successive military defeats, they recognised that China 
should at least leam about technology from the West.The scholar-officials of 
insight launched Western Affairs Movement, aiming at Self-strengthening & 
Restoration (ZI QIANG FU XIN). Li Hong-zhang (1823-1901), another 
outstanding scholar-official and a follower of Zeng Guo-fan, claimed that 
China could not continue to be conservative when foreign countries were 
undertaking reforms one after another, day by day the nation would be 
reduced and weakened otherwise.12
The initiators of this movement, however, never tried to create a new 
society, nor to challenge Confucianism, but rather, they dreamt of restoring 
China's power and strength. In the eyes of these scholar-officials, what China 
needed was only skills and techniques while the classical ideology of rule by 
virtue was still unquestionable. As the well-known slogan put forward by 
Zhang Zhi-dong (1837-1909) said: "Chinese learning for the fundamentals, 
Western learning for practical application." (ZHONG XUE WEI TI, XI 
XUE WEI YONG.)13
The most influential effort to save China from domestic troubles and foreign 
invasion in the nineteenth century was the'Hundred Days Reform of 1898" 
promoted by Kang You-wei (1858-1927), the most famous reformer of the
l^  Cf., Grieder, 1981: 22; S.Teng, J.K.Fairbank (ed.), 1964:18; and S. Spector, 1964. 
I 3 Cf., W. Ayers, 1971; M. Bastid, 1988.
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late Qing Dynasty. He was known as "Kang the Modem Sage and Reformer", 
and sponsored by the open-minded Emperor Guang Xu (1875-1908). The 
Reform of 1898 added an illustrious page to Chinese history because it was 
the first time that China's literati, represented by Kang You-wei and his 
disciple Liang Qi-chao (1873-1929),took the initiative in trying to save their 
nation by systematic reform. They wanted to modernise the Chinese state and 
its administration, military and police systems, law, education, technology 
and economy on the one hand, and on the other to seek a way to open the 
minds of the Chinese towards the world (i.e., the West), to weave new 
relationships between China and the West, the governor and the governed, 
and the past and the present.14
Unfortunately, this Reform lasted less than a hundred days and the dream of 
changing society by reform ended with 1898's Coup of September. It could 
be suggested that the period of the Reform was short because it came too late. 
However, we should remember that, down to the end of the nineteenth 
century, the scholar-officials as reformers at no point sought to overthrow 
the imperial authority by arousing the masses of the Chinese, in spite of 
perceiving the great gap dividing the rulers from the ruled. Rather, they 
were convinced that a conscientious elite minority with a broader vision, 
supported by an opened-minded emperor, could save the nation. It is not 
surprising that for these literati the problem was not the social system, but 
right rulership. Such reform, launched by scholars, and relying on this or 
that emperor, but without the support of society , could have little future.15
1^ Cf., J.R. Levenson, 1953; J. Lo, 1967; H. Chang, 1971; P.C. Huang, 1972; and 
Hsiao Kungchuan, 1975.
15 Cf., F. Wakeman, 1973; L.S.K. Kwong, 1984.
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The failure of the Reform of 1898, however, was a sign that China had to 
undertake a more profound social change during which not only the policies 
of the government, and the personnel of officialdom, but also the social 
system, the relationship of the governor to the governed, must be replaced. 
Now it was no longer a question of China keeping its power and strength, but 
a question of catching up with the West. The ideas, efforts, and failure of 
Kang You-wei and Liang Qi-chao enlightened the minds of China's new 
generation of intelligentsia.
The first generation of China's modem intellectuals emerged during the 
Revolution of 1911. They were called "modem intelligentsia" not merely 
because they translated the term "intelligentsia" from Japanese to describe 
themselves when studying in Japan, but also, more meaningfully, because 
they were more or less Westernised, and shared a critical or even 
revolutionary attitude towards Chinese society and its rulers. Aiming at 
overthrowing the imperial authority and establishing a Westem-type 
republic, they indeed made a revolution which destroyed the Qing Dynasty in 
1911.
Ironically, the first generation of China's modem intelligentsia was created 
by the Qing Government itself. Educational reform was the major concern of 
the reformers serving the state in the late Qing Dynasty. It included the 
abolition of the Eight-legged Essay (BA GU WEN)16 in 1898 and of the Civil
16 Eight-legged Essay is a literary composition, best-known for its strict rigidity of form 
(eight parts/legs), which each candidate must write for the Civil Service Examination.
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Service Examination System in 1905, and the establishment of professional 
schools during the last years of the nineteenth century. In these newly- 
established schools, students could learn not only traditional Chinese classics 
but foreign languages, military science, navigation and shipbuilding as well. 
In 1904 a full-fledged education system was set up, patterned after Western 
models and consisting of primary school, middle school and college.17 
Moreover, some outstanding students were even sent to Western countries 
such as Britain, Germany, the United States, and above all, to Japan. Amongst 
them there were people who, sooner or later, characterised the process of the 
transformation of China. Here two men should be mentioned briefly: Yan Fu 
(1853-1921) and Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925). The former was the pioneer in 
the translation of Western works into Chinese, including T.H. Huxley's 
Evolution and Ethics in 1898 and H. Spencer's A Study of Sociology in 
1903. These two books greatly influenced the minds of the first generation 
of China's modem intelligentsia. The latter was the founder of the 
Revolution Alliance (TON MENG HUI), the predecessor of the Kuomintang 
(KMT). Initially, the purpose of the Revolution Alliance was simply to free 
the Han people from the rule of the Qing Dynasty mled by the alien 
Manchurains. Ultimately, this organisation established the first republic in 
Chinese history: the Republic of China.18
Returned students from Japan and the West played a significant socio­
political role in the Revolution of 1911. These students, who had absorbed 
various Western ideas, especially evolutionary and revolutionary ones,
U  W. Ayers, 1971; P.A. Cohen, 1974.
18 B. Schwartz, 1964; H.Z. Schiffrin, 1968; and C.M. Wilbur, 1976; and K. Laitinen, 
1990.
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believed that China must be changed to a Westem-type republic through 
revolution in order to elevate it to a position of freedom and equality among 
nations. At first, however, they were merely a minority of radicals who even 
sought to change society through terrorism, such as the assassination of the 
emperor.
The Revolution of 1911 was led by Dr Sun Yet-sen and his friends, a group 
of radical intelligentsia, but socially based on the conflicts within society. It 
did topple the throne of the emperor and end autocratic monarchy, and 
therefore Dr Sun Yet-sen came to be remembered as "the Father of the 
Nation".19 Yet a social revolution, the goal of which was to change traditional 
society by creating a new kind of people, was much more complicated than 
the establishment of a new kind of governmental system, which, at most, 
could be seen as the first step of a "long march". The young intellectual 
revolutionaries at that time were mentally ill-prepared for it. As a result, the 
period after the establishment of the Republic was marked by a series of 
events such as Yuan Shi-kai's proclaiming himself emperor, Zhang Xun's 
restoration of the dethroned monarch, and, more serious and long-lasting, 
the emergence of separatist war-lord regimes.20 In the meantime, China and 
its people fell into chaos, and the revolutionary intelligentsia was 
increasingly disappointed at the situation. In the Revolution, they thought that 
they had achieved two of the three great goals of the Revolution. These three 
were: to free the Han Chinese from the Manchurian rules, to establish a 
democratic government, and to improve the living conditions of the
Cf., Y.C. Wang, 1966; L. Bianco, 1971; M.B. Rankin, 1971; H. Chang, 1987; L.E. 
Ma, 1990.
20 Cf., L.W. Pye, 1971; S.R. MacKinnon, 1980.
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commoners. But after that, they found things different from what they 
expected. They were now far less optimistic than they had been in the days of 
the Revolution. Dr Sun Yet-sen even admitted that "the Revoution has not 
accomplished yet".21
The scholar-officials of the Qing Dynasty, whether conservatives or radicals, 
whether Zeng Guo-fan and Li Hong-zhang or Kang You-wei and Liang Qi- 
chao, were nevertheless traditional literati, nurtured by Confucianism and 
bound to the mling class. On the contrary, the first generation of the modem 
intelligentsia, whether nationalists or "bourgeois revolutionaries", were 
educated abroad, especially in Japan, and attached not to officialdom but 
financially dependent on overseas Chinese merchants.22 Therefore the 
fundamental disagreement on the way to strengthen the nation could be easily 
identified: reform or revolution. It resulted from their different socio­
economic positions rather than their own personal orientations: all reformers 
in the late Qing Dynasty occupied some posts in officialdom, while all 
revolutionaries did not. In spite of this, they still shared something in 
common: both groups tried to save the nation but both, thinking themselves 
geniuses and the masses fools, kept their distance from the commoners and 
thus lacked the mass support of other social classes. The leaders of the 
Revolution of 1919 first tried to overthrow the Qing Dynasty by forming a 
secret society (the Revolutionary Alliance), and when they realised that the 
reactionary forces were too strong, they then turned to local warlords who 
too wanted to destroy the central government of the Qing Dynasty. Only
21 Sun Yet-sen, 1927:1. English translation is modified.
22 Cf., Yen Ching Hwang, 1976.
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before his death in 1925, did Dr Sun Yet-sen recognise that to save the 
nation Mwe must bring about a thorough awakening of the masses of our own 
people."23 (My emphasis)
The idea that the enlightenment of the common people was the prerequisite of 
the salvation of the nation was not widespread until the May Fourth 
Movement in 1919, during which the second generation of China's modem 
intelligentsia grew up. This generation, unlike the first, was composed not 
only of students returned from the West, but, greater in number, of students 
and teachers within China as well. Among them there were several varieties 
of leading figures, differentiated by their various roles at that time, and/or by 
their influence on Chinese history afterwards. Among these were:Hu Shi 
(1891-1962) and Lu Xun (1881-1936), the foremost advocates of the New 
Culture Movement which ensured that the vernacular language gradually 
replaced classical Chinese. Chen Du-xiu (1880-1942) and Li Da-zhao (1889- 
1927), the pioneers of intellectuals who introduced Marxism into China and 
the the founders of the CCP. Zhou En-lai (1898-1976) and Mao Ze-dong 
(1893-1976), two of the young activists who later became the leaders of the 
CCP and the People's Republic of China.24
The May Fourth Movement was remarkable not only because it created the 
second generation of China's revolutionary intelligentsia, but also because 
this intelligentsia, as educated people, resolutely rejected Confucianism,
23 Sun Yat-sen, 1927:1. English translation is modified.
24 M. Meisner, 1967; S.R. Schram, 1967; J.B. Grieder, 1970; Hsueh Chun-tu, 1971; B. 
Schwartz, 1972; L. Feigon, 1983; D. Wilson, 1984; V. Schwarcz, 1986; A. Dirlik, 1988; 
and Jin Cong-ji, 1989.
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which had been the dominant ideology for tens of centuries. It was the first 
time that Confucian doctrine had been rejected in public when the May 
Fourth intelligentsia called for "DE XIAN SHENG" (Mr Democracy) and 
"SAI XIAN SHENG" (Mr Science), and cried "down with Confucianism!" 
Lu Xun in his short story The Diary of A Madman, the first written in the 
vernacular, declared that behind the mask of virtue and benevolence of the 
Confucian classics, which were full of words like "loving people", there were 
only two words: killing people (CHI REN).25
But the most politically significant characteristic of China's revolutionary 
intelligentsia was its connection with the masses of Chinese people. 
Unprecedentedly they went down to the masses of workers and then of 
peasants instead of being bound within the literati and standing above the 
commoners. From the beginning of the May Fourth Movement in 1919 
onwards there were more and more educated youths who learned to integrate 
themselves with the masses, which changed both the masses and the 
intelligentsia itself to a certain extent. Needless to say, the historical process 
of the integration of the intelligentsia with the masses of workers and 
peasants was a lengthy process. In the first stage, the May Fourth 
intelligentsia, unlike the first generation, recognised that it should be the 
foremost task to enlighten the masses. Thus they went down to the masses, 
first to the workers and then to the peasants, "to disseminate truth"; yet like 
the first generation, they saw themselves as teachers of the masses and the 
masses as their pupils. This only changed after 1927, the year the KMT and
25 Lu Xun, 1980: 54. Cf., P.H. Chen, 1976. Lu Xun's attitude towards Confucian 
tradition seems too radical. Cf., Lin Yu-shen, 1979.
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the CCP split up into their respective political factions, when the latter was 
weak and had to escape to the countryside. As a result of waging a long and 
painful guerrilla war in the remote mountain areas, the intelligentsia in the 
CCP gradually began to recognise that, on the one hand, the advanced 
elements of the intelligentsia could never change the old society into 
something new unless they enlightened and mobilised the masses of the 
people; on the other hand, and more importantly, the intelligentsia should 
take the masses as their teachers, drawing on the wisdom of the masses. 
Otherwise they might change their original intention and themselves slip 
back into the old mt of being intellectual aristocrats. As a matter of fact, until 
1939 when Mao made a speech marking the twentieth anniversary of the 
May Fourth Movement, nobody had clarified the point that, although they 
are usually the first sector of people to be awakened and thus play the role of 
vanguard, standing at the head of the revolutionary rank, "if intellectuals do 
not become one with the masses of workers and peasants, then they will 
accomplish nothing" as far as revolution is concerned.26
In praxis, this process of integration with the masses was full of conflicts, 
misunderstandings, political quagmires, and spiritual troubles. As we have 
mentioned, this process came about partly because of the unexpected KMT- 
CCP conflict in 1927. What is more, an unforeseen consequence resulted 
from this happened. That is: when Mao and his intellectual colleagues took 
power after more than twenty years' struggle in 1949, most of their soldiers 
were illiterate "peasants in uniform". Because of this, thereafter, the 
relationship of the revolutionary intelligentsia to those peasants in uniform
26 Mao Ze-dong,1954b: 10-17.
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became one of the serious problems that the CCP had to face. This was 
dramatically demonstrated in the political campaigns from 1949 to 1976. 
Was it that peasants in uniform distrust these intellectuals, as Mannheim 
generalised that when intellectuals attach themselves to a class the original 
members of this class can still distrust these intellectuals?27 Or was there a 
class struggle, as Mao asserted, because most of the members of the 
intelligentsia originally came from rich families and thus still represented the 
interests of the middle and/or upper classes as far as their world outlooks 
were concerned?
When the May Fourth generation intelligentsia and their followers 
participated in the stmggle against the warlords and foreign invaders, and in 
the process of integration with the masses, there also existed another kind of 
educated people: the "traditional intellectuals", if we use Gramsci’s term. It 
was not necessary for these traditional intellectuals to be Confucian literati. 
As a matter of fact, since the beginning of the twentieth century, many of 
China's educated people were not really traditional, but, more or less, 
Westernised, no matter whether they had studied abroad or not, for the 
education system, as we have said, was reformed along the lines of the 
Western systems after 1898. This category of "traditional intellectuals" 
covered most of the scientists, scholars, writers and artists. Comparatively 
speaking, they were more liberal in terms of their political views, but less 
active in the political arena; more successful in their professional 
accomplishments, but less capable in practical fields; more aloof from social 
affairs, but less courageous in adhering to their beliefs, than the
27 K.Mannheim, 1979:141.
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revolutionary intelligentsia, or, "organic intellectuals". On the one hand, like 
the revolutionary intelligentsia, traditional intellectuals were dissatisfied 
with the situation that had existed in China since the 1840s, and dreamed of a 
new China with power, wealth and independence; on the other hand, like the 
traditional scholar-officials, they were tied to the gentry in many ways and 
separated themselves from the commoners, thinking themselves the "elite of 
the nation". The relationship between these two kinds of educated people, 
i.e., revolutionary intelligentsia and traditional intellectuals, became another 
serious problem after 1949. For the former, the problem was, as Gramsci 
predicted28, how to assimilate and conquer the traditional intellectuals 
ideologically and/or institutionally; but for the latter, the problem was how 
to adapt themselves to new social circumstances while keeping their 
traditional ways of living and thinking.
Without doubt, these two problems were in fact interweaved. The "peasants 
in uniform" had a distrust of, and a conflict with, both the revolutionary 
intelligentsia and traditional intellectuals, who were considered to be either 
bourgeois or petty bourgeois elements, for they both had received school 
education which, in the eyes of the "peasants in uniform", was a kind of 
privilege, which exclusively belonged to the bourgeoisie in China before 
1949. Moreover, it was not only traditional intellectuals who were separated 
from the commoners, but also, perhaps more significantly, the former 
revolutionary intelligentsia who, together with the "peasants in uniform", 
occupied important socio-political positions after 1949, and thus stood above 
the masses of Chinese workers, peasants, and other educated persons (for
28 A.Gramsci, 1971:10.
81
example, school teachers). They became newly-born bureaucratic officials. 
What is more, both the traditional intellectuals and revolutionary 
intelligentsia, to various extents, looked down on the "peasants in uniform". 
These peasants in unifom were called "Worker-peasant Cadres"(GONG 
NONG GAN BU), which meant that they were laymen of science, 
technology, and education. In the meantime, the traditional intellectuals 
further thought themselves qualified "real intellectuals" for they had finished 
formal education from primary school to university, and had been 
intellectual professionals for years. They considered the revolutionary 
intelligentsia only "little intellectuals "(XIAO ZHI SHI FEN ZI), because 
most of them did not go to university, and achieved little in science and 
academic research.
Such a complex of social conflicts, rooted in their various social positions and 
their different cultural backgrounds, resulted in a series of events during 
Mao’s era, especially in the continual political campaigns from 1949 to 1976, 
as we shall see in following chapters.
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III. Organisational Network of the New System
After 1949, two main problems confronted the new Government: first, the 
economic one of how to develop China from one of the poorest countries to 
an industrialised society. This had to be done within the limits of the 
international arena, i.e., the economic blockade from the West on the one 
hand, and on the other assistance from the Soviet Union.29 This aim was also 
hampered by the fact that several hundreds of millions of peasants, who made 
up more than 80 per cent of the whole population, as Table 2.1 shows, were 
amongst the poorest people in the face of the earth.
Table 2.1. The proportion of rural population to urban population.
Year AH Population Rural Area Urban Area
1953 601,138,035 86.74% 13.26%
1964 723,070,269 81.60% 18.40%
1982 1,008,175,288 79.40% 20.60%
Source: 1982 Population Census of China, Beijing, 1985:535-551.
The new Government therefore adopted a strategy of "Independence and 
Self-reliance "(DU LI ZI ZHU, ZI LI GENG SHENG) as its basic policy of 
economic development. The second of the two main problems was how to 
recreate a social order in the most populous nation in the world after a 
century's chaos. As we have mentioned above, for thousands of years Chinese 
rulers had always put social order above all else. When the CCP took power, 
social order and stability were still emphasised and, as much as possible, they
29 This latter might have threatened China's independence too, and even if it did not, was 
not alone sufficient to develop China into an advanced society.
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maintained China as a unitary multinational state facing the great task of 
construction in a hostile environment of international threats.
Accordingly, to deal with these two problems, the CCP established a series of 
institutions and organisations. One was the Residence Registration 
System (HU KOU ZHI). It is a system of administration organised on the 
basis of households whose members (1) had to register at local police stations 
as permanent residents, then (2) were given HU KOU, the Residential Card, 
and after that, (3) more importantly, could not change their domiciles at 
will.30 HU KOU System could be traced back originally to the Song Dynasty 
(A.D. 960-1279)31, yet it was the KMT which set up the BAO JIA, a special 
kind of HU KOU System, in which each JIA was made up of 10 households 
and each BAO of 10 JIA, in 1932. Afterwards, in both the Japanese occupied 
areas and CCP areas, various sorts of HU KOU system were established. 
After 1949, especially after the setting-up of the Advanced Agricultural 
Producer’s Co-operative (in which the land and other chief means of 
production were collectively owned by the co-operative) in 1956, it was 
necessary for the Government to register people in order to prevent the 
emigration of peasants from rural areas to urban areas, and of townspeople 
from one place to another. Moreover, HU KOU made it easier for the CCP 
and its Government to check on residents, to control the birth rate, to keep 
eyes on people's day-to-day activities, to look into their personal/social 
connections, and to ferret out various kinds of offenders: hooligans, bandits,
30 ZHONG HU A REN MIN GONG HE GUE ZU ZHI FA GUI XUAN BIAN (Selected
Documents of Regulations of Organisation Law in the PRC), 1985: 268.
31 Lu Si-mian,1985:507-544.
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and so-called "counter-revolutionaries’'. In a word, HU KOU is an effective 
tool to control residents.
According to the Regulations of Residence Registration promulgated in 
1958, each person must register as a permanent resident at the place where 
he/she lives for most of his/her time, and if a person wants to move to an 
urban area from the countryside, he/she must have an official certificate such 
as an employment offer from a factory or an admission offer from a 
university.32 It is an unreasonable demand for those peasants who tries to 
leave their land for a town or city: without an employment offer they can not 
apply for an urban HU KOU, but without an urban HU KOU booklet peasants 
could rarely get the opportunity to obtain an employment offer from an 
urban enterprise. As a matter of fact, after the HU KOU System, Chinese 
peasants could hardly leave for urban areas. Even nowadays, in the most 
open areas such as the Special Economic Zones, it is still impossible for those 
without urban HU KOU to find permanent jobs.33 In practice, HU KOU 
limited vertically those who could leave rural areas for urban areas, towns 
for cities, or cities for metropolitan areas, and, horizontally, those who 
wanted to move from village to village, town to town, city to city, metropolis 
to metropolis, and even community to community within a town or city.
32 ZHONG HU A REN MIN GONG HE GUE FA GUI XUAN JI[XU YI] (Selected 
Documents of Laws and Regulations of the PRC, Vol.II), 1958:53-54.
33 Of course, there are more and more "illegal migrant persons" in Shenzhen and other 
Special Zones along the South coast of China which has been the "open areas" towards the 
West since the 1980s. But these persons, mostly peasants from near countryside, are to be 
"grasped" and sent back by the local government, or, if they were lucky, to be given 
"illegal jobs" from time to time. Cf., SZTQB, 1987-1991.
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Another system was the Unit System (DAN WEI ZHI). When the PRC was 
established there were plenty of people in urban areas who were either 
unemployed or, it was decided, should be re-employed, for the new 
Government needed more and more people to participate in the 
"Construction of a New China". The policy thus adopted by the CCP and the 
Government was: Low Salaries, High Employment (DI GONG ZI, GAO JIU 
YE). The leaders of the CCP and PRC knew that China at that time was a very 
poor country but they wanted to lead the Chinese people into an economically 
advanced society. What is more, such a society had to be a socialist one. A 
socialist country, as understood by the CCP leaders, was basically more a 
society in which the economic and social lives of the majority of the 
population could be taken care of collectively, rather than a society in which 
individual freedom was the basic principle. Therefore, the Government 
should not merely offer jobs to the people but also be responsible to them for 
their lives "from their birth to old age, including illness and burial 
arrangements" (SHENG LAO BING SI). In a unit such an idea was partly 
turned into practice. A unit could be a factory, a school, a hospital, a shop, or 
a government organ. Whatever it was, essentially it became a triply 
integrated unit, from which individuals as employees drew their wages, 
within which they as social members were administered, and under which 
they were politically organised and ideologically supervised.
The employment system in China since the 1950s was called "Iron Rice 
Bowl" (TIE FAN WAN). It meant that as soon as a person was employed by a 
state-run or collective unit he had a secure job, so long as he/she did not 
either commit a crime or make a serious political mistake. Such an Iron Rice 
Bowl guaranteed no further worry about unemployment on the one hand,
and bound this person economically and socially to the unit on the other. 
Whereas people could apply for a job to a unit if they held HU KOU, in most 
cases, it was foolish to resign. Since a job was an Iron Rice Bowl it was not 
readily available. And more importantly, since an employee would not be 
discharged from employment unless he/she broke the law or was accused of 
making serious political mistakes, a resignation hinted that he/she had done 
something wrong or at least was undisciplined, which signalled that it would 
be much more difficult for this person to find a new job in another unit 
within the area where they had HU KOU registration.34
A unit is not merely an economic unit of production, but further, a complex 
unit of social life. Taking the university as an example, we find that it is 
responsible for public welfare, it supplies living quarters for staff and 
dormitories for students. It also has its own creche, primary and middle 
schools for the children of its staffs, a shopping centre, public places of 
entertainment, post office, bank branch, and police station, all within the 
university. A university as a unit was a small society.
No doubt not all units were as large as a university. Those people who 
worked in smaller units, which had no capacity to supply so many facilities, 
had to go shopping in other public markets, send their children to public 
schools, and live outside their units. For them the Neighbourhood 
Committee, led by the Subdistrict Office, was a key organisation which 
administered residents from one hundred to six hundred families as an
34 Again, even today it is not easy for those who rashly resign their permanent jobs from 
their units in inland to find a suitable posts in the "open areas" unless they have certain 
specific connections with officialdom.Cf., SZYQB, 1989.
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integrated group.35 But no matter whether it was large or small, a unit was by 
no means simply economic in its function, but rather, a social complex as 
well. As a Chinese saying describes, "A large one is a whole, a small one is 
also a whole.” (DA ER QUAN, XIAO ER QUAN.)
Politically a unit was a basic organisation which united its staff to complete 
their political tasks: to mobilise youth to join the army, to call employees to 
expose and denounce ”bad elements" and "counter-revolutionaries", and to 
organise people to participate in political campaigns, for instance. Without 
such a unit political mission could hardly be accomplished.
In each unit, everybody had a "Dossier” (DANG AN), a specific personal 
file. The Dossier recorded not only a person's technical experience but also, 
much more significantly, his/her political behaviour and attitudes in political 
campaigns and in day-to-day life. The Dossier followed people all their lives, 
despite the fact that they themselves did not have right to read it, and 
therefore did not know what exactly was recorded in it.
China, as a well-organised society since 1949, was divided into numerous 
units, to which individuals belonged economically as well as socio-politically, 
and from which they could not subjectively separate themselves. Yet in any 
unit, the last and most powerful organ was undoubtedly the Primary Party 
Organisation (JI CENG DANG ZU ZHI).
35 ZHONG HU A REN MIN GONG HE GUE ZU ZHI FA GUI XUAN BIAN (Selected 
Documents of Regulations of Organisation Law in the PRC), 1985: 254-257.
88
Some further historical explanations are necessary before we examine its 
structure and the functions of social control in units. After the May Fourth 
Movement of 1919, during which Marxism as a solution to China's social 
problems was accepted by the revolutionary intelligentsia, a Communist 
Party based on Leninist principles was introduced into China in 1921. 
Gradually it became the most important collective actor in effecting 
fundamental social change and in 1949 the new mling party built an actual 
one-party state, although there were also eight small "Democratic Parties".36 
But why did the revolutionary intelligentsia accept Marxism rather than any 
other Western idea as their leading ideology? Why did they organise a 
Communist Party based on Leninist principles which followed Russian 
Bolsheviks instead of liberal parties on the Western democratic model? How 
could such a Leninist Party and its army drive out the KMT, which was 
supported by the USA, from the mainland to Taiwan and take power in 1949?
Historically, many specific explanations could be explored in the process of 
the social transformation of China since 1840. For instance, if the Reform of 
1898 had not failed there could have been no the Revolution of 1911. If there 
had not been the disappointing situation under the warlords after the 
Revolution of 1911, nor the Russian Revolution of 1917, the young 
impetuous students and intellectuals might have chosen other ways to save 
China from chaos. They might have just followed Dr Sun Yat-sen's way, 
continuing with his so-called "bourgeois democratic revolution". Moreover, 
if there had not been the Second World War, the Red Army of the CCP might
36 More discussions about these "democratic parties" and their relations to the CCP will be 
seen in Chapter Three.
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have still been a small contingent of roving rebel bands in the remote 
mountain areas.
As we have showed above, however, China had been in decline since the 
nineteenth century when the gentry and scholars-officials, their 
representatives in officialdom, could no longer run the state well against 
Western technical and military superiority. Furthermore, China was still 
socio-economically a pre-industrial society where neither a powerful 
bourgeoisie nor a strong proletariat had developed.37 In addition, the role of 
the West, which invaded China, exploited Chinese resources and markets, 
secured special privileges under the unequal treaties, and suppressed the 
stirrings of Chinese capitalism, was little more than a colonialist one. Under 
such circumstances, it was very reasonable that the younger generation of 
China's radical and revolutionary intelligentsia was so fascinated with the 
Russian Revolution of 1917. For the same reason, we can see why, within an 
agrarian society such as China, where the majority of the population were 
unorganised peasants scattered in the vast countryside, the revolutionary 
intelligentsia, who were composed of only a minority of the educated 
men/women, but whose goal now was the total transformation of society, 
could achieve little without forming a special political organisation with 
strict discipline, specific criteria of recruitment, and a hierarchical structure, 
namely, a Leninist Party.38
37 Cf., B. Schwartz, 1951; M. Meisner, 1967; Kamal Sheel, 1989; and Arif Dirlik, 1989.
38 Cf., Tang Tsou, 1987:257-262; J.K.Fairbank,1988: 104-105; and C.A. Johnson, 1970.
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However much resulted from internal social development than simply 
introduced from Russia by radical intelligentsia, when it was founded in 
1921, the CCP was merely a very small secret political clique of radical 
intellectuals. Four years later, when the working class had begun to 
participate massively and more significantly in politics, and then when the 
Northern Expedition Against the Warlords (1926-1927) began, the CCP 
expanded its force, as table 2.2. shows.
Table 2.2. CCP Membership in its First Seven Years:
Party congress Year Number
First Congress 1921 57
Second Congress 1922 195
Third Congress 1923 432
Fourth Congress 1925 994
Fifth Congress 1927 57,967
Sources: Lewis, J. W. 1963: 108-120; He Meng-bi, 1984.
Yet only in 1929, when Mao found that it was essential to practise his 
principle that "the Party commands the gun"(DANG ZHI HUIQIANG), was 
the Party Branch (DANG ZHI BU), the most basic and effective Primary 
Party Organisation, organised on the Red Army's company basis.39
After 1949, such a method of Party control gradually spread all over the 
country. A Primary Party Organisation was set up in every factory, mine,
39 Mao Ze-dong, 1954a: 81-83. Scholars are arguing whether the "Communist 
Revolution" led by the CCP is a special kind of Communist movement or just a nationalist 
peasant movement. (Cf., C.A. Johnson, 1970.) As shown in Chapter One, my point is 
more based on analysis of internal causes of the Revolution rather than argument of its 
nature.
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and other enterprise; in every XIANG {i.e., a Rural Administrative Unit, or 
later, the People's Commune); in every town; in every Agricultural Co­
operative (or later, Production Brigade); in every office, school and street; 
in every company of the People's Liberation Army (PLA); and in every 
other primary unit if there were three or more full members of the CCP.40
The Primary Party Organisation has three levels. These are:
(1). the Primary Party Committee (JI CENG DANG WEI HUI), an 
organisation which leads a hundred or more Party members in units as large 
as a university, factory, people's commune, district of a community, or 
battalion of the PLA;
(2). the General Branch (DANG ZONG ZHI), which organises fifty or more 
Party members in units such as the department of a college or university, or 
workshop; and
(3). the Party Branch (DANG ZHI BU), which is composed of less than fifty 
Party members on the level of small workshop, production brigade, street, 
or company of the PLA.
Among these three levels of Primary Party Organisations, the Party Branch 
is of course the most basic one, "the bridge which links the Party leadership 
with the masses," it was said. According to the Constitution of the CCP, the 
Party Branch puts into practice the decisions of the Central Committee or of 
higher Party organisations on the one hand, and reports what happens at the 
basic level to the higher organisations on the other. It not only recruits new
40 "The Constitution of the CCP", Adopted at the 8th National Congress of the CCP on 
September 26, 1956, in Documents of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee: 
Sept.,1956 - April,1969,Vol.I, Hong Kong, 1971: 23.
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members, examines, appraises, criticises and even punishes its members, but 
educates, organises and leads the masses of non-Party members as well.41 
Each of these Primary Party Organisations and their Party secretaries has a 
decisive role at their various levels of operation.
Individuals in the PRC, including the so-called "intellectuals”, i.e., those 
educated and skilled people, are thus geographically tied by their Resident 
System, socio-economically bound by their "units", and politically ruled by 
the Primary Party Organisations.
IV. Intellectuals under the New System
Under such a well-organised system of institutions, a key problem is how, as 
the CCP wished, individuals could use their initiative creativity and critical 
spirits for the purpose of developing China into an industrialised society and 
at the same time keep it on the "Communist" road.
This problem gets considerably more serious and meaningful if we look 
closely at intellectuals who, like others, lived and worked under these 
institutions and organisations. Because of HU KOU, intellectuals could not 
move so easily from place to place as they had done before 1949. Further, 
being bound by various units, they could not transfer to other workplaces and 
occupations as they pleased. The units for traditional intellectuals were
41 "The Constitution of the CCP", in Documents of Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee: Sept., 1956 - April, 1969, Vol. /, Hong Kong, 1971: 23-26.
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mainly universities and schools, the Academy of Sciences, and the 
Associations of Writers and Artists. In each of these units, there was a 
Primary Party Organisation which decided what these intellectuals 
should/could do and what they should/could not do. The Party bosses in these 
units could be so powerful that they might brutally treat those intellectuals 
whom Mao and Zhou respected.42
To take professional writers and artists as examples, these people used to be 
the most undisciplined individuals who enjoyed lots of "freedoms" 
professionally and socially. But under the New System, they were all 
registered with their units (usually the Associations of Writers and Artists), 
and therefore were economically and politically tied to these units. Amongst 
hundreds of thousands of them, there is only one exceptional individual, Ba 
Jin, who has no economic relation to his unit (Shanghai Branch of China's 
Writers Association). That is to say, Ba Jin had no salary from any state-run 
unit. But like others, he was also restricted through holding posts in his unit: 
he must go there to participate in "ideological studies", public meetings, and 
political campaigns 43
A significant transformation of China's intellectuals followed the victory of 
the CCP. On the one hand, all members of the former revolutionary 
intelligentsia, together with the’peasants in uniform", became State Cadres 
(GUO JIA GAN BU) at various levels of government or Party organisation 
after 1949. On the other hand, until 1956, nearly all traditional intellectuals,
42  Cf., Chen Yi, 1979.
43 Ba Jin, 1987.
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except those who were accused of being counter-revolutionaries and thus 
arrested in Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign (1950-1952), and 
the Elimination of Counter-revolutionaries Campaign (1955), were given 
jobs by the Government in different units.44 The transformation of 
intellectuals from rebels or professionals into officials or salaried specialists 
structurally changed their position within society, and thus their relationships 
to material production and the state organs were altered. Intellectuals were 
now no longer ’’free professionals" in any sense; rather, they had become 
some sort of intellectual-official or intellectual-aristocrat.
After a century of chaos, China in the early years of the People's Republic 
was in an economic mess, and thus the CCP faced a huge task of construction 
or reconstruction. But there was a great shortage of intellectual and 
professional personnel. There were only some 185,400 university graduates 
within China between 1928 and 194745, for instance. Since 1949, there have 
been more and more graduates and post-graduates, as table 2.3. shows, but 
the number of educated people was still not sufficient as far as the economic 
construction is concerned. For instance, only 0.39 per cent of the whole 
population were university graduates or undergraduates in 1964 (and 0.59 
per cent in 1982).46
"When a thing is scarce, it is precious"(WU YIXI WEI GUI). As a result, the 
CCP and the Government firstly honoured all of the people who received
44  Zhou En-lai,1984:158-167.
45  ZHONG GUE GAO DENG XUE XIAO JIAN JIE (A Brief Introduction to Chinese 
Universities and Colleges), 1982:7.
4 6 1982 Population Census of China, 1985: 542-551.
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mid-school education or higher with the title of ZHI SHI FEN ZI("the 
members of people who have knowledge", or more simply, "intellectuals"). 
Secondly, They were divided into three categories according to their levels 
of education: (1). "Senior Intellectuals" (GAO JI ZHI SHI FEN ZI), 
including university professors, research fellows in the Chinese Academy 
and other institutes, well-known writers, artists and scientists; (2)."Ordinary 
Intellectuals"(PU TONG ZHI SHI FEN ZI), covering those people who 
received a university education(whether they finished it or not); and (3). 
"Little Intellectuals "(XIAO ZHI SHI FEN ZI), referring to the men and 
women who reached the second level of middle school education.
Table 2.3. Number of Graduates and Post-graduates in the PRC 
from 1949 to 1966.
Year Graduate Post-graduate
1949 21,353 107
1950 17,607 159
1951 18,712 166
1952 32,002 627
1953 48,091 1,177
1954 47,096 660
1955 54,466 1,730
1956 63,214 2,349
1957 56,180 1,723
1958 72,424 1,113
1959 69,839 727
1960 136,138 589
1961 151,283 179
1962 177,255 1,019
1963 198,754 1,512
1964 204,499 895
1965 185,521 1,665
1966 140,670 1,137
Total 1 ,695,104 17,534
Source: The Yearbook Of China [Education]: 1949-1981, 1982: 
964-971.
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These educated people were then treated as a special social group whose
knowledge and skills should be effectively used in the process of the
"Construction of a New China". The problem for the CCP and the
Government was not only that intellectuals were quantitatively few, but also,
more seriously, that the traditional intellectuals from the old society should 
be.
not^simply used. Instead, they should mould themselves into a new kind of 
intellectual: intellectual workers with "socialist consciousness" (or in Mao's 
words, with the consciousness of "serving the people"). Thus the CCP on the 
one hand needed intellectuals technically; on the other hand, it wanted to 
change them ideologically. The policy of the CCP toward intellectuals was 
accordingly "to unite, educate, and reform"(TUAN JIE, JIAO YU, GAI 
ZAO) them.
In praxis, to stroke and strike intellectuals alternately, as Merle Goldman 
suggested, was a contradictory policy: While the CCP tried to stimulate 
intellectuals to carry on creatively and productively within their professions, 
it also indoctrinated them in official orthodoxy.47
But China's intellectuals, whether we define them as educated people 
following the CCP or strictly as producers of ideas, in fact are scattered 
throughout society. Some may be members or officials of the ruling party, 
some may be just academics without any socio-political post, while others 
may be even in gaol. Following Gramsci, we have simply divided China's 
intellectuals into revolutionary intelligentsia and traditional intellectuals.
4? M. Goldman, 1971:1-2;1981: 9-10; 1985: 285-286. Also Cf., J.D. Seymour, 1968. As 
this research will show, the CCP has never got out of such a contradiction.
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Their actual situations are much more complicated than this theoretical 
classification suggests. China’s intellectuals since 1949 can be further divided 
into at least four smaller groups.
The first group can be called "the Revolutionary Intellectuals"(GE MING 
ZHI SHI FEN ZI). They are those who used to be university students 
(graduated or not graduated) before they became professional 
revolutionaries, and who were still either doing their academic research, 
artistic creation or literary criticism, from time to time, or at least were in 
charge of ideological affairs, including propaganda, culture, education, etc., 
after they became Party cadres. That they are called "revolutionary 
intellectuals" does not mean that they still had a critical attitude towards the 
status quo and further demanded a revolutionary change of the establishment 
after 1949. They are called so because they got deeply involved in the 
Revolution led by the CCP before 1949, and thus, after the victory of the 
CCP, like those "peasants in uniform", they were considered 
"revolutionaries". For the sake of remembering their past experience, they 
will be still named as "revolutionary intellectuals" in this thesis.
The second group is given the title of "the Patriotic Democratic 
Personages"(AI GUO MIN ZHU REN SHI) by the CCP, and will be simply 
called "Democratic Personages" in this research. This group includes those 
who were the leading figures of the eight small organisations which followed 
or co-operated with the CCP to different extents before 1949. Nearly all 
members of this group led privileged lives after 1949 and some of them 
might symbolically occupy high positions in officialdom without possessing 
real power.
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That the members of these small organisations were called "democratic 
personages" while these organisations were called "democratic parties" is not 
only because they were in favour of democracy in the Western sense, but 
also, more meaningfully, because the CCP thought these organisations were 
potentially co-operative in the Revolution before 1949, which was called by 
the CCP "new democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie led by the 
proletariat". After 1949, that these organisations were still called 
"democratic parties" hints that they were neither Communist organisations 
like the CCP nor reactionary organisations like Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist 
Party (KMT), but progressive bourgeois or petty-bourgeoisie organisations 
which actually belonged to the past. Therefore, "democratic personages" 
were thought to be neither comrades nor enemies, but "the fellow travellers" 
(TONG LU REN), that is to say, the people who were, and could still be seen 
as, friends.
The Party named the third group the "Old-type Intellectuals"(JIU ZHI SHI 
FEN ZI), and I will continue to use it, referring to China's old generation 
(i.e., the generation of pre-1949 China) of scholars, natural and social 
scientists, philosophers, historians, literary writers and artists in the fields of 
education, culture, science, technology, and literature and art. As we have 
pointed out, due to the Western influence since the Reform of 1898, this 
group of intellectuals should be no longer simply considered "traditional 
literati". Socio-economically they did not attached themselves to the 
establishment, becoming a kind of "free professionals". Ideologically they 
were partly Westernised and partly traditional, while politically they either 
maintained a position between the CCP and the KMT (some of them were
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members of the ’’democratic parties”) or tried to remain separate from 
politics.
The last of these four groups is ’’the New Generation of Intellectuals” (XIN 
YI DAI ZHI SHI FEN ZI). This is the generation whose members receive 
education after 1949. They were expected to be "New-type Intellectual 
Workers” who would eventually replace the Old-type Intellectuals.
Obviously these four groups of educated people, or "intellectuals”, were 
socio-politically so different that they should not be regarded as the same. 
The CCP elite was partly composed of the members of the first group 
themselves. During the first decade of the PRC, they supplied the staff the 
CCP relied on in cultural and educational circles to carry out the CCP's 
policies. The second group, in the eyes of the CCP, had co-operated with the 
CCP before 1949, and contributed to the establishment of the PRC, and thus 
were repaid with social prestige and comfortable living conditions but need 
not really participate in leadership and state affairs. The last group was 
guided by the CCP and educated under the New System, and thus, there was 
little problem, the CCP thought. And if there was, it would be at most a 
problem of some individuals rather than the Generation as a whole, because, 
until the Cultural Revolution in 1966, this generation was not "old" as well as 
"big” enough yet, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
The main problem for the CCP at the beginning of the PRC was, obviously, 
the problem of the third group—the "Old-type Intellectuals". The CCP 
wanted to use them for their technical skills while criticising them 
ideologically. As it has been showed, due to the great need of educated and
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skilled personnel for the sake of economic construction, the CCP in the 1950s 
managed to give almost all the Old-type Intellectuals jobs in either state-run 
or collective units. This kind of job in unit under the New System is, as we 
described earlier, an "Iron Rice Bowl", which would not be lost unless one 
broke the law or made a serious political mistake. Yet such a job no longer 
makes educated and skilled people greatly different from other state- 
employed people as far as their economic position is concerned. Except for a 
tiny group of privileged "famous personages"(ZHU MING REN SHI) or 
"senior intellectuals", nearly all the educated and skilled people lead a life of 
"eating enough but never too good" (JI YAO CHI BAO, DAN BU NENG 
CHI HAO), a life other urban commoners obtain.48 This is partially because 
of the ideal of building up a socialist society in which the difference between 
mental and manual workers will eventually disappear, partially because of 
the reality of the poor China where too many people need to be looked after, 
and thus because of the policy of "Low Salary, High Employment".
The CCP tried to reach a socio-economic egalitarianism in its "great course 
of socialist construction". Such an egalitarianism could be seen amongst 
various fields of employment in state-run units as far as employees' annual 
income is concerned. However, there were still differences. As Table 2.4. 
shows, in the PRC, from 1952 to 1978, in most years (except 1958 and 1959), 
the average income of employees in state-run scientific, cultural, educational, 
and hygienic units was usually lower than the average annual income of all 
employees in the state-run units. It was also lower than the average income of
48 Comparatively, the peasants' life is described as "eating porridge in slack season but dry 
food in busy season"(XIAN SHI CHI XI, MANG SHI CHI GAN).
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employees in all other state-run units, except that of employees in 
agricultural (from 1956) and trade ones.
Table 2.4. Average annual income of personnel in different state-run units.
YEAR Emplo­
yee
10,000
Av.
Income
¥1.00
1* 2 * 3* 4* 5* 6* 7 * 8 * 9*
1952 1,580 446 515 564 375 583 360 634 368 458 376
1953 1,826 496 576 591 433 643 381 650 392 498 423
1954 1,881 519 597 612 459 648 403 672 422 521 451
1955 1,908 534 600 612 461 645 443 610 448 532 479
1956 2,423 610 674 698 498 746 490 661 548 586 597
1957 2,451 637 690 744 501 752 529 651 580 613 631
1958 4,532 550 526 595 471 673 489 642 557 586 639
1959 4,561 524 514 554 411 627 454 589 542 583 631
1960 5,044 528 538 581 365 618 449 564 519 543 615
1961 4,171 537 560 596 362 620 455 582 519 553 605
1962 3,309 592 652 705 392 702 494 631 542 559 626
1963 3,293 641 720 775 421 760 550 672 574 604 658
1964 3,465 661 741 765 433 782 581 683 596 614 688
1965 3,738 652 729 730 433 774 579 687 598 624 684
1966 3,934 636 689 644 428 755 570 697 583 620 660
1967 4,006 630 701 672 426 754 563 696 578 620 681
1968 4,170 621 689 654 419 740 561 667 577 630 681
1969 4,335 618 683 661 418 734 561 660 564 611 680
1970 4,792 609 661 650 419 709 553 660 555 588 678
1971 5,318 597 635 662 426 709 539 655 554 604 668
1972 5,610 622 650 714 423 723 585 702 598 616 679
1973 5,758 614 640 715 436 714 568 680 582 602 659
1974 6,007 622 648 710 483 713 571 675 582 629 661
1975 6,426 613 644 704 460 699 562 639 574 609 645
1976 6,860 605 634 696 459 684 555 621 566 602 636
*: 1. Average Income in Industry; 2. Average Income in Building Construction;
3. Average Income in Agriculture, Forestry, Irrigation, and Meteorological Observation;
4. Average Income in Transportation and Communication;
5. Average Income in Trade;
6. Average Income in Urban Public Utilities;
7. Average Income in Science, Culture, Education, and Public Health;
8. Average Income in Banking and Insurance; and
9. Average Income in State/Party Organs and Mass Organisations.
Source: ZHONG GUO TONG JINIAN JIAN[ 1981] (Statistic Yearbook of China, 1981), 
Oversea Edition, Hong Kong, 1982: 107, 426.
Of course, it does not necessarily mean that all employees in scientific, 
cultural, educational, and health units were ’’intellectuals". For instance, even 
in 1982, amongst 26,457,518 employed professional and technical "experts", 
there were only 3,452,547 university graduates and undergraduates. That is
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to say, less than one eighth of the employees in these units received higher 
education.
At the same time, there were "intellectuals" in other units, for example, in 
State/Party organs, who were 2,564,422 together, including 1,223 men and 
women who had not got jobs yet.49 But, as the CCP authorities admitted, it is 
scientific, cultural, educational, and health units where most "intellectuals”, 
i.e., university graduates and undergraduates gathered.50 For example, as late 
as 1982, there were more than 57 per cent of university graduates and 
undergraduates in these scientific, cultural, educational, and health units.
If we further look into some differentiated details of their salaries, we will 
find that, in Peking area from 1956 to 1966, professors, scientists, doctors, 
and engineers earned between ¥117 and ¥345 per month, a higher payment 
than what workers got, as Table 2.5 shows. From Table 2.5 as well we saw 
the great differences between intellectuals and cadres as far as their salaries 
are concerned. Intellectuals earned lower salaries than cadres, for instance, 
professors in grade 1 earned less than cadres in grade 6, and cadres in grade 8 
earned as much as professors in grade 2. If we further remember that, under 
the "Communist System", cadres not only earned monthly salaries, but more 
importantly enjoyed special privileges, such as their houses, cars, telephone, 
secretaries, such differences would be more obvious.
49 19S2 Population Census o f China, Peking, 1985: 384-389, 404-431, 464-467, 470- 
471, 548-551.
50 Cf., Deng Xiao-ping, 1957.
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Table 2.5. Monthly salaries of professors, research fellows, doctors, engineers, and 
workers, cadres, in Peking Area from July 1956 to July 1966.
Grade on the Professor* Research Doctor Engineer*** Worker**** Cadre
wage scale fellow**
1 ¥345.0 ¥  345.0 ¥333.5 ¥  333.5 ¥  107.10 ¥644.0
2 ¥ 287.5 ¥  287.5 ¥287.5 ¥287.5 ¥  90.88 ¥581.0
3 ¥241.5 ¥241.5 ¥253.0 ¥247.5 ¥  77.15 ¥517.5
4 ¥207.0 ¥  207.0 ¥224.5 ¥  213.0 ¥  65.48 ¥460.0
5 ¥ 177.0 ¥  177.0 ¥200.0 ¥  183.0 ¥  55.59 ¥414.0
6 ¥  149.5 ¥149.5 ¥177.0 ¥ 157.5 ¥  47.19 ¥368.0
7 ¥126.5 ¥  155.5 ¥ 135.5 ¥  40.05 ¥  322.0
8 ¥  117.5 ¥  34.00 ¥287.5
*: This includes vice professor and some lecturer.
**: This includes associate research fellow, and some research lecturer.
***: This includes chief engineer, deputy chief engineer, and general engineer in heavy industry.
**♦*: This means manual workers in building industry.
Source: Yao Shu-ben, 1986: 87, 102, 119, 129, 150.
It may be questioned whether such a comparison of professors/research 
fellows/doctors/engineers to cadres is fair enough, for cadres in grades 1-8 
were actually those who occupied the highest posts of the country. These 
were: President and Vice-president of the State, Chairman and Vice- 
chairmen of the Standing Commission of the National Congress, Premier and 
Vice-premiers of the State Council (grades 1-3), and Ministers of the Central 
Government, Governors of provinces (grades 4-8). But if we just compare 
academics to cadres in universities, the latter still earned higher salaries than 
the former, as Table 2.6 shows.
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Table 2.6.Monthlv salaries of academics and cadres in universities, in Peking area, from 
1956 to 1966.(¥1.00 [RMB])
Grade 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Aca­
demic 345 287 241 207 177 149 126 106 89.5 78 69 62 56
Cadre 368 322 287 253 218 195 172 155 138 124 110 99 87
Source: Yao Shu-ben, 1986: 119-120.
Also we should remember that, before the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), 
professors and research fellows obtained a sum of remuneration if they 
published their books, but cadres usually did not publish their own works 
(Mao was an exception). The employees in literary and artistic units got 
almost the same amount of monthly salaries as other intellectuals due to a 
similar income system. And they too were not only given monthly salaries 
from their units, but also paid remuneration when they got their literary 
works published.
What is more, professors and writers consisted of a very small minority of 
the employees in universities and literary units. More precisely, taking 
professors as examples, from 1952 to 1965, as Table 2.7 shows, professors 
were never more than one fifth of the university academics, and since 1960, 
they decreased to less than 3 per cent. At the same time, the number of 
professors was getting lesser and lesser, from 5,223 in 1952 to 3,506 in 1965. 
Even if we put professors and vice-professors together, they were never 
more than one third of university academics. And, as time went on, the 
proportion of professors and vice-professors was continuously decreasing, 
from 30.13 per cent in 1952 to 5.71 per cent in 1965.
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Table 2.7. The proportion of professors to other university academics in China, 1952-1965.
Year Professor Vice-
professor
Lecturer Tutor* Assistant Total
1952 5,223 2,939 6,923 12,004 27,089
1953 4,792 2,981 7,495 18,362 33,630
1954 4,746 3,005 8,662 22,422 38,835
1955 4,522 2,977 10,095 24,472 42,066
1956 4,558 3,337 15,573 34,878 58,346
1957 4,615 3,453 17,464 44,486 70,018
1958 4,315 3,215 13,025 17,084 47,354 84,993
1959 3,936 3,073 13,306 18,411 60,931 99,657
1960 3,674 3,089 21,274 27,550 83,555 139,142
1961 3,871 3,529 24,358 28,878 98,100 158,736
1962 3,815 3,947 27,576 20,018 89,015 144,371
1963 3,713 4,472 29,553 13,244 86,943 137,925
1964 3,653 4,416 29,489 10,879 86,739 135,176
1965 3,506 4,382 29,200 11,611 89,417 138,116
*: Tutor here means the man/woman who has not been titled "lecturer" but already got higher 
payment than teaching assistant
Source: ZHONG GUO JIAO YU NIAN JIAN[1949-1981] (The Yearbook of China 
[Education], 1949-1981), Peking, 1984: 973.
Another example is the Chinese Academy of Sciences. From 1957 to 1973, 
the proportion of research fellows and associate research fellows also 
decreased, as Table 2.8 shows.
Table.2.8. Research staff in the Chinese Academy of Sciences from 1957 to 1973.
Year Research Fellow* Research Lecturer Research Assistant Total
Number % Number % Number %
1957 753 11.70 931 14.47 4,750 73.83 6,434
1962 623 3.91 2,113 13.26 13,198 82.83 15,934
1965 688 3.14 2,874 13.10 18,375 83.76 21,937
1973 414 3.07 1,768 13.13 11,289 83.80 13,471
*: This includes associate research fellows.
Source: ZHONG GUO SHE HUl TONG JIZ I LAO ( Statistical Data of Chinese 
Society), Peking, 1985: 197.
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Accordingly, we can say that in China under Mao, despite general socio­
economic equality, there was also a small socio-economic "elite" of cadres 
and "senior intellectuals". Further, as mentioned above, what we should 
remember is that from monthly salaries we cannot get a complete idea about 
the special privileges of state/Party cadres and some "senior intellectuals" 
who were given high posts (symbolically or functionally) in state organs. In 
spite of this, when comparing those first-grade professors and research 
fellows with top state/Party cadres, we can see an obvious distance from the 
rest as far as their income is concerned. On the other hand, if we look at the 
majority of university academics (lecturers and teaching assistants), of 
research staff in the Chinese Academy of Sciences (research lecturers and 
researching assistants), and of general doctors in hospitals from Table 2.9, 
we must draw the conclusion that the actual differences between them and 
manual workers still existed but the differences were quite small.
Table 2.9. Monthly salaries of lecturers, researchers, doctors, cadres and manual 
workers in Peking Area from 1956 to 1966.
Grade Lecturer* Research
Lecturer**
Doctor*** Cadre Worker****
7. ¥ 126.5 ¥ 126.5 ¥ 155.5 ¥322.0 (1).¥ 107.10
8. ¥106.0 ¥106.0 ¥ 137.0 ¥287.5 (2). ¥ 90.88
9 ¥ 89.5 ¥ 89.5 ¥ 121.0 ¥253.0 (3). ¥ 77.15
10 ¥ 78.0 ¥ 78.0 ¥106.0 ¥218.5 (4). ¥ 65.48
11 ¥ 69.0 ¥ 69.0 ¥ 91.0 ¥ 195.5 (5). ¥ 55.59
12 ¥ 62.0 ¥ 62.0 ¥ 79.5 ¥ 172.5 (6). ¥ 47.19
13 ¥ 56.0 ¥ 56.0 ¥ 69.0 ¥ 155.5 (7). ¥ 40.05
*: This includes teaching assistants who earned at most ¥ 89.50 per month.
**: This includes research assistants who earned at most ¥ 78.0 per month.
***: This includes interns who earned at most¥ 91.0 per month.
****: Manual workers in China were divided into only 8 grades, and those in grade 8 earned ¥ 34 per month. 
Cf., Table 2.5.
Source: Yao Shu-ben, 1986: 87,119, 129-130, 135, 150.
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Politically, the "old-type intellectuals" were mostly between the KMT and the 
CCP before 1949, and, because of KMT's escape from the mainland, they 
were facing a new question of how to get used to the New System under the 
leadership of the CCP after 1949. Not surprisingly, most of them maintained 
their non-party status while quite a few were arranged or "helped"(by the 
CCP) to be members of the "democratic parties".
For instance, 2,110 out of the 7,499 professors and associate professors at 
the end of 1955 were members of the "democratic parties" (28 per cent), but 
the CCP members were less than five per cent. At the same time, amongst 
more than 3,840,000 so-called "intellectuals" (including about 100,000 
"senior intellectuals") in scientific, engineering, educational, cultural, and 
health circles, only seven per cent of them were CCP members.51
As showed above, at the beginning of 1956, the CCP most optimistically 
judged that most educated people had already been members of the working 
class and thus supported its "socialist policies", therefore there should be 
more and more "intellectuals" to be recruited in the party.52 But six months 
later, the proportion of educated people in the CCP, including those who 
received secondary education, either finished or unfinished, was still less 
than 12 per cent, as Table 2.10. shows.
In fact, as late as 1985, seven years after the dramatic change of policy 
towards educated people who were again titled "members of the working 
class", the proportion of university graduates and undergraduates in the CCP
51 Li Wei-han, 1986: 803-810.
52 Mao Ze-dong, 1989: 348-349, 355; Zhou En-lai, 1984:179-180.
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was only four per cent while at the same time that of illiterate people was 
10.1 per cent, and that of "little intellectuals", i.e., the people who received 
secondary education, was still less than 14 per cent.53
Table 2.10. Class background of CCP members in June, 1956.
Background Number %
Peasants 7,417,459 69.10
Workers 1,502,814 14.00
Intellectuals* 1,255,923 11.70
Others 558,188 520
Total 10,734,384 100.00
*: "Intellectals" include those Party members who ever received secondary education, either finished 
or unfinished, either before or after joining the Party.
Source: Deng Xiao-ping, 1956.
To win over the majority of the non-Communist intellectuals was therefore 
one of the greatest and most difficult tasks for the CCP, for it needed 
educated and skilled people for the sake of economic construction on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, these "intellectuals" were not as easy to 
subjugate ideologically as they were to organise and to deal with 
economically. To change these old-type intellectuals ideologically, the CCP 
in the early years of the PRC launched the Thought Reform Campaign.
By the mid 1950s, however, the CCP and its leaders, especially Mao, 
recognised that some intellectuals belonging to the second group 
("Democratic Personages") were dissatisfied with their high positions 
without actual influence on policy-making and thus itched for the right to 
participate in political affairs, or, at least, to have a say in politics.
53 Cf., TONG Yl ZHAN XIAN GONG ZUO SHOU ZE (Handbook of United Front 
Work), Nanjing University Press, 1986: 140.
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Furthermore, even in the 1950s, and especially after the Great Leap Forward 
in 1958, quite a few members of the first group ("Revolutionary 
Intellectuals") did not want just to abide by the CCP passively; they were still 
critical of the status quo, and therefore, for the CCP, could be threatening to 
the establishment, for nearly all of them were Party members and some were 
high officials.54
To conquer those different groups of intellectuals ideologically, the CCP 
and Mao launched a series of political campaigns since the 1950s. The next 
two chapters will look into the whole process of the continual political 
campaigns in Mao's time, by which we will not only take a panorama of these 
political campaigns continuously, but also analyse the various roles of 
different groups of China's established intellectuals, and, furthermore, 
examine the problem of intellectuals' social locations in a "Soviet-type 
Communist" society, seeing whether they form a new ruling class, an 
independent stratum, or belong to some other classes or strata.
54 Without any doubt, the CCP has never been a monolithic bloc, but rather, there are 
always various factions within it, which are always fighting over this or that. In this 
research, when I examine the relationship between the intellectual and the CCP, I will 
consider inner-party conflict a significant factor in those political campaigns, and further, in 
the relationship between the intellectual and the CCP, though such an inner-party conflict 
itself should be another subject of research.When I study various kinds of China's 
established intellectuals, of whom those intellectuals within the CCP (i.e., most 
“revolutionary intellectuals”) consist of a considerably great number, I will notice that 
those revolutionary intellectuals, as well as some of other kinds of intellectuals, are of 
course greatly affected by such inner-party conflict. As a result, there are always various 
individual intellectuals who become victims, for they historically or ideologically identified 
themselves with certain factions which lost.
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CHAPTER 3: China's Established Intellectuals in Political
Campaigns(I)
YUN DONG in Chinese used by the CCP means either mass movement or 
political campaign, for instance, student movement, labour movement, and 
peasant movement in general; or reading campaign, aid-army campaign, and 
land-reform campaign in particular. To carry on a particular campaign, the 
leadership of the CCP usually first makes a decision, chooses the purpose, 
and puts forward the proposal; then sends work-teams to basic levels of units 
to communicate the Party's instructions,to mobilise the masses, and to 
practise the Party's decisions; and finally, examines the procedure of the 
campaign to see if the aim has been achieved, by finishing a work-report in 
which all successful or unsuccessful working experiences should be listed.1 
The following two chapters will focus on those political campaigns whose 
purpose was to criticise intellectuals or their works through thought reform, 
labour reform, or other means, by which the leadership of the CCP assumed 
that the old-type intellectuals could be remoulded ideologically while a new 
type of intellectual workers could be created. By systematically examining 
the process of the continual campaigns, we will have a clearer idea whether 
China’s intellectuals in a "Soviet-type Communist" society form an 
independent stratum, and, if they do not, whether they can/cannot freely float 
up and down amongst various classes.
1 Cf. G. Bennett,1976: 38-45; C.P. Cell, 1977: 43-73.
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I. The ** Old-type Intellectuals*1 in the Thought Reform Campaign
As we have seen in Chapter Two, when the CCP took power in 1949, there 
was a great task of economic construction and a great lack of intellectuals to 
carry it out. Besides those revolutionary intellectuals and "democratic 
personages", the majority of educated people were thought to be the "Old- 
type Intellectuals" who had some kind of specific knowledge or skill. The 
problem for the CCP was how to stimulate these old-type intellectuals to 
work creatively in their disciplines for the sake of "rebuilding China".
As we have mentioned in Chapter Two, by 1952, these old-type intellectuals 
were mostly given "Iron Rice Bowls": permanent jobs. However, in the eyes 
of Mao and his comrades, to rebuild China did not mean to restore the old 
China with its ancient ways, but rather it meant to create "a new China 
following the socialist road". According to the CCP, the old-type intellectuals 
used to attach themselves to landlords, national capitalists, comprador 
bourgeoisie, or even Western imperialists before 1949, rather than "free 
professionals" floating between various classes. And afterwards they were 
still considered to live in the "spiritual kingdom of exploiting classes' 
ideology". The old-type intellectuals hence should/could not be used intact as 
an active force. But instead, they had to be ideologically remoulded into a 
new kind of working man/women.
To achieve such an aim, from 1951 to 1952, the CCP launched a year-long 
Thought Reform Campaign amongst these old-type intellectuals. Since the 
old-type intellectuals were mostly teachers and university students, the 
campaign was firstly launched in the institutes of higher learning. On 29
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September 1951, Zhou En-lai delivered a lengthy mobilisation address to 
three thousand professors and academic administrators of 
universities/colleges from Peking and Tianjin. He called for the study of 
Marxism, especially Mao's works, and the criticism, especially self-criticism, 
of various non-proletarian ideas amongst the intellectuals. He even took 
himself as an example, showing the necessity of thought reform.2 Zhou's 
speech signalled the beginning of the Campaign. Shortly after that, all 
teachers in all levels of schools, as well as all students in universities,colleges, 
and high schools were involved in the Campaign. By 23 October 1951, Mao 
further declared that thought reform was necessary for all categories of 
intellectuals.3 It thus spread all over the country: intellectuals in all fields of 
literature and art, science and technology, religion, business, democratic 
parties, and even governmental organs began to study Mao's works and 
official papers, and to criticise/self-criticise their own bourgeois ideology 
and other kinds of non-proletarian world outlooks.
The Thought Reform Campaign was designed with three stages, as some 
Chinese and Western writers have argued.4 The first was the period of study. 
The old-type intellectuals from the elderly college dean to the newly- 
registered student were organised in groups, reading and discussing the 
prescribed works of Mao and official papers carefully and intensively: word 
for word, day and night. The intellectuals nevertheless could to a certain 
extent exchange their own opinions on the understanding of Mao’s works 
and the Party's documents at this stage, which lasted a month or so.
2 Zhou En-lai, 1984: 59-71.
3 Mao Ze-dong, in RMRB, 23 October, 1951.
4 Cf., T. Chen, 1960; Yang Jiang, 1988; and R. Liften, 1961.
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The second stage was different. The intellectuals started measuring 
themselves against the officially-given standards of the new kind of 
intellectual working person. They now found, or were found to have, so 
many "dirty” things in their minds: individualism, subjectivism, 
opportunism, dogmatism, bureaucratism, sectarianism, selfishness, vanity, 
arrogance, vacillation, and the ideal of Westernisation, especially pro- 
Americanism or America worship. To wash these ideas out of themselves 
completely, intellectuals should "take a bath in public"(DANG ZHONG XI 
ZAO), or in more vulgar words, "take off their trousers, then cut off their 
tails" (TUO KU ZI, GE WEI BA). That is to say, these old-type intellectuals 
should show "the evils" within their minds to the public shamelessly and then 
attack them mercilessly until they were thought to be cleared away. Every 
individual intellectual was asked to write down, to read in front of others, 
and to submit to authorities, the summary of his/her own personal 
experiences and social relations, in which the criticism was not general, but 
instead, specific, by demonstrating the process of his/her development. 
Therefore, to make a simple statement of position was not sufficient. Wrong 
opinions that were held must be confessed in details and then, through the 
study of Mao's works and examination, what his/her thought was now and 
why it was so must be explained by themselves, and finally it must be 
approved by the authorities and the audience. The numbers of listeners 
largely depended upon academic prestige: the more influential the subject, 
the larger the audience. Nationally well-known professors and scientists also 
published their self-criticisms in the press.
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The third stage was the last one, during which these self-criticisms were 
formally accepted one after another by the the authorities and thus the 
intellectuals were considered "to have passed the test" (GUO GUAN LE). 
Without doubt, not everyone could smoothly pass the test. Some of them had 
to rewrite their self-criticisms several times, while others could be seen as 
diehards. No matter what kind of people they were, they all underwent a 
reassignment of their jobs in the end:promotion or demotion.5
It is interesting to look through the articles published in official press during 
the campaign. If we take the People's Daily , the official newspaper of the 
Central Committee of the CCP, and the Guangming Daily , the newspaper of 
the intellectuals edited by the democratic parties, as examples, we can find 
that there were 227 signed articles relevant to the Thought Reform Campaign 
during the period of the campaign (30 September 1951-26 October 1952).6
These articles were published step by step alongside the campaign. At the 
beginning, they were mostly about the study of Marxism-Leninism and Mao 
Ze-dong Thought, such as Political Study amongst Teachers in Peking 
University, I Hope Teachers Will Be Successful in Their Political Study, 
Teachers in Universities!colleges Should Attend to Their Political Study in 
Earnest, My Attitude towards Political Study, and Political Study Should Be
5 R. Liften, 1961: 430-442; A.F. Thurston, 1988: 56-61;Yang Jiang, 1988: 219-292.
6 As I have emphasised in Chapter One, intellectuals had no other way to express 
themselves except through the official press in China from 1949 to 1976. Such official 
media should be considered either the expression of the ruling party (through different 
people) or the reflection of the reality of that controlled by the Party under which 
intellectuals showed themselves. Or in most cases, I would argue, they should be 
considered both.
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Helpful to Resolve Practical Problems. Then they were more about "thought 
reform", for instance, Making Up My Mind to Reform My Thought, I  Really 
Need Thought Reform,Why Should I Reform My Thought, On Thought 
Reform o f Intellectuals, and Negating My Past, Reforming My Thought. 
Finally they were concentrated on intense criticism and self-criticism, with 
titles like Criticising Bourgeois Ideology, Bourgeois Fallacies Must Be 
Exposed without Any Reserve, We Cannot Tolerate the Savage Offensive 
from Bourgeoisie, Fighting against Bourgeois Ideology , Criticising My 
Educational Ideas which Served the Reactionary Ruling Class , Criticising 
My Exploiting Ideas , Criticising My Corrupt Bourgeois Ideas, Hanging My 
Head, Admitting My Guilt, and My Reactionary Ideas Have Harmed the 
Peoples Education .
Table 3.1. The articles relevant to the Thought Reform Campaign, classified by subject.
Study Criticism & Self- Criticism  Total
in General
Criticism Self-criticism Countercriticim
RMRB* 28 9 41 78
GMRB** 44 21 82 2 149
Total 72 30 123 2 227
TOTAL 72 155 227
% 31.72 68.28 100
*: RMRB means People's Daily;
**: GMRB means Guangming Daily.
Source: RMRB, GMRB, 30 September 1951 - 26 October 1952.
As Table 3.1. shows, most of these articles were of criticism and self- 
criticism. That is to say, criticism and self-criticism was more important than 
just general call for study and thought reform.
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These articles were, of course, carefully chosen from numerous ones 
according to the Party's test and the authors' reputation. The authors were 
respectively the revolutionary intellectuals, the democratic personages, and, 
above all, the old-type intellectuals, because the Campaign was aiming at 
them, as Table 3.2. shows.
Table 3.2. Articles in the Thought Reform Campaign, classified on authors' locations.
Revolutionary
Intellectuals
Democratic
Personages
Old-type
Intellectuals
T otal
RMRB 5 7 66 78
GMRB 16 14 119 149
Total 21 21 185 227
% 9.25 9.25 81.5 100
Source: RMRB, GMRB, 30 September, 1951 - 26 October, 1952.
All of these authors were well-known intellectuals, amongst them were CCP 
intellectual officials in charge of culture and education, the leaders of the 
democratic parties, university principals, college deans, and other leading 
figures in various branches of learning. Their writings varied according to 
their different socio-political positions: while the revolutionary intellectuals 
and the democratic personages were calling for the study of Mao's works and 
thought reform in general, the old-type intellectuals were mainly criticising 
themselves. As Table 3.3. shows, four out of the five articles written by the 
revolutionary intellectuals in the People's Daily were general calls for the 
study of Mao's works and thought reform, the remaining one was on 
criticism. All seven articles by the democratic personages in the same paper 
were about study and thought reform. In the Guangming Daily, there were 
four self-criticism articles out of the sixteen by revolutionary intellectuals.
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More interestingly, there was only one self-criticism article by a democratic 
personage, and the author, Liang Shu-ming, wrote two counter-criticism 
articles as well. Most of the self-criticisms were written by the old-type 
intellectuals: all the 41 articles in the People's Daily, and 77 out of 82 in the 
Guangming Daily.
Table 3.3. Articles in the Thought Reform Campaign, classified on the subjects and the 
authors' locations.
Study in 
General
Criticism & Self- criticism Total
Criticism Self-criticism Countercriticim
RMRB
R. I* 4 1 5
D. P.** 7 7
O. I.*** 17 8 41 66
Total 28 9 41 78
% 35.90 64.10 100
GMRB
R.I.* 8 4 4 16
D.P.** 10 3 1 2 16o. i*** 26 14 77 117
Total 44 21 82 2 149
% 29.53 70.47 100
*: "R.I." stands for Revolutionary Intellectuals; 
**: "D.P." stands for Democratic Personages; 
***: "O.I." means Old-type Intellectual.
Source: RMRB, GMRB, 30 September, 1951 - 26 October, 1952.
If we further divide these old-type intellectuals into smaller groups 
according to their professions, we find that it was scientists in both the 
natural and social fields who made up the majority of these self-critics as 
Table 3.4. shows. This could be explained by the fact that in the early years of 
the PRC, the main target to win over through criticism and self-criticism was 
not democratic personages, nor literary writers and artists amongst the old- 
type intellectuals, but instead, natural and social scientists, whose knowledge 
and skill were more urgently needed in the course of economic construction.
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Table 3.4. Articles written by the old-type of intellectuals, classified by authors' 
professions and subjects of the articles.
RMRB
Study in 
General
Criticism Selfcriticism Total %
Natural Scientist 3 5 18 26 39.40
Social Scientist 4 2 14 20 30.30
Literary Writer 6 7 13 19.70
Others 4 1 2 7 10.60
Total 17 8 41 66
%
GMRB
25.76 1 2 .12 62.12 100
Natural Scientist 11 3 26 40 34.19
Social Scientist 12 2 43 57 48.72
Literary Writer 2 1 8 11 9.40
Others 1 8 9 7.69
Total 26 14 77 117
% 2 2 .2 2 11.97 65.81 100
Sources: RMRB, GMRB, 30 September, 1951 - 26 October, 1952.
Through thought reform, including the study of Mao's works, criticism and, 
more importantly, self-criticism, these old-type intellectuals could be 
ideologically remoulded, as both they themselves and the CCP expected, into 
the new kind of working men who were not only professionally like other 
salaried labourers but also politically like workers supporting the leadership 
of the CCP. Because of this expectation, there were no specific targets to be 
punished in the Thought Reform Campaign. In other words, while all of the 
intellectuals were asked to study Mao's works and other official papers 
seriously, and to denounce themselves sternly, nobody was politically 
punished. Of course many individuals were criticised. For example, amongst
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30 criticism articles in the People's Daily and the Guangming Daily, seven 
were criticisms of Liang Shu-ming, a man well-known in China since the 
1920s for both his academic career and political activities. His critics claimed 
that his self-criticism What Kinds of Progress I  have Made Since 1949 (in the 
Guangming Daily on 5 October 1951), was not enough.
These critics were nonetheless of the old-type intellectuals themselves. It 
seemed that they criticised Liang more in order to show their own successful 
ideological remoulding than to follow the CCP's line aiming at Liang as a 
target, for Liang wrote two counter-criticism articles as a reaction, and, 
more significantly, he still enjoyed the special privilege of being one of the 
tiny group of the famous non-communist personages who were interviewed 
by Mao regularly after the Thought Reform Campaign.7
However, there were intellectuals who underwent bad treatment, or at least, 
experienced psychological problems, in the Campaign, as the CCP's official 
textbook admitted thirty years later.8 An example was Shen Cong-wen, a 
distinguished novelist before 1949. Even before the Campaign was launched, 
his novels were thought to be an expression of petty bourgeois thought and 
therefore his books were banned after 1949, and he was criticised severely, 
being no longer considered to be qualified as a writer in the new society. 
Shen Cong-wen could not understand this and once attempted to commit 
suicide. In the end, he was assigned as an instructor in the Chinese History 
Museum.9
1 Liang Shu-ming, 1987:173-183. Cf. Dai Qing, 1989: 3-35.
8 Hu Hua, 1985: 65-66.
9 Ling Yu, 1988: 418-446; Nieh Hua-ling, 1972: 111-113; Huang Yong-yu, 1988.
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In spite of individual exceptions, one thing is clear: the CCP did not
launch the Thought Reform Campaign to punish China's old-type 
intellectuals politically, but on the contrary, to assert control over them 
ideologically, and to gain political support from them. At that time the CCP 
was confident that it had the capacity to build up a new China, while in the 
meantime recognising that without the cooperation of the intellectual an 
economically strong nation under the flag of socialism was impossible.
Of the political campaigns, the Thought Reform later turned out to be the 
mildest. It is doubtful whether the majority of the old-type intellectuals had 
really achieved the desired inner spiritual transformation through the 
Campaign. As far as the CCP's political control over these old-type 
intellectuals was concerned, however, the Campaign was indeed successful: 
the old-type intellectuals as a whole could no longer be a political problem 
for the CCP during Mao's time. There were still individuals from this group 
who were criticised or even punished from time to time. For instance, Feng 
You-lan, a great Chinese philosopher in this century, and Liang Si-cheng, an 
outstanding scholar in ancient Chinese architecture, were criticised.10 The 
old-type intellectuals would be further criticised in large numbers, especially 
during the Anti-Rightist Campaign in the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution 
in the 1960s. But in these later cases they were more victims who were 
criticised together with other main targets rather than main targets 
themselves. Since the Thought Reform Campaign, China's old-type
10 Liang Si-cheng in 1955, Liang Shu-ming in 1955,Ma Ying-chu in 1958, Feng You-lan 
in 1958 , Zhou Gu-cheng in 1964, were criticised. More details about Feng You-lan can 
be seen in Chapter 6 .
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intellectuals learned "to tuck their tails between their legs"(JIA ZHE WEI BA 
ZUO REN), i.e., they were overdiscreet in word and deed, feeling shame or 
even guilt at their class origins, past experiences, and various "dirty ideas". It 
was widely believed that "so long as they are living, intellectuals should go 
on studying and remoulding." (HUO DAO LAO, XUE DAO LAO, GAI 
ZAO DAO LAO.)
Just after the Thought Reform Campaign of 1951-1952, the CCP and its 
government began its First Five-year Plan. Intellectuals were expected to 
contribute their knowledge and skills to the construction of the nation. The 
problem now was less how to wash out various non-proletarian ideas in the 
minds of the old-type intellectuals than how to stimulate their enthusiasm for 
the socio-economic development of society. There was a great scarcity of 
technical experts in the 1950s, as we have showed in Chapter Two. To deal 
with such a problem, the CCP established more schools and enroled more 
students. From 1949 to 1955, there were 239,327 students who graduated 
from institutes of higher learning, and 794,445 from polytechnic schools.11
From the beginning of 1956, the CCP adopted a more relaxed policy toward 
the old-type intellectuals. In January 1956, the Central Committee of the CCP 
convened a special "Conference of Intellectuals". Zhou En-lai delivered an 
important address in which he, as a Party leader for the first time, declared 
that "the overwhelming majority of intellectuals had become government 
workers" and thus were "already a part of the working class". According to
11 ZHONG GUO JIAO YU NIAN JIAN (the Yearbook of China: Education), 1984: 
971,984.
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Zhou, intellectuals, who had passed five-years studying, working, and 
especially remoulding in political campaigns, should no longer be distrusted 
in their work. What is more, because of the fundamental change of their 
social locations, they should no longer be seen as members of the 
bourgeoisie, but instead, as members of the working class. The change of 
their world outlook, Zhou asserted, was a long process, and if they did not 
turn against the people in words and deeds, if they were prepared to devote 
their knowledge and energies to serving the people, the cadres of the CCP 
should be able to wait for the gradual awakening of their consciousness and 
help them patiently. Zhou even criticised Party men by complaining of 
certain unreasonable features in the present employment and treatment of 
intellectuals, and in particular certain sectarian attitudes amongst some of the 
CCP's officials towards intellectuals outside the Party. According to Zhou, 
intellectuals as members of the working class should be further recruited into 
the CCP, and he criticised the refusal of senior intellectuals who applied to 
join the CCP, blaming it "closed-doorism". In general, Zhou urged the 
offering of better working and living conditions to intellectuals in order to 
let them concentrate on their study and research.12
Without any doubt, it was still necessary for intellectuals to receive political 
education and ideological remoulding, because, according to both 
Confucianism and Maoism, everybody including the CCP leader (for 
instance, Zhou En-lai himself), needs remoulding. Old-type intellectuals 
could never be an exception. However, by locating educated people amongst
12 Zhou En-lai, 1984: 158-189.
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the working class, the CCP did to a great extent change its policy towards the 
old-type intellectuals. Why was there such a great change?
It could be argued that it was largely motivated by economic rather than 
political reasons because of the great lack of technical experts and the heavy 
load of rebuilding the country. It could also be argued that not all the Party 
leaders and officials agreed with Zhou's opinion. But if there had not been 
the social transference of these intellectuals from the old professionals to the 
new salaried working men/women, if the CCP had not got the impression that 
the old-type intellectuals as a whole did show their submissive obedience to 
the authorities during the Thought Reform Campaign and other campaigns 
or individual events, there would have been no change of policy, and Zhou 
would not have been able to make that address, no matter what he personally 
wished.
Ironically, this relaxed policy was short-lived. There were leaders within the 
CCP such as Zhou who realistically wanted to give great play to intellectuals' 
professional knowledge and skills in the process of economic development. 
But there were others, especially Mao, it was believed, who further tried to 
use intellectuals for political ends as well as to use them as a critical or even 
supervisory force outside the CCP.13
When some intellectuals—this time, mainly "democratic personages"— were 
really stimulated to play their given socio-political role, the CCP and Mao 
recognised that it was too dangerous to place trust readily in "intellectuals".
13 M.Meisner, 1988: 171-174.
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As a result, the CCP's policy towards educated people made a 180-degree 
turn: not merely the old-type intellectuals, but also, more noticeably, the 
democratic personages, and even some revolutionary ones, were thought 
to belong to the bourgeoisie, and some of them were further declared as 
"enemies of the people". Such a dramatic change of policy towards 
educated people resulted in a lot of tragic events and innocent victims in 
the PRC since 1957. It also revealed the fact that the CCP and its leaders, 
especially Mao, did not find the proper way to deal with the so-called 
"intellectuals".
II.The "Democratic Personages" in the Hundred-flower Period
While the Thought Reform Campaign, aimed at remoulding China's old- 
type intellectuals ideologically, was considered successful by the CCP as 
far as these old-type intellectuals' political attitude and behaviour during 
and after the campaign were concerned, the Anti-Rightists Campaign was 
not. This time, however, the main targets were not the old-type 
intellectuals, but the democratic personages.
The so-called "democratic personages" in the PRC were those leading 
figures of the eight small parties. These were: (l).the Revolutionary 
Committee of the KMT; (2).the Democratic Constmction Association; 
(3).the Democratic League; (4).the Association For Promoting 
Democracy; (5).the Democratic Party of Peasants & Workers; (6).the 
Third September Society; (7).the Party for the Public; and (8).the Taiwan 
Democratic Self-government League. Amongst them, the first three were 
the largest ones. They respectively consisted of the left-wing KMT 
generals/officials, the national capitalists, and the leading intellectuals.
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Besides the Democratic League, the Democratic Party of Peasants & 
Workers and the Third September Society were also intellectuals’ 
organisations.14
Unlike the old-type intellectuals, the democratic personages were those 
educated men and women who were interested, and indeed got involved, 
in politics before 1949. Politically, they were in the middle between the 
KMT and the CCP, called the "third force". As time went to the late 
1940s, the CCP achieved military victory one after another, these 
personages and their organisations started turning to the Left. In 1948, 
they officially claimed that they accept the leadership of the CCP earnestly 
and sincerely. Because these democratic organisations and their leaders 
enjoyed high prestige amongst intellectuals and national bourgeoisie, their 
political support of the CCP greatly helped the CCP to win over many 
urban educated men or men of property, who might have left the 
mainland with the KMT in 1949.15
To repay them for their support, the CCP honoured these democratic 
personages high posts, high reputation, and better living conditions after 
1949. But functionally, after 1949, these small organisations were 
political parties more in name than in reality, and their leaders became the 
democratic personages holding posts without real power.16 What is more, 
the most important positions in these organisations, for instance, the
14 Cf., Jiang Ping, 1987; Yu Gang, 1987.
15 Of these democratic parties, the Democratic League of China was the most 
influential one amongst intellectuals. More details about its history can be seen in A.J. 
Shaheen, 1977; and Y.C. Ting, 1978.
16 Cf., M.Meisner, 1988:69; H.C. Hinton, 1973: 245-247.
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secretaries-general, were even occupied by the secret members of the 
CCP.17
Table 3.5. Education background of the top leaders of the CCP, and of the Democratic 
League, the Democratic Party of Peasants & Workers, the Third September Society in 
the 1950s.
CCP DL* DPPW** 3rd SS*** Total
Middle School 3 1 4
College 3 1 2 6
First Degree 4 3 1 8
Msc/M.A. 3 3
PhD 1 2 3
Total 6 6 6 6 24
*: DL stands for the Democratic League;
**: DPPW stands for the Democratic Party of Peasants & Workers; 
***: 3rd SS stands for the Third September Society.
Sources: 1. REN MIN SHOU CE, 1957 ( People's Yearbook, 1957), the Da-gong 
Daily Press, Peking, 1957; 2MIN GUO REN WU ZHUAN (Biographies o f China's 
Figures of the Republic), Vol. 1-6, edited by Li Xing, Song Zhi-wen, et al, China 
Publishing House, Beijing, 1978-1987; 3. Biographical Dictionary o f Republican 
China, Vol. I - IV, edited by H. L. Boorman, Columbia University Press, New York/ 
London, 1967, 1968, 1970, 1971; 4. Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 
1921-1965, Vol. I - II, edited by D.W. Klein, A. B. Clark, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971; 5. Who's Who in the People's Republic o f China, 
edited by W. Bartke, K. G. Saur, Munchen/ New York/London/ Oxford/Paris, 1987; 
6 .Who's Who in China, 1918-1950, edited by J. Cavanaugh, Chinese Materials 
Center, Hong Kong, 1982; 7. Who's Who in Modern China, edited by M. Perleberg, 
Ye Olde Printerie Ltd., Hong Kong, 1954.
On the other hand, like the old-type intellectuals, these democratic 
personages in general were more qualified as "the people who have 
knowledge" than the CCP's leaders as far as their formal education and 
scholarly experiences are concerned. The difference of education
17 Qian Jia-ju, 1986: 193. ’’The secret members of the CCP" were those whose 
membership were neither open to the public nor to other members of the CCP (except 
for their direct leaders) and democratic parties. Cf., Liao Meng-xing, 1987.
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background between the top leaders of the CCP, and the top ones of the 
Democratic League, the Democratic Party of Peasants & Workers, the 
Third September Society can be seen from Table 3.5. When they worked 
together, a new question arose: who are more qualified to be officials?
In 1949, when the PRC was established, the Government seemed to be a 
coalition, for three out of the the six vice-chairmen of the Central 
Government, and two out of four vice-Premiers of the Government 
Administrative Council (the predecessor of the State Council), were 
democratic personages. Further, as Table 3.6. shows, the democratic 
personages also occupied some other important positions in the state 
leadership, although most of them, if not all of them, actually just 
’’holding posts without real power".
Table 3.6. The political status of the personages in the State Organs in October, 1949.
the Central 
Government
CCP Non-CCP Total
Chairman 1 1
Vice-chairmen 3 3 6
Members 
the State 
Council*
28 28 56
Premier 1 1
Vice-premiers 2 2 ** 4
Ministers 20 15 35
Members 7 9 16
Total 62 57 119
% 52.10 47.90 100
* It was called the Government Administrative Council then.
**: Of them one post was actually occupied by Guo Mo-ruo, a secret member of the CCP, who played 
the role of non-party personage. More details can be seen in Chapter Six.
Source: People's Yearbook, 7957, pp. 165-176, Dagong Daily Press, Shanghai, 
1952.
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At the provincial and lower levels, democratic personages also held some 
posts. These posts, however, were more symbolic than functional, because 
all the policies were exclusively made by the CCP, either by the Central 
Committee or, at a lower level, by the Party Committees, and the 
democratic personages as non-Party members, in most cases, could not 
attend CCP’s policy-making meetings, nor could they have the privilege 
of reading the so-called "classified papers" or "confidential documents". 
In spite of this, the democratic personages in the early years of the PRC 
indeed obtained some positions in the State organs at least in name.
By the time of 1952-1953, when the CCP and its leaders, especially Mao, 
decided to leap forward to a socialist economic model, such a "coalition 
government in name" existed even less than it had done before. In 1954, 
Mao became the President of the State in the First National People’s 
Congress, when the only Vice-President was Zhu De, Mao's old partner 
in the Red Army since 1927. Much more significantly, in the State 
Council, under Premier Zhou, all of the 10 Vice-Premiers and the 8 
Heads of the eight Offices were Party officials. The non-Party personages 
now had to be unwillingly moved to the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, which was thought to be a rubber-stamp 
body, for it always "approved" the Party's decision.
Nevertheless, as Table 3.7. shows, non-Party personages were amongst 
the leadership, and some of them even maintained ministership in the State 
Council, although they mostly held the posts without power. The problem 
is that not all of them were satisfied with such a position, as we are soon 
going to see.
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Table 3.7. The leadership of the PRC in First National People's Congress 
of 1954.
CCP member Non-CCP member Total
President 1 1
Vice-president 1 1
State Council
Premier 1 1
Vice-premiers 10 10
Heads of Offices 8 8
Secretary General 1 1
Ministers
Standing
Committee
22 13 35
Chairman 1 1
Vice-chairmen 5 8 13
Secretary General 1 1
Total 51 21 72
% 70.83 29.17 100
Source: People’s Yearbook, 1955, PP. 216, 275-276, Dagong Daily Press, 
Tianjin, 1955.
In the mid-1950s too, the Government had increasing success in fulfilling 
the First Five-year Plan in advance. The total output value of industry and 
agriculture in 1956 was ¥125,200,000(RMB), an increase of 54.6 per cent 
over 1952, 170 per cent over 1949. During the First Five-year Plan 
period(1952-1957), China's industry grew very rapidly. According to 
official data, the actual per annum increase was 18 per cent, or 16 per cent 
according to Western estimates. It was anyhow more than the ambitious 
14.7 per cent yearly increase set by the plan.18 During this period as well, 
the CCP transformed private industry and commerce into state or semi­
state enterprises, and self-sufficient agriculture into co-operatives or 
collectives. China's peasants, who had been self-supported farmers
M.Meisner, 1988: 123.
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scattered over the vast land, were organised nationwide into firstly 
Mutual Aid Teams, and then Cooperatives.19
Such a transformation was so fast that some figures within the leadership, 
such as Zhou En-lai, recognised that there was a tendency towards "rash 
advance"(MAO JIN) but failed to stop it or at least slow it down. Instead, 
Mao severely criticised these figures within the CCP as "the men who are 
only 50 metres from the Rightists".20
But in spite of these achievements, in spite of the Three-anti Campaign in 
1952-1953 (i.e., Anti-corruption, Anti-waste, & Anti-bureaucracy 
Campaign), by 1956, many party cadres, after 7 years in office since 
1949, were becoming more and more bureaucratised. It was almost 
inevitable that persons, who, as governmental administrators, were in the 
positions that had the effect of separating themselves from the masses, 
should become more and more bureaucratic. Some "old cadres"21 now 
thought that it was their turn to enjoy power and privilege when the CCP 
in its power increasingly attracted new comers who saw party 
membership as the avenue for a career in government and a stepping stone 
for higher posts. Such a process of revolutionaries becoming rulers
19 The Cooperative itself developed from Elementary Cooperative, in which 
distribution was according to the amount of land peasants contributed, to Advanced 
Cooperative, in which the land and other chief means of production were 
collectively owned by the Co-op and the distribution system was based on the principle
of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work".
20 Mao, 1969: 145-154,299-300; 1974: 138. Cf., Li Rui, 1989: 170-172.
21 "Old cadre" in Chinese under the CCP does not necessarily mean a cadre in his old 
age. On the contrary, it means a cadre who has been a member of the CCP for a long 
time.
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resulted in more contradictions between the cadres and the masses. How to 
handle these contradictions became another problem.
Theoretically, these two kinds of problems were mutually interdependent: 
on the one hand, the rapid development of the economy could make the 
former revolutionaries more bureaucratised and the contradictions 
between the cadres and the masses more serious; on the other hand, the 
bureaucratisation of the cadres and the serious contradictions between the 
cadres and the masses could in turn retard the development of the 
economy and further shake the stability of society. Hence the task in front 
of the CCP, whose aim was to develop China’s economy rapidly while 
protecting society from disorder and polarisation, was to handle the 
contradictions between the cadres and the masses correctly.
Both the old-type intellectuals and the democratic personages were not as 
active as the CCP expected. For the former, through the Thought Reform 
Campaign and the transformation of their social positions from old-style 
professionals to the new salaried working people, it was still bitter to be 
told that they were nevertheless politically different from the working 
class, for there would always be a bourgeois kingdom of ideology in their 
minds because of their social and educational background. For the latter, 
it seemed ironical to mount the rostrum but hold little actual power.
As we have already seen, in January 1956, Zhou delivered an important 
address on intellectuals in which he declared that the majority of educated 
people were already members of the working class, and appealed to CCP 
officials to respect their intellectual works and to improve their living 
conditions. As members of the working class, educated people, especially 
the established intellectuals, should therefore be recruited into the CCP.
1 3 2
By the end of 1955, it was said that there were around 100,000 senior 
intellectuals, but only 7 per cent of them were the members of the CCP. 
Whereas, amongst 7,499 professors and vice-professors of higher 
education of learning all over the country, 2,110 were the members of the 
democratic parties, that is, 28 per cent. If we look into those who occupied 
the posts of university principles, college deans, and department heads, 
the proportion was as high as one third.22 Since Zhou declared that the 
majority of educated people were already members of the working class, 
there were more and more individual intellectuals who were recruited by 
the CCP. For instance, in the first two months of 1956,110 intellectuals in 
Shanghai joined the Party. They consisted of "experts, scholars, writers, 
artists and engineers who had made great contributions in teaching, 
scientific research, engineering technique, and cultural and artistic 
pursuits". On 21 March 1956, an editorial was published in the People's 
D aily, entitled Do Well with Our Membership Drive amongst 
Intellectuals. Afterwards, more university academics were admitted to be 
members of the CCP. In Changchun alone, for example, in the first three 
months, 228 professors joined the CCP. In the first half of 1956, 300 
senior intellectuals joined the CCP in Peking and Shanghai, and 2,592 
senior intellectuals in the whole country.23
The most dramatic signal of the change of policy towards intellectuals was 
the slogans of "Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of 
thought contend"(BAIHUA QI FANG, BAIJIA ZHENG MING). "Let a 
hundred flowers blossom" was actually used by Mao and other CCP 
leaders as early as 1951 for the theatrical reform,24 while "Let a hundred
22 Li Wei-han, 1986: 803-810.
23 T.H.E. Chen, 1960: 111-112.
24 n . Das, 1979: 2.
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schools of thought contend" was borrowed from the Chinese classics of 
the Spring & Autumn Annals(722-481 B.C.) and Warring States(403-221 
B.C.), when many schools arose including Confucianism, Taoism, and 
Legalism. Mao in 1952 said that there should be no orthodox school 
within the field of historical research, including research into the history 
of the CCP.25 On 2 May 1956, for the first time, Mao combined these two 
"let-a-hundred" together and adopted them as the policy for promoting 
progress in science and literature in his address to the Supreme State 
Conference. Then, on 26 May, Lu Ding-yi, director of the Propaganda 
Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, made a lengthy address 
Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom, Let a Hundred Schools o f Thought 
Contend. He authoritatively elaborated the new policy and explained that 
the policy meant "freedom of independent thinking, freedom of debate, 
freedom of creative work, freedom to criticise, to express and to maintain 
one's own views" in literature, art and science. These freedoms were of 
course limited "within the ranks of the people themselves", according to 
Lu. He explained that the reason for adopting such a relaxed policy was 
that ideological questions could not be resolved by administrative orders, 
and only through open debate could right overcome wrong step by step.26
If this "Double-hundred Policy" was specially designed for creating a 
relatively liberal atmosphere amongst the old-type intellectuals so that 
they could be more enthusiastic for the nation's construction and the 
healthy development of literature, art, and sciences, etc., the policy of 
"Long-term coexistence, mutual supervision" (CHANG JI GONG CUN, 
HU XIANG JIAN DU) was adopted more as a political strategy in
25 Li Shu, 1989.
26 Lu Ding-yi, 1956.
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cooperation with the democratic parties. Mao even said that there should 
be two "long-lives": long live the CCP, and long live the democratic 
parties. Zhou explained that the CCP and the democratic parties could die 
at the same time in future although they were bom on different dates.27 
That is to say, as long as the CCP exists, the democratic parties will be 
allowed to continue.
However, as we have said, these democratic parties were by no means 
opposition parties in the Western sense, but cooperative organisations 
under the leadership of the CCP. The question is, if these democratic 
parties were in theory defined as the organisations of the national 
bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, and the intellectuals belonging to them, 
while the CCP was the party of the proletariat, how could they co-exist 
for long? Did it mean that, alongside the "socialist transformation" of 
industry and agriculture, the national bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, and 
their intellectuals had already changed into working men as a whole, and 
thus the contradiction between the working class and the national 
bourgeoisie and their intellectuals, between the CCP and the democratic 
parties, no longer existed? Or did it mean that the contradiction still 
existed but was no longer antagonistic, instead, it was the contradiction 
within the rank of the people?
There has always been debate about the original intention of the change of 
policy towards intellectuals and the democratic parties. Some think that 
the policy was a "trap" , i.e., it deliberately encouraged intellectuals to 
commit themselves in order that the CCP could know what the 
intellectuals really thought and then might have a pretext to criticise or
2? Li Wei-han, 1986: 813, 823.
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even punish those whose ideas deviated from the orthodox ideology. 
Those who hold the ’’trap theory" have strong evidence when they find 
that it was Mao himself who said during the Anti-Rightist Campaign that 
the purpose of the "unchecked" publication of the intellectuals' criticism 
during the Hundred Rowers period, especially the five weeks from 1 May 
to 7 June, was "to catch big fish", or in Chinese saying, "to lure the snake 
out of his lair in order to kill him easily"(YIN SHE CHU DONG).28 
Others insist that there was no "trap" at all because from the outset the 
leadership of the CCP including Mao had already clearly distinguished the 
Left and the Right.29
As a matter of fact, the real process is more complicated. It was suggested 
that in 1957 Mao could have continued his liberal policy towards 
intellectuals and democratic parties if there had not been the challenge 
from other leaders of the CCP, for instance, Liu Shao-qi.30 Undoubtedly 
the CCP was not a monolith in the mid-1950s, as indeed it has never 
been. However, no evidence has been found that Liu Shao-qi and others in 
the highest level at that time disagreed with Mao on the CCP's policies of 
"Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought 
contend" and "Long-term coexistence, mutual supervision". On the other 
hand, as we have already said, the main task for the CCP in the mid-1950s 
was to develop China's economy as far as possible. Because of this, 
support from non-Party intellectuals was technically necessary. It seems 
that the leadership of the CCP had come to an agreement on this for the 
time being, which can be seen from both Mao's speeches during that 
period and Liu Shao-qi's Political Report at the Eighth Congress of the
28 Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 444.
29 Deng Chu Min, 1957.
30 Qian Wei-chang, in RMRB, 17 July, 1957; R. MacFarquhar, 1974, passim.
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CCP in 1956, although at lower levels, Mao admitted then, as many as 
eighty to ninety per cent of CCP officials did not understand and 
therefore did not support this ’’Double-hundred Policy".31 (My emphasis)
Another reason that the CCP adopted these relaxed policies towards 
intellectuals and democratic parties in the mid-1950s is that the leadership 
tried to avoid events like those happening in Poland and Hungary in 1956. 
Mao was warned by such events that if the contradictions within a so- 
called socialist society were not correctly distinguished and handled the 
leadership could be severely shaken. Mao divided these contradictions 
into two kinds: antagonistic and non-antagonisitic ones.
An antagonistic contradiction is the one between the people and their 
enemies, whereas a non-antagonistic contradiction is the one amongst the 
people themselves. By "the people"(REN MIN), Mao meant the classes, 
strata and social groups which favour, support and work for the cause of 
socialist construction. The CCP and Mao thought in 1956 that the main 
contradictions in China were those amongst the people because the acute 
class stmggle had in the main finished. However, if the non-antagonistic 
contradictions were not properly handled, Mao innovatively pointed out, 
they could develop into antagonistic ones, and bring chaos.
Mao thought whether or not the contradictions could be properly handled 
depended upon whether or not the leadership correctly distinguished the 
two kinds of contradictions and what kinds of methods were accordingly 
used. Mao insisted that, whereas the antagonistic contradictions between
31 Mao Ze-dong,1989: 204, 210, 240-241, 337; Liu Shao-qi, 1956. Cf., Li Wei-han, 
1986: 845.
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the people and their enemies should, in most cases, be resolved by 
dictatorship, that is, by using the state machine, such as the police, to 
suppress "enemies of the people", the non-antagonistic contradictions 
among the people should be handled by democratic methods. That is to 
say, discussion, education, persuasion, criticism and self-criticism, rather 
than compulsory and coercive means, should be used. What is more, if the 
leadership just simply suppressed people including intellectuals, who 
merely expressed their opinions, greater problems like the events in 
Poland and Hungary would eventually result.32
Amongst various non-antagonistic contradictions, one was the 
contradiction between the intellectual and the CCP, or in CCP's words, 
"the contradiction between intellectuals and the working class". This is 
why the CCP convened a special conference in January 1956 to deal with 
the problem of intellectuals, trying to obtain the support from them.
But there was another non-antagonistic contradiction at that time: the one 
between the masses and the cadres, or in CCP's words, the problem of 
bureaucracy.33 To deal with this, the CCP in 1956 launched an Open-door 
Rectification Campaign (KAI MEN ZHENG FENG), the aim of which 
was to get rid of bureaucracy within officialdom.
It was the first time since 1949 that the CCP leadership invited 
intellectuals, especially democratic personages, to criticise bureaucratism, 
subjectism, and sectarianism within the CCP. As a matter of fact, there 
was no campaign called "Hundred Flowers" in China at that time, but
32 Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 384-391.
33 Unlike Stalin's leadership, Mao's openly admitted the existence of official 
bureaucracy. But unlike Djilas or Trosky, Mao thought it non-antagonistic.
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’’Rectification". It was a campaign during which the CCP asked both the 
democratic personages and the old-type intellectuals to "contend and 
bloom"(MING, FANG), like a hundred schools of thought or a hundred 
flowers of art, in order to express their critical opinions, and to help the 
CCP to get rid of bureaucracy.
The question is, why did the CCP invite non-Party intellectuals to criticise 
it? The idea that a Communist party should always listen to the masses of 
the people can be found in Mao's writings in the 1930s. According to him, 
in a rectification campaign, people should adhere to the principle of 
"telling all that you know, and telling it without reservation; blaming not 
the speaker, but heeding what you hear; correcting mistakes if you have 
committed them, and avoiding them if you have not." But such a principle 
had seldom practised, and if it had, it was only applicable within the CCP 
itself or between the CCP and "the masses of the people". (In the past the 
"people" classified mainly as workers and peasants.) In 1957, however, 
for the first time democratic personages and the old-type intellectuals 
were involved in the CCP's Open-door Rectification and were asked to 
play an active role, like critics. It obviously meant that, in the eyes of the 
CCP, educated people in both categories of the "democratic personages" 
and the "old-type intellectuals" were amongst the masses of the people.
One explanation of the CCP's invitation of intellectuals as critics is that the 
CCP leadership thought the intellectuals as a whole were trustworthy. One 
might cite as evidence for this Zhou En-lai's claim in January 1956 that 
most of the intellectuals were already members of the working class, or 
Mao’s statement in February 1957 that most of the intellectuals had made 
marked progress since 1949 and had shown that they were in favour of the 
established system.
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Moreover, in January, 1956, and March, 1957, Zhou and Mao even 
sought the recruitment of one third of all intellectuals into the CCP by the 
end of the Third Five-year Plan, that is, by the end of 1967.34
Another explanation, more complicated, is that it had always been Mao's 
strategy to deal with a question before it became a problem, and that the 
CCP's leadership, especially Mao, learned a lesson from events in Poland 
and Hungary in 1956. Therefore, they tried to avoid chaos by letting 
people speak out instead of suppressing their opinions until they 
developed into such a serious situation that a "Hungarian Incident" would 
be unavoidable. As Mao himself said later,
by launching the rectification of our own accord, we have purposely invited 
a possible 'Hungarian Incident’, broken it down into many small 
'Hungarian Incidents' staged in various organisations and colleges, and 
dealt with them individually. 35
Nonetheless, there is no evidence at all that the CCP and Mao deliberately 
plotted for the punishment of the democratic personages (and the old-type 
intellectuals) when the slogans of "Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a 
hundred schools contend", and "Long-term coexistence, mutual 
supervision" were put forward. On the contrary, it seemed that Mao and 
the CCP were too optimistic and self-confident at the beginning.
Comparatively, both democratic personages and the old-type intellectuals 
hesitated about participation in the blossoming and contending when they
34 Zhou En-lai, 1984: 179-180; Mao Ze-dong, 1989: 349, 355. Cf., F.C. Teiwes,
1979:236.
35 Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 450.
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were just invited. On 24 March 1957, professor Fei Xiao-tong, a key 
figure in the Democratic League and a leading social anthropologist, in 
his The Early Spring for the Intellectuals, showed that many intellectuals 
saw the new official evaluation of intellectuals in Zhou En-lai's speech in 
January 1956 as their "re-liberation”. However, they still worried about 
the political weather, seeing it as an early spring which could be followed 
by a colder wave.36
Historian Jian Bo-zhan, another well-known intellectual, wrote Why Is 
There still the Feeling of Early Spring? four weeks later. Jian saw that, 
after the "Double-hundred" policy was advanced for more than a half 
year, the socio-political atmosphere was still like a special kind of 
weather: "the thunder clap is loud, the raindrops are small". That is to say, 
people were talking about the policy everywhere, but there was no real 
blossoming and contending. Jian complained that "the leadership cadres in 
some places or establishments are limiting themselves to giving lip service 
to the slogan without taking action to make flowers blossom forth or 
relaxing their restrictions." As a result, intellectuals
"have to guess to what extent, if the call is sincere, flowers will be allowed 
to blossom forth and whether the call will be recalled after the flowers are in 
bloom. They have to guess whether the call for flowers is the end or just a 
means and whether the call is made for the sake of bringing prosperity to 
culture and science or of unearthing thoughts and rectifying individuals.
They have to guess which are the problems that can be brought up for 
discussion and which are the problems that cannot be discussed. "37
J^Fei Xiao-tong, 1957^. A detailed study of Fei and his involvement in the Campaign 
will be seen in Chapter Five.
37 Jian Bo-Zhan, 1957. English translation is adopted from MacFarquhar, 1960.
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Of course there were people, especially some democratic personages, who 
had already bravely criticised the CCP since it put forward the slogan of 
’’Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought 
contend”. For example, in speeches to the People's Political Consultative 
Conference, Zhang Bo-jun, a Vice-chairman of the Democratic League 
and Chairman of the Democratic Party of Peasants & Workers, suggested 
that the work of the People's Political Consultative Conference (in which 
the democratic parties play their political roles) should be strengthened. 
Another example was Luo Long-ji, another Vice-Chairman of the 
Democratic League. Luo thought that amongst senior intellectuals, "there 
are many who study social sciences... have no class to teach”, and some 
who returned from either Britain or the United States were not suitably 
employed but were given jobs as cart-pullers or cigarette-pedlars. Luo 
further pointed out that "during the past years there were not many 
flowers bloomed and few schools of thought contended in the academic 
and ideological fields... The basic cause lies in the fact that the senior 
intellectuals are still suspicious and are still plagued by misgivings."38 As 
a matter of fact, as early as July 1956, Zhang Bo-jun, Luo Long-ji, and 
Zhang Nai-qi, a Vice-Chairman of the Democratic Construction 
Association, complained that the CCP officials and non-CCP officials 
were not politically equal in governmental organs. They even claimed that 
the democratic parties should be like advisory bodies.39
Without doubt, Mao could not completely agree with the above opinions. 
As early as January 1957, he complained that in the CCP there was a 
tendency to stress arranging jobs for intellectuals to the neglect of
38 RMRB, 19, 23 March, 1957. English translation is partly adopted from 
MacFarquhar, 1960.
39 Cf., Li Wei-Han, 1986: 820-821.
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remoulding them. In his opinion, there was too much of the former and 
too little of the latter. Was he criticising Zhou En-lai indirectly here, for 
Zhou in his speech On the Problem of Intellectuals in January 1956 did 
emphasis the former but talk about the later not very much? In the 
meantime, according to Mao, there was queer talk amongst professors, 
"such as that the Communist Party should be done away with, the CCP 
cannot lead them, socialism is no good, and so on and so forth." "Before," 
Mao went on, "they kept these ideas to themselves, but since the policy of 
'Let a hundred schools of thought contend’ gave them an opportunity to 
speak up, these remarks have come tumbling out."40
Did he hence regret his "Double-hundred Policy" and now want to punish 
those professors? The answer is negative. In the same speech, for instance, 
Mao insisted that the policy of "Let a hundred flowers blossom" was 
correct. He said:
Some comrades hold that only fragrant flowers should be allowed to 
blossom and that poisonous weeds should not to be allowed to grow. This 
approach shows little understanding of the policy of 'Let a hundred flowers 
blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend.'... We should allow 
democratic personages to challenge us with opposing views and give them a 
free hand to criticise us. Otherwise we would be a little like the KMT.
As for those who made wrong criticism such as Zhang Nai-qi,
if they want to fart, let them.... The falser their words and the greater their 
mistakes, the better, and the more isolated they will become and the better 
they will educate the people by negative example 41
40 Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 353.
41 Mao, Ibid., pp. 358-359, 375-376.
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A month later, on 27 February, 1957, Mao made one of his most 
important and famous speeches entitled On the Correct Handling o f the 
contradictions among the People to about 1,800 high officials, including 
the leading democratic personages, at the session of the Supreme State 
Conference. Mao optimistically announced that "never before has our 
country been as united as it is today" because "the large-scale, turbulent 
class struggles of the masses characteristic of times of revolution has in 
the main come to an end."A2(My emphasis)
In short, he was saying that there were, of course, contradictions within 
the Chinese society, but they were mainly non-antagonistic ones among 
the people, and thus should be correctly handled only through education, 
including criticism and self-criticism. The formula was: "From unity, 
through criticism, to unity".
Mao then explained why the CCP leadership put forward the slogans of 
"Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought 
contend" and of "Long-term coexistence and mutual supervision" as its 
policies towards the intellectuals and democratic parties. Firstly, the 
"Double-hundred Policy" was adopted (1) "in recognition of the 
continued existence of various contradictions", which were mainly non- 
antagonistic in China then, and (2)"in response to the country's urgent 
need to speed up its economic and cultural development." That is to say, 
on the one hand, it would be harmful to simply suppress people's opinions 
by administrative measures, which, in the long run, would result in bigger 
problems. On the other hand, for the sake of the development of economy
42 According to Mao, even "the contradiction between the working class and the 
national bourgeoisie comes under the category of contradictions among the people" in 
China, although he did not fully explain why and how it could be. Mao, 1977: 386.
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and culture, the CCP needed a relatively mild atmosphere under which 
intellectuals in various schools of thought would willingly contribute their 
knowledge and skills.
Secondly, "why should the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democratic parties 
be allowed to exist side by side with the CCP?" Because, Mao answered, the 
CCP had no reason to reject those democratic parties or to deny them the 
opportunity of making a living service to the country. As to mutual 
supervision, Mao thought that the CCP had a great need to hear opinions 
different from its own, in order to get rid of bureaucracy.43
Obviously, there were three reasons for the policy:
(1). For the purpose of the economic and cultural development, the CCP 
needed the contribution of the non-Communist intellectuals either in 
democratic parties or in the fields of art and science;
(2). For the sake of social stability, the CCP preferred that the people 
including intellectuals should express their opinions rather than be 
suppressed; and
(3). For the CCP itself, Mao required the democratic parties and their 
personages to play a critical and even supervisory role.
Two weeks later, on 12 March, Mao made another important speech at the 
CCP's National Conference on Propaganda Work, which about 150 to 160 
non-Party personages attended. Mao estimated that there were five million 
so-called "intellectuals" (educated people) in China at that time. "The
43 Mao, 1977: 386, 395, 408-414.
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overwhelming majority," Mao said, "or well over 90 per cent, of the total of 
five million, support the socialist system in various degrees." That is, 
intellectuals as a whole could be trusted. What is more, "for a vast country 
like ours," Mao pointed out, "five million intellectuals are too few," and 
"without intellectuals our work can not be done welL"{My emphasis) 
Therefore the CCP should do a good job of uniting them. Mao again justified 
the "Double-hundred Policy", and further claimed that "the policy is not only 
a good method for developing science and the arts, but, applied more widely, 
it is a good method for all our work."44 (My emphasis)
Never has a Communist party leader legitimatised the expression of non- 
Communist (or even anti-Communist) ideas in a "Soviet-type Communist" 
society before. However, neither of his 27 February and 12 March 1957 
speeches were published at that time, nor could they be seen even in part in 
the official press. Was that because the CCP cadres in charge of the press did 
not agree with Mao's idea, or because they did not know whether the speeches 
were sincere, or just a strategy on Mao’s part? Whatever its cause Mao 
himself was very dissatisfied with the silence of the People's Daily. As a 
result, Deng Tuo, the chief-editor of the People's Daily, and others like Chen 
Qi-tong, an army high official in charge of propaganda, who wrote an article 
in the People's Daily to question the "Double-hundred Policy", were sternly 
criticised.45
44 Mao, 1977: 423-424, 433.
45 Mao Ze-dong, 1989 168-169, 252; Cf. M.Goldman, 1989: 50-51; T. Cheek, 1986: 
193-196.
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From the beginning of March to the end of April, 1957, Mao was busy at 
meeting and talking with Party officials in charge of propaganda, education, 
literature, art, press and publication, with local cadres and army officials, as 
well as writers and artists. These meetings and talks were from group to 
group, in both Peking and other cities. Mao explained the reasons of adopting 
the "Double-hundred Policy" to them repeatedly.
Above all, on 30 April, 1957, Mao met almost all leaders of the democratic 
parties on the rostrum of Tian An Men Square. He announced that the "class 
struggle had ended" and Chinese people were now entering upon another 
type of war: "the war on nature". As he explained many times before, Mao 
said that the contradictions within Chinese society were mainly non- 
antagonistic, although it was still necessary for the democratic personages 
and old-type intellectuals to be remoulded ideologically, for their minds had 
not yet changed from bourgeois world views to working class ones. For Mao, 
however, a more problematic non-antagonistic contradiction was the one 
between the ruling party and the people because of bureaucracy within the 
CCP, and that was why the CCP launched the Rectification Campaign. When 
Mao met the leaders of the democratic parties on the Rostmm, he asked the 
democratic leaders "to attack more, attack earnestly" the CCP's work 
including higher education, general education, literature and art, science, and 
health matters. Mao ordered that these attacks should be published in the 
newspapers, where they could arouse the readers’ attention. Mao was even 
saying that the system of Party committees in schools/universities was
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perhaps inappropriate, and that he was thus considering professors be 
allowed to run schools/universities.46
It now seemed that the "early spring" had passed. More and more 
intellectuals began blossoming and contending either at various forums or in 
official newspapers. For instance, in Peking alone, there were 350,000 
democratic party members who participated in forums by the end of April47 
Amongst these forums, the most important and critical ones were the two 
from 8 to 16 May for the leading democratic personages and 21 May to 1 
June for the well-known businessmen.
These forums were convened by the United Front Department of the CCP, a 
special organ to supervise the democratic parties, their leading figures, and 
other well-known non-Communist intellectuals. According to Li Wei-han, 
head of the United Front Department, there were respectively 70 and 108 
persons who made speeches at the two forums.48 Their speeches were 
summarily published in the People's Daily, the CCP’s official newspaper, 
with no comment. It was the first time that the Party's newspaper looked like 
a independent paper in a non-Communist society. There were also critical 
articles written by democratic personages and other well-known intellectuals 
in the People's Daily, Guangming Daily, and other newspapers during this 
unique period.
46 Mao Ze-dong, 1989: 363-372.
47 RMRB, 22, 26 April, 1957.
48 Li Wei-han, 1986:831.
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The intellectuals who expressed their opinions during this unique five-week 
period were by no means a single organised group, thus they did not speak 
with one voice. The following points were the main issues raised during the 
blooming period of May, 1957, and they were also the ones later severely 
criticised by the CCP in the Anti-Rightist Campaign:49
(1). The question that "the world belongs to the Party".
The democratic personages complained that "the Party has replaced the 
Government". Zhang Bo-jun pointed out that the CCP's organisation 
exercised control over virtually everything. He alluded to the necessity of 
drawing a clear line between the authority of the state administrative organs 
and the duties of the CCP organisations. Chu An-ping, editor-in-chief of the 
Guangming Daily, further wrote an article entitled Allow Me to Criticise 
Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou in the Guangming Daily. After pointing 
out the fact that all 12 vice-Premiers in the State Council were Party-men, 
Chu asked: "Could it be that there is not a single person amongst the non- 
Party people who can sit in a vice-premier's chair, or that none of them can 
be groomed to hold this chair?" "Isn't it too much that within the scope of the 
nation, there must be a Party man as leader in every unit, big or small, 
whether section or subsection; or that nothing, big or small, can be done 
without a nod from a Party man?" According to him, "a party leading a 
nation is not the same thing as a party owning a nation; the public supports the 
Party, but members of the public have not forgotten that they are masters of
49 All direct quotations are originally from RMRB, GMRB, 8 May-4 June, 1957. English 
translation of them is partly adopted from MacFarquhar: 1960:40-53, 226; and N. Das, 
1979: 56-69.
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the nation.” Chu strongly opposed the idea that "the world belongs to the 
Party"(DANG TIAN XIA).
(2). The problem of "holding a post without power”.
Many democratic personages who were appointed as cadres at different 
levels of government felt that they held posts in name but were without actual 
power (YOU ZHIWU QUAN). Zhang Bo-jun complained that "while some 
CCP cadres got promoted very fast, non-CCP cadres rarely had similar 
opportunities." Others pointed out that "the CCP members might get 
promoted over three classes a year, but the non-CCP men, however assiduous 
in work, were not promoted for three to five years." They described the 
democratic parties as mere "eyebrows", that is, an ornament, of the CCP. 
Zhang Bo-jun said that "some adult members of the democratic parties and 
groups had not had a chance to play their due role in state affairs". It was said 
that Huang Yan-pei, Chairman of the Democratic Construction Association, 
was refused a list of the directors of the departments of industry of different 
provinces for security reasons, while Huang was a Vice-Premier and 
Minister of Light Industry of the Government Administrative Council. If 
Huang was treated like this, would it be impossible for other democratic 
personages who occupied lower posts than Huang's to expect to have the 
authority to go with those posts? Zhang Nai-qi added that he himself as the 
Minister of Food in the State Council "acquired power only through a series 
of struggles". Luo Long-ji complained that "at the standing committee 
meetings of the National People's Congress and the People's Political 
Consultative Conference, the democratic parties and groups could not voice 
any effective opinion on matters under discussion because they were not 
informed in advance of the matters to be discussed, and they had no time to
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study them at the moment of discussion." Zhang Bo-jun said that "many 
industrial units have their own design departments nowadays, but there is not 
a single design department for political work. The Standing Committee of the 
People’s National Congress, the National Committee of the People's Political 
Consultative Conference, the democratic parties, and the mass organisations 
should make as four of this kind of political design department, and the major 
projects of political construction should be discussed in these four 
departments before they are put into effect."
(3). The question that ,fthe layman leads the expert”.
The democratic personages, together with the old-type of intellectuals, saw 
themselves as experts in scientific, technical, educational and cultural fields 
while they viewed the CCP cadres as laymen. They believed that "a layman 
cannot lead an expert" (WAI HANG BU NENG LING DAO NEI HANG). 
But in practice, Luo Long-ji complained, in the Eight Offices of the State 
Council, and in addition in the State Planning Commission, the State 
Economic Commission, and the National Construction Commission, all the 
responsible cadres were CCP members. Luo thought these departments 
should take in more non-Party intellectuals with technical and field 
experience to work in them. Some figures, for instance, Luo Long-ji, and 
Chen Ming-shu, a member of the Standing Committee of the Revolutionary 
Committee of the KMT, insisted that the unqualified Party members, i.e., the 
Party men with a low level of knowledge and a lack of experience (in the 
relevant fields), should be removed from their present position in, for 
example, institutions of higher education. Some of them even further voiced 
opposition to the running of institutions of higher education by the Party 
Committees.
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(4). The question of legal system.
The democratic personages thought it was necessary to improve the legal 
system. They complained that the democratic parties were not notified of the 
reason when some of their members were arrested in the Eliminating 
Counterrevolutionaries Campaign in 1955. Another case was of a man who 
had been under arrest since 1951, "but so far there had been no definite 
announcement made as to the conclusion of his case." Chen Qi-you, 
Chairman of the Party for the Public, urged promulgation of a civil and 
criminal code, and conduct of business according to legal procedure. Luo 
Long-ji proposed that "the two Standing Committees of the National People's 
Congress and of the People's Political Consultative Conference should jointly 
establish a special organisation to inspect the deviations during the past 
campaigns and at the same time to provide a guarantee that people who dare 
to bloom and contend would not be subject to attack and retaliation." He 
suggested that all of those who were wrongly accused or criticised in the past 
should be rehabilitated, and insisted that the CCP should not take part in this 
rehabilitation procedure because it was the CCP which made those wrong 
cases.
(5). The question of "wall and moat".
Some people found that since 1949 there was a "wall" or a "moat" (QIANG, 
GOU) between the CCP and the masses of the people. Chang Yun-chuan, a 
member of the Executive Bureau of the Democratic Party of Peasants & 
Workers, expressed his opinion that the "wall and moat" between the CCP 
and the masses was due to CCP members' sense of particularity and of 
superiority. "In leading the masses to carry through the revolution in the
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past,” Zhang said, "the Party stood amongst the masses; after Liberation, it 
felt the position had changed and, instead of standing amongst the masses, it 
stood on the back of the masses and ruled the masses." Zhang Xi-ruo, a well- 
known non-party intellectual, Minister of Education, complained that some 
Party members thought "that they were the first people on earth, and treated 
themselves as meritorious contributors to the revolution.... In this way there 
grew in them the thought of authority, and they acted like those with 
authority in the days of old, 'once authority is in his hands, he starts issuing 
orders'." Further, Zhang criticised some CCP members in their dealings 
with the masses. He pointed out that "when it was absolutely necessary they 
sought the co-operation of the masses. At the critical moment, they adopted 
the Confucian philosophy, 'tell the masses what to do, but not why to do it'." 
Huang Yao-mian, professor of Chinese literature, member of the Standing 
Committee of the Democratic League, found that "sometimes a Party 
member made a mistake, but it was taken as right; and a non-Party man did 
right, but it was taken as wrong." Moreover, "when a Party member 
committed a mistake, his case was dealt with behind closed doors. If not 
punished by the Party organisation, he was reinstated with the same powers. 
When a non-Party man committed a mistake, the Party organisation did not 
let him know where he was wrong, nor did it extend assistance to him, but it 
let him drift along, and punished the organisation to which he belonged."
(6). On the Thought Reform and other political campaigns.
Some democratic figures questioned the past political campaigns. One was 
Zhang Nai-qi. He objected to the demand that the national bourgeoisie should 
undergo further thought reform. According to him, the national bourgeoisie 
had already passed through several thought reform processes, and subjecting
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them to any further ideological remoulding would only increase their 
inferiority complex, which would do no one any good. Zhang also talked 
about the question of "fixed rate of interest”. After the CCP took power, 
China's businessmen as members of the national bourgeoisie invested their 
capital in joint state-private enterprises and drew a fixed rate of interest on it. 
Since then, the CCP had always regarded this fixed rate of interest as 
exploitation. Zhang disagreed with that, saying that since the non- 
antagonistic nature of the relationship between the national bourgeoisie and 
the working class had already been confirmed by the CCP leadership, there 
was no reason to treat a fixed rate of interest as exploitation any longer. He, 
as Minister of Food, further thought that "the policy of state monopoly for 
purchase and marketing of grain, cotton, etc." made the situation worse. 
Other figures like Luo Long-ji complained that, besides the Thought Reform 
Campaign, there were many cases of wrong punishment or criticism in other 
campaigns: the Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign in 1950- 
1952, the Anti-three Evils (Corruption, Waste and Bureaucracy within the 
Party, Government, Army and Mass Organisations) Campaign in 1951-1952, 
the Anti-five Evils (Bribery, Tax Evasion, Theft of State Property, Cheating 
on Government Contracts and Stealing of Economic Information by Owners 
of Private Industrial and Commercial Enterprises) Campaign in 1952, and 
the Eliminating Counterrevolutionaries Campaign in 1955.
(7). On the Policy towards the Soviet Union.
The democratic personages criticised the CCP's policy towards the Soviet 
Union, saying that the relationship between the two countries was not equal. 
For example, Long Yun, Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of 
the KMT, thought that it was unreasonable for China to bear all the expenses
154
of the "Resist-America & Aid-Korea War" , he believed that the Soviet 
Union should share these costs. In addition, the Soviet Army dismantled and 
shipped away without payment some of the machinery from Chinese 
factories when it liberated north-east China. Long Yun criticised policy 
towards the Soviet Union by saying that "the foreign aid budget of our 
country is too large and should be curtailed." He believed that "it will take 
our country more than ten years to repay the loans from the USSR, if we can 
ever repay them. Besides, we have to pay interest to the Soviet Union. China 
fought for socialism, but look at the result!"
The above criticisms were reported to Mao and other top leaders of the CCP, 
and at the same time published in either the People's Daily, or the Guangming 
Daily, or both, from 8 May to 4 June 1957. According to Li Wei-han, who 
chaired the fomms and reported the criticisms to the leadership of the CCP, 
at the beginning of May 1957, Mao did not plan to launch an Anti-Rightist 
Campaign, nor did Li himself convene the forum for the purpose of "luring 
the snake out of his lair". By mid-May, however, some intellectuals began to 
talk about "Speakers Comer in Hyde Park", namely, the freedom of speech. 
Mao then changed his mind and judged that the relationship between the CCP 
and the intellectuals who criticised the status quo was not like the relationship 
between a man's sister and his wife in a traditional Chinese extended family 
in which, however often these two women were criticising each other, they 
were always the members of a family. But rather, it was the relationship 
between the people and their enemy.
Mao never explained why he had such a sudden and astonishing change of 
mind, which left a lot of mysteries for us. There are many stories of course
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about it. For instance, it was said that Mao sent his secretaries to Peking 
University where hundreds of ”big-character posters" criticising the CCP's 
bureaucracy were put up on the wall. When they came back to Mao and 
reported what they read from those "big-character posters", Mao was 
shocked and even became seriously ill.50
Were they beyond Mao's expectation? Did Mao feel wronged and angry 
because he thought he was cheated or even betrayed by the democratic 
personages and old-type intellectuals (for example, university professors), 
and even some young students and CCP intellectuals? Or had he known 
various intellectuals not trusty (but useful), thus when they went too far, Mao 
just simply changed his strategy, for instance, to deal with intellectuals first, 
and then official bureaucracy? Or Could Mao not obtain full support from 
other Party leaders on the issue of "let a hundred flowers bloom" and then 
had to victimise these "flowers"?51 All of these kinds of question may find 
certain positive answers from detailed history directly or indirectly. What 
we are more interested in is that Mao’s change of mind actually caused some 
more serious practical and theoretical problems. Let us examine practical 
problems first.
In mid-May, 1957, in a secret letter to CCP's other leaders and high 
officials, Mao located those democratic personages who were invited by the 
CCP to participate in blooming and contending in the category of 
"reactionary elements":
50 Interview with Su Shao-zhi, May, 1988.
51 Cf., MacFarquhar, 1974.
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Please watch out for the wild attacks of the reactionary elements in the 
democratic parties. Get each of these parties to organise forums. ... Organise 
forums at colleges and universities to let professors speak their minds about the 
Party, and as far as possible try to get the Rightists to spew out all their venom, 
which will be published in the newspapers. 52 (My emphasis)
Only now can we see here a trap or the so-called "Open Plot" (YANG 
MENG). In the same letter, which was later entitled Things Are Beginning to 
Change , Mao told the Party cadres:
The Rightists1 pledge of support to the people's democratic dictatorship, to the 
People's Government, to socialism and to the leadership of the CCP is all a 
sham, and on no account should be given any credence. This holds true for all 
Rightists, whether in the democratic parties, in the fields of education, literature 
and art, the press, science and technology, or in industrial and commercial 
circles.53
But intellectuals in both democratic parties and higher institutions of 
education did not know that the CCP and Mao had already made the decision 
to launch an Anti-Rightist Campaign until 8 June. They went on blooming 
and contending. The following criticisms or suggestions, which were later 
labelled the most "vicious” attacks on the CCP, were actually expressed after 
15 May and before 8 June. In other words, they were expressed later than the 
CCP decided to launch the Campaign but earlier than it was made known to 
the public. These were (l).Zhang Bo-jun's "political design department"; (2).
52 Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 449.
53 Ibid. pp. 441-445.
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Luo Long-ji's "political rehabilitation committee "(Luo himself did not use 
this phrase); and (3). Chu An-ping's "the Party's world".54
On 25 May, Mao for the first time showed his attitude in public when he 
received the entire body of delegates to the Third National Congress of the 
New Democratic Youth League (China's Communist Youth, i.e., the CCY). 
Mao announced, "any word or deed at variance with socialism is completely 
wrong."(My emphasis)55 Furthermore, on 3 June, Mao added that "a 
considerable portion of the criticisms and views are mistaken" in Li Wei- 
han's closing address to the forum attended by democratic personages.56 And 
above all, on 8 June, 1957, Mao wrote an editorial for the People's Daily 
entitled What Is This for? and an inner-Party directive for the Central 
Committee of the CCP Muster Our Forces to Repulse the Rightists' Wild 
Attacks.
54 RMRB, 21-22 May, 2 June, 1957. As a matter of fact, both Zhang Bo-jun and Luo 
Long-ji tried to follow either Mao's criticism of the State Council which, according to Mao, 
did not give any detailed explanation and background knowledge before it submitted its 
Annual Report on Governmental Work to the CCP leadership (Mao) and the National 
People's Congress , and ask them to approve it, or Mao's suggestion that those mistakes 
committed in the Eliminating Counter-revolutionaries in 1955 be corrected under the 
supervision of the Central Committee of the CCP, the National People's Congress, and the 
Political Consultative Conference. But it is obvious that, on the one hand, Zhang and Luo 
went too far, for neither mentioned the CCP in their suggestions, and on the other hand, 
they did not have the "licence" of saying what Mao said even if they said the same. Cf., 
Mao, 1969: 145-154; 1977: 398; 1989: 145.
55 RMRB, 26 May,1957.
56 ibid., 4 June,1957; a .  U  Wei-han, 1986:835.
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The Anti-Rightists Campaign was then officially launched. It is the largest 
political campaign aimed at intellectuals in the PRC, in which not only those 
well-known democratic personages and university professors who responded 
to the CCP's call and spoke out in blooming and contending, but also many 
other educated people, including university students and village school 
teachers who said nothing, were punished. Moreover, not only non- 
Communist intellectuals, for instance, democratic personages and old-type 
intellectuals, but also many Communist intellectuals, especially certain 
number of literary writers and artists who had been the CCP members even 
before 1949, were labelled as the "Rightists" and then lost jobs. Perhaps most 
serious is that, after the Anti-Rightist Campaign, China's educated people as a 
whole were considered members of the bourgeoisie by the CCP and Mao, and 
a great distrust between the CCP and China's educated people lasted at least 
for more than two decades.
III.The "Democratic Personages'* and the Anti-Rightist Campaign
The Anti-Rightists Campaign was divided into several stages. The first 
covered the period from 8 to 30 June 1957, during which the CCP called for 
and mobilised the masses of cadres, intellectuals, and workers to take part in 
the Campaign, and criticised the "Rightists" in general, and the democratic 
personages in particular. From 8 to 14 June, six editorials were published 
one after the other in the People's Daily, while all other newspapers were full 
of criticism of the "Rightists". The problem is that there were many 
intellectuals who responded to the CCP's call for blossoming and contending
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before 8 June. Who should be labelled as the "Rightists”? How to identify 
them? What were the criteria?
On 18 June, when Mao’s 27 February speech On the Correct Handling of the 
Contradictions among the People was published for the first time, he added 
the following six criteria to distinguish between "fragrant flowers" and 
"poisonous weeds", which had been strict limits to both academic research 
and artistic creation since then, and until at least the 1980s:
(1). Words and deeds should help to unite, and not divide, the people of all the 
country; (2).They should be beneficial, and not harmful, to socialist 
transformation and socialist construction; (3). They should help to consolidate, 
and not undermine or weaken, the people’s democratic dictatorship; (4). They 
should help to consolidate, and not undermine or weaken, democratic 
centralism; (5). They should help to strengthen, and not shake off or weaken, 
the leadership of the CCP; (6). They should be beneficial, and not harmful, to 
international socialist unity and the unity of the peace-loving people of the 
world. 57
"Of the six criteria," Mao added, "the most important are the two about the 
socialist path and the leadership of the Party." Obviously, those who ever 
complained against the CCP or its "socialist policies" were really in danger of 
being labelled as the "Rightists". What they could do was to respond to the 
CCP, to get involved in the campaign, and to criticise or self-criticise those 
"Rightist opinions", as soon as possible. As a result, a series of meetings were 
organised by the democratic parties, in which nearly all well-known
5? Mao Ze-dong, 1977:412. One can compare Mao's officially published speech with his 
original one. The six criteria, together with many other paragraphs, for example, the one 
of "class struggle sometimes is very sharp", was not in the original text, which can be seen 
in Mao, 1989: 131-190.
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democratic personages were actively involved. Amongst them, there were 
persons who were soon labelled as the "Biggest Rightists" such as Zhang Bo- 
jun. But for those democratic personages who "bloomed and contended" 
during the hundred flowers period, it was too late. When the CCP planned to 
launch the campaign, there must already have been some personages chosen 
as the targets. Zhang Bo-jun, Luo Long-ji, Zhang Nai-qi, Chu An-ping, and 
Fei Xiao-tong, became the main targets.
Later on, Zhang Bo-jun's "political design department" was denounced by 
the CCP as a scheme of adopting a Western political system, Luo Long-ji’s 
"political rehabilitation committee" was seen as a negation of past political 
campaigns, and Chu An-ping's criticism of the idea that "the world belongs to 
the Party" as a challenge to the CCP's leadership. Zhang Nai-qi was declared 
as a capitalist who dreamed of the old days he had lost, and Fei Xiao-tong as a 
bourgeois scholar who tried to restore bourgeois sociology which had 
already been abolished in 1953.
The climate at this stage, however, was relatively mild. The targets were 
accused of making serious political mistakes rather than committing 
reactionary crimes, they were called "Rightist elements", "bourgeois 
elements", or "bourgeois Rightist elements", rather than "reactionary 
Rightist elements", "counter-revolutionary elements", or "counter­
revolutionary Rightist elements". Zhang Bo-jun, Zhang Nai-qi, Luo Long-ji, 
and Chu An-ping could, more or less, have opportunities to offer 
explanations or even to defend themselves in the official press.58
58 Cf., RM RB , 10-29 June, 1957.
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On 26 June, the National People's Congress session opened. The main issue of 
this session was officially announced to be the criticism of the "Rightists". 
Most of the well-known democratic personages were representatives. Zhou 
En-lai in his Report on Governmental Work made charges against the 
"Rightists". It was the first time that a CCP top leader criticised the 
"Rightists" in public.59
The primary charge against the "Rightists" was, according to Zhou, that they 
were trying to divorce state power from the CCP's leadership. Other charges 
included: (1). they questioned that Marxism was a universal truth; (2). they 
made a direct attack on the socialist economic system; and (3). they tried to 
belittle the significance of Soviet assistance, etc..
On the other hand, perhaps more significantly, Zhou still located the 
Rightists "within the ranks of the people", and he called them "some 
people"(YOU REN) in most cases.60 This was significant because Mao's On 
the Correct Handling of the Contradictions among the People was published 
only a week before, and according to Mao, if a contradiction occurred among 
the people, it could be correctly handled only through education rather than 
punishment. In Zhou En-lai's mild words, did he hint that the "Rightists" 
should not be seen as the enemy of the people, and thus not be punished? But 
whatever Zhou wanted, it was Mao who would make the last decision, which, 
as later showed, located all the "Rightists" in the "enemy of the people".
Mao's What Is This for was published as an editorial in the People's Daily, but his 
Muster Our Forces to Repulse the Rightists' Wild Attack was not published at that time.
60 Zhou En-lai, 1957.
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Accordingly, the articles or speeches to criticise the "Rightists" during this 
stage were mostly general and mild. For instance, in the People's Daily, 
49.44 per cent were mild criticisms (PI PING), 32.58 were severe criticisms 
(PI PAN), 11.24 were counter-criticisms, and 6.74 were self-criticisms, as 
Table 3.8. shows.
Table 3.8. The articles in the People's Daily during the first stage of the Anti- 
Rightists Campaign.
Mild Criticism Severe Criticism Self-criticism Countercriticism Total
DP* 2 2 17 3 10 52
oi*** 18 10 3 31
R J * * * 1 1 2
Others 3 1 4
Total 44 29 6 10 89
% 49.44 32.58 6.74 11.24 100
*: DP stands for the Democratic personages;
**: 01 stands for the Old-type Intellectuals;
***: RI stands for the revolutionary Intellectuals.
Source: RMRB, 8-30 June 1957.
If we further survey these 44 mildly critical articles/speeches, we find from 
Table 3.9. that some of them were actually talking about study, rectification, 
contending, socialist road, and the contradiction among the people. They had 
titles like Studying Chairman Mao's 27 February Speech Seriously, Studying 
Mao's Speech, Carrying on Rectification in Democratic Parties, How Should 
Non-Party Personages Help the Party to Rectify its Style o f Work? Let 
Blossoming and Contending Develop Healthily, Chinese People Must Go 
along Socialist Road, Our Problem Belongs to the Contradictions among the 
People, and My Understanding on the Resolution of the Contradictions
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among the People. The authors of these articles were nevertheless arguing 
and reasoning with, rather than accusing of or attacking on, the targets. And 
the authors themselves were well-known established intellectuals as well, 
some of them in fact were close friends of the targets.
Table 3.9. Mild criticism articles in the People's Daily, 8-30 June, 1957, classified on 
subjects.
DP* O. I** R J*** Others Total %
Study 4 4 9.09
Rectification 8 4 12 27.27
Socialism 5 5 1 11 25.00
CAM**** 2 2 4.55
Criticism 3 9 1 2 15 34.09
Total 22 18 1 3 44 100
*: DP stands for the Democratic personages;
**:OI stands for the Old-type Intellectual;
***: RI stands for the Revolutionary Intellectual;
****: CAM stands for Contradictions among the People.
Source: RMRB, 8 to 30 June 1957.
But in July, the political climate turned much hotter. On 1 July, an editorial 
appeared on the front page of the People's Daily: Wenhuibao’s Bourgeois 
Orientation Should Be Criticised. It later turned out that this editorial was 
again written by Mao himself. In this editorial, Mao not only criticised the 
Wenhui Daily, a non-Party newspaper published in Shanghai, but also, more 
importantly, declaring that "the Rightists are bourgeois reactionaries who 
oppose the Communist Party, the people, and socialism."61
It was the first time since the Campaign was launched that the CCP in public 
located the Rightists in the category of "reactionaries"(FAN DONG PAI),
61 Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 451.
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which in Chinese used by the CCP meant, more or less, "enemies of the 
people", or "counter-revolutionaries". It was the first time as well that not 
only some individual democratic personages, such as Zhang Bo-jun, Luo 
Long-ji, and Chu An-ping, were severely criticised, but also the Democratic 
League and the Democratic Party of Peasants & Workers were denounced as 
a whole.
The accusation was that they had played a particularly vicious role in the 
course of the contention amongst the "hundred schools of thought" and the 
Rectification Campaign, and that they operated in an organised way, 
complete with a plan, programme and line which alienated them from the 
people and which was directed against the CCP and socialism. Mao even 
declared that there was an anti-socialist and anti-Party alliance, led by 
Zhang Bo-jun and Luo Long-ji, and labelled it the Zhang-Luo Alliance, 
which "had caused all the troubles of the spring."62
Also in July, when Mao addressed a special meeting to plan the Campaign at 
Qingdao Conference, he started by saying that
during the period of socialist revolution in our country the contradiction 
between the people and the bourgeois Rightists, who oppose the Communist 
Party, the people and socialism, is one between ourselves and the enemy, that 
is, an antagonistic, irreconcilable, life-and-death contradiction. The bourgeois 
Rightists who have launched wild attacks against the working class and the 
Communist Party are reactionaries or counterrevolutionaries:63 (My emphasis)
62 Mao Ze-dong, 1977:451-456.
63 Ibid. pp. 473.
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The Anti-Rightist Campaign then spread from the democratic parties and 
institutions of higher education to science and technology, to literature and 
art, to the press, and even to middle and primary schools. It became a nation­
wide campaign in which not only non-Party intellectuals but also some 
revolutionary intellectuals and CCP officials were labelled as the "Rightists", 
for Mao declared in his Qingdao Speech that the fight against the Rightists 
should not only take place outside the CCP, but also within it. From Table 
3.10, we can see that in June only one of the named Rightists in the People's 
Daily was a CCP member and more than 60 per cent of them were members 
of the democratic parties. Professionally, more than 60 per cent were cadres 
in the democratic parties and university teachers.
Table 3.10. the labelled Rightists in the People's Daily, June, 1957.
University
teacher
University.
student
Mid-school staff
CCP/CCY* DPS**
3
Non-party
10
2
1
Total
13
2
1
%
23.21
3.57
1.79
Journalist 1 5 2 8 14.28
Engineer 1 1 1.79
Businessman 2 1 3 5.36
Writers, Artist 
Official in state 
organs
Official in 
DPS*** 21
2
3
2
3
21
3.57
5.36
37.50
Others 1 1 1.79
Total 1 35 20 56
% 1.79 62.50 35.71 100
*: CCY means the Chinese Communist Youth;
**: DPS stands for the democratic parties;
***: Some of them occupied posts in State organs, or were businessmen, at the same time.
Source: RMRB, 8-30 June, 1957.
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But since July, more and more CCP members were labelled as the 
"Rightists”, especially in the fields of the press and of literature and art. As 
Table 3.11. shows, in July alone, 32 CCP members or members of the CCY 
were labelled as the "Rightists" in the People's Daily, and more than half of 
them were journalists and writers/artists. However, the proportion of the 
Party members called the "Rightists" was still comparatively small (24.62 
per cent in July). The democratic personages were still the main targets of the 
Campaign (more than 50 per cent in July).
Table 3.11. The labelled "Rightists” in July, 1957.
CCP/CCY DPS Non-party one Total %
University.
teacher 5 12 8 25 19.23
University
student 1 3 4 3.08
Scholars in
CAS* 1 1 1 3 2.31
Mid-school staff 3 2 5 3.85
Journalist 9 9 1 19 14.61
Engineer 1 1 4 6 4.62
Businessman 2 2 1.54
Writer, Artist 8 5 6 19 14.61
Official in
state organs 6 1 7 14 10.77
O fficial in
DPS** 32 32 24.61
Others 1 1 0.77
Total 32 66 32 130
% 24.62 50.70 24.62 100
*: CAS stands for the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
**: Some of them occupied posts in state organs, or were businessmen, at the same time. 
Source: RMRB, 1-31 July, 1957.
After July these personages were criticised not only because of their ideas 
expressed during the Hundred Rowers period, but also because of their past 
experiences. Some were even personally attacked. Amongst them, there were
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Fei Xiao-tong and Zhang Nai-qi, whose private life or favourite hobby were 
included in the accusation against them. In June 1957, the official press still 
called them "comrades", "gentlemen", "friends", or "some people". But in 
July, they, as enemy of the people, were called "wolves", "foxes", "owls", 
"vipers", "venomous bees", "evildoers", "hypocrites", and "the scum of the 
nation".
In the meantime, they themselves entitled their confessions at the session of 
the National People's Congress Pleading Guilt toward the People, Pleading 
with the People for Mercy, Surrendering Myself to the People , Admitting 
My Guilt to the People or My Guilt. They were accused of breaking the law 
because of their opinions, although, according to the Constitution of the PRC 
adopted in 1954, every citizen enjoys the freedom of speech and of the press, 
etc., and although, according to the CCP's policy towards all critics, "the 
speakers should not be blamed"(YAN ZHE WU ZUI).
The second stage of the Campaign lasted through all of the second half of 
1957. It was carried out, as Deng Xiao-ping, the General Secretary of the 
CCP, reported, "mainly in the masses of bourgeoisie and intellectuals, 
including staff and students in business circles, democratic parties, education 
circles, press circles, literary and art circles, science and technology circles, 
public health circles and the departments of the state."64
In Peking University alone, for example, it was said that 10 per cent of the 
students were labelled as the "Rightists". Some other examples of labelling
64 Deng Xiao-ping, 1957.
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the "Rightists" could be seen as following: in Shanghai's Fudan University, 
8.5 per cent of teachers; in the Democratic League, 6.6 per cent of members; 
and in Shanghai business circles, over 5 per cent of businessmen.65
The Campaign went into its third stage in early 1958 when Mao issued a 
decree dismissing Zhang Bo-jun, Zhang Nai-qi, and Luo Long-ji from their 
ministerial posts in the State Council. A series of dismissals and expulsions 
followed until October 1958. As a result, nearly all leading democratic 
personages , intellectuals, and state officials who were labelled as the 
"Rightists" lost their posts in either state organs, leading bodies of the 
democratic parties, or professional occupations in institutes of higher 
education, the Academy of Sciences, and the Association of Writers and 
Artists. Amongst them, whereas there were none of the members of the 
Central Committee of the CCP, there were many leaders of the democratic 
parties. Taking the Democratic League as an example, 36 per cent of its 
Standing Committee members were labelled the "Rightists", as table 3.12 
shows.
Table 3.12. The percentage of those labelled "Rightists" in the leading bodies of the 
Democratic League.
%
Standing Committee members 36
Central Committee members 29
Central Committee alternate members 43
Provincial committee chairmen 46
Municipal/county committee chairmen 35.4
Source: F. C. Teiwes: Politics and Purges in China, pp.305.
65 F.C. Teiwes, 1979:291, 297.
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If we look at those labelled "Rightists" who used to be ministers or vice 
ministers in the State Council, we will find that seven out of eight were 
democratic personages. These seven were:
Zhang Bo-jun, Minister of communication, Chairman of the Democratic 
Party of Peasants and Workers, Vice-chairman of the Democratic League; 
Luo Long-ji, Minister of Timber Industry, Vice-chairman of the 
Democratic League;
Zhang Nai-qi, Minister of Food, Vice-chairman of the Democratic 
Construction Association;
Lin Han-da, Vice-minister of Education, Vice-chairman of the Association 
for Promoting Democracy;
Zen Zhao-lun , Vice minister of Higher Education, Standing Committee 
member of Democratic League;
Huang Qi-xiang, Vice-chairman of Physical Education and Sports 
Commission, Vice-chairman of the Democratic Party of Peasants and 
Workers; and
Fei Xiao-tong, Vice-chairman of Nationality Affairs Commission, 
Standing Committee member of the Democratic League.66
In December 1957, the CCP listed more than a hundred democratic 
personages as labelled "Rightists", who were mostly dismissed or demoted 
with few individual exceptions. In January 1958, the CCP further chose 96 
well-known individuals as typical "Rightists". All of them lost their jobs,
66 The only exception was Wang Han, a CCP member who held the post of vice-minister 
of Supervision Ministry before being labelled as "Rightist".
170
some of them were sent to labour camps, others had to do manual jobs under 
supervision while they remained in their units, and only two of them did not 
suffer such an organisational punishment.
By the end of 1958, there were more than 550,000 people who were labelled 
as the "Rightists". According to Li Wei-han, the man who was in charge of 
the United Front Department of the CCP in the 1950s and thus one of the 
leading cadres dealing with the democratic personages and intellectuals, these 
"Rightists" were mostly democratic personages, businessmen, engineers and 
technicians, university teachers and students, writers and artists. Amongst 
these over 550,000 Rightists, "more than a half of them lost their jobs in their 
state-run units, many of them were sentenced to labour camps as criminals, 
some of them became destitute and homeless while their families were 
mined or dead, and the small numbers who could stay in their original units 
mostly could not do their professional jobs."67 China's "democratic 
personages" were socio-politically destroyed while most non-Party 
intellectuals learned from the Anti-Rightist Campaign that they must keep 
silence over political issues.
IV. Conclusion
From 1957-58 onwards, there was another type of "enemy of the people" in 
Chinese society next to landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad 
elements: the Rightists. They were together called "the Five Categories of
67 Li Wei-han, 1986: 838-839.
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Persons” (WU ZHONG REN).68 China's democratic parties could no longer 
play their past socio-political role, although they still existed in name, and 
some democratic personages still occupied posts in the state organs until 
1966. China's intellectuals as a whole were again considered as members of 
the bourgeoisie, until 1978.
It is obvious that such a result was far from the expectations of Mao and the 
CCP. In 1951, when the CCP launched the Thought Reform Campaign, it 
sought to establish a new relationship to the old-type intellectuals through 
mild criticism and self-criticism. By such a "thought reform” (or "brain­
washing”), the CCP expected that the old-type intellectuals would in the end 
remould themselves into a new kind of intellectual workers. No matter 
whether these old-type intellectuals really changed or not in terms of their 
ideological view of the world, they at least understood that, in the New 
System under the rule of the CCP, they should go on remoulding so long as 
they lived, and they could do certain limited scientific and academic research 
so long as they were politically obedient to the CCP.
So what was wrong when dealing with the democratic personages? Why 
could the CCP not win them over but rather pushed them away from it, and 
made them the "enemies of the people"? How could the old-type intellectuals, 
who had shown their political loyalty in 1951-1952, be victims of the conflict 
between the CCP and the democratic personages? Were there democratic 
personages who really tried to overthrow the "Communist" system? If there
68 Cf., Mao Ze-dong, 1969: 180-182, 418-419; 1974: 181-182. They were even called 
"the Five Black Categories" (HEI WU LEI) in the Cultural Revolution.
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were, did they form a 550,000-member group? Why did the CCP and Mao 
dramatically change its policy towards educated people from locating them as 
members of the working class to members of the bourgeoisie?
As I have mentioned, we can find many historical details to answer such 
questions. Whatever details we found, I would argue, the key reason for all 
of these is that when the CCP and Mao dealt with China's educated people, 
including their established intellectuals, it treated them too simplistically at 
both theoretical and practical levels. As a matter of fact, the CCP misjudged 
intellectuals in both 1956 and 1957. That is to say, either locating them all as 
members of the working class or as members of the bourgeoisie is over- 
simplistic. It seems that after the Thought Reform Campaign and after the 
CCP made its economic achievements in its First Five-year Plan, it was too 
optimistic and confident, and when some leading democratic personages 
criticised the CCP's bureaucracy, it was too sensitive and intolerant.
The point is that China's educated people, including their established 
intellectuals, are socially in different positions and thus politically and 
ideologically in various groups. Traditional intellectuals are mainly scholars, 
scientists, and writers who have been absorbed in "pure" academic, scientific, 
and literary work for years, and paid little attention to politics. That was the 
reason why they were called "traditional intellectuals", also that was the 
reason why they could pass the "political test" in the Thought Reform 
Campaign without enduring heavier pressure and more sufferings.
But the democratic personages are very different. The fact itself that they 
became leaders of the democratic parties (or the "third force") between the
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KMT and the CCP before 1949 showed that they were not "scholars ignoring 
whatever went on outside the window", but rather, they were not only 
interested in socio-political development, but also, more significantly, 
independent of both the KMT and the CCP. This kind of intellectuals can 
never be satisfied with good living conditions and high posts without real 
power. The latter in fact could be even worse: they would feel deprived by 
being given such posts. Whatever system they were living in, for instance, 
under the KMT or under the CCP, they would feel responsible to speak out if 
there was anything wrong. They belonged to the category of critical 
intelligentsia.
The problem for the CCP is that it has never differentiated intelligentsia 
from general intellectuals,69 while it always widely used the term 
"intellectual" to cover all the educated people. Thus when many traditional 
intellectuals showed their ideological obedience to the CCP, it thought that all 
educated people should be seen as members of the working class, but when 
certain number of critical intelligentsia spoke out to criticise it, it felt hostile 
to all the educated people.70
69 As a matter of fact, in Chinese even nowadays there is no such difference at all between 
intellectuals and intelligentsia, although intelligentsia has indeed existed since 1919, if not 
earlier. Cf., Chapter Two.
70 As we have said, Mao indeed tried to tell the difference of the Left from the Right, but 
this is more a political strategy to control all of them rather than social analysis of 
intellectuals’ locations. If he did such an analysis, he usually just put them into the 
bourgeoisie, especially since 1957. More details about Mao's treatment of intellectuals will 
be discussed in Chapters Four and Seven.
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At the same time, members of the former intelligentsia in the democratic 
parties, who have never been in great numbers, did not understood that,under 
the "Soviet-type Communist" system, they could no longer play their former 
critical role until they were labelled as the "Rightists". As a result, the critical 
intelligentsia in the democratic parties was basically destroyed, and the 
democratic parties remained more in name than in substance afterwards.
Since 1957, however, the problem of intellectuals in Chinese society became 
more and more a problem of the revolutionary intellectuals within the CCP, 
for both the old-type intellectuals and the democratic personages then were 
forced to be passive in socio-political development because of the Anti- 
Rightists Campaign. The next chapter will continue to survey China’s 
intellectuals in political campaigns, focusing on some groups of the 
"revolutionary intellectuals" since 1949. Through examining these 
revolutionary established intellectuals in political campaigns, we will further 
see clearer that there is indeed great indeed difference between various 
intellectuals, and that the members of the intelligentsia, even within the 
establishment, are always critical towards the status quo, although they have 
to pay very much, including their lives, for such critical spirits.
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CHAPTER 4: China's Established Intellectuals in Political
r
Campaigns(II)
After the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the CCP dramatically changed its 
evaluation of China's intellectuals. They ceased to be regarded as 
members of the working class and were classified once more as the 
bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the main task of the People's Republic set by 
the CCP remained unchanged: to develop the economy. Moreover, the 
CCP set forth a "General Guide-line"(ZONG LU XIAN) for China's 
socio-economic development in January, 1958, which was summed up 
with a nationwide slogan: "Go All Out, Aim High and Achieve Greater, 
Faster, Better, and More Economical Results in Building Socialism". This 
General Guide-line resulted in one of the most significant events in the 
history of the PRC: the Great Leap Forward. By such a "great leap", the 
CCP leadership expected that in both industry and agriculture China 
would catch up with the West within one or two decades, and in the 
meantime, a rapid process of social and ideological change would 
accompany this economic growth. According to this ambitious strategy, 
China's main industrial production would overtake that of the United 
Kingdom in three years, and that of the United States in ten years. And 
hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants would lead a Communist or 
semi-Communist life in the People's Communes.1
This time, intellectuals were no longer considered as knowledgeable 
people without whom the Great Leap Forward could not be successful. 
Instead, the masses of common people, especially peasants, became the
1 Cf., Chen Bo-da, 1958; Hu Hua, 1985: 167-169; Li Rui, 1989: 3-4; R. 
MacFarquhar, 1983: 15-19; and passim; M. Meisner, 1988:204-215.
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main force. ’’The masses' tide of enthusiasm", Mao declared, "is like 
atomic energy". Ironically, the Great Leap Forward resulted in disaster 
for China's economy, and the Chinese people, especially peasants, 
suffered the aftermath for at least three years from 1960 to 1962, during 
which millions of people, especially peasants, suffered from, or even died 
of, starvation or malnutrition.2
Neither the old-type intellectuals nor the democratic personages could 
play a critical role when faced by this economic disaster. It was the 
revolutionary intellectuals’ turn to show their independent thinking. It 
turned out later that it was these revolutionary intellectuals within the 
CCP who were the most difficult people to control. Mao himself 
gradually recognised that the main problem since 1949 actually existed 
within the CCP, especially in the fields of culture, education, literature, 
art , and sciences, or in a word, in the field of ideology.3 As a matter of 
fact, in the succession of political campaigns after 1949, especially in the 
Cultural Revolution, these revolutionary intellectuals became the main 
target.
I. A Brief Introduction to the "Revolutionary Intellectuals"
China’s revolutionary intellectuals, like the old-type intellectuals and the 
democratic personages, were strongly influenced by Western culture. 
Many of them had either studied or worked in the West (or Japan), or 
read Western writings in their early careers. But unlike the old-type
2 J.K.Fairbank, 1988: 302-305; R. MacFarquhar, 1983: 322-325; S. R. Shalom, 
1984: 46-63; Hu Hua, 1985:172-176.
3 Mao, 1977: 409. Cf., HQ, 1967, Vol.7; 1969, Vol.5; 1976, Vol.4.
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intellectuals who continued with their studies, or the democratic 
personages who believed in parliamentary politics, China's revolutionary 
intellectuals were involved from the outset in the military struggle against 
the old regime or foreign imperialists.
Moreover, there is a basic difference between the two generations of 
revolutionary intellectuals, as we have mentioned in Chapter 2: the first 
generation, following the French Revolution model, tried to establish a 
Westem-style republic, but the second was more fascinated by the Russian 
Revolution of 1917, believing that only through a people's (workers' 
and/or peasants') revolution could China and its people, including 
intellectuals, be released from chaos and oppression.
As we have argued in Chapter One, it is the Revolution which made these 
intellectuals be revolutionaries. Before joining the Revolution, they were 
either young educated individuals or, at most, radical members of the 
intelligentsia. Of course, it is considerably important to note the 
difference of these revolutionary intellectuals from the intellectuals who 
did not get involved in politics (old-type intellectuals), or the ones who 
did but did not join the "Communist Revolution" (democratic 
personages). It is also important to notice the variety between these 
educated youth or radical intelligentsia, who joined the Revolution 
consciously, and those "peasants in uniform", who mostly had no other 
option except "raising the standard of revolt". The revolutionary 
intellectuals are those members of intelligentsia who could no longer 
continue their study when Chinese society was so unbearably poor and 
unequal that they had to defend the poor against the rich, defend the weak 
against the strong, and defend China against the West, following their own 
understanding of the Russian Revolution Model.
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Because of both their educated background and critical spirits, during the 
process of the fight against the KMT, the second generation of 
revolutionary intellectuals as a whole was considered a "valuable asset" by 
the CCP and Mao, and indeed its members became the nucleus of the 
Chinese "Communist Revolution" in Yan'an, in other Red areas, and in 
the cities under the rule of the KMT. However, there already existed 
various conflicts. One was the conflict between these revolutionary 
intellectuals and the "peasants in uniform". In the Red Army, the majority 
of the soldiers were of course the "peasants in uniform", and they did not 
fully trust the members of the "valuable asset". This is partially because 
these revolutionary intellectuals were mostly from rich or middle class 
families, and partially because they had mostly received traditional or 
Western "bourgeois" education before joining the Revolution. Whereas, 
the "peasants in uniform" were mainly children of poor families who 
received little school education and thus could read few words.
Another conflict was the one between these intellectuals and the old-type 
intellectuals and/or the democratic personages. The revolutionary 
intellectuals thought only they themselves were revolutionary, while 
considering the old-type intellectuals and the democratic personages were 
either non-revolutionary or even counter-revolutionary. On the other 
hand, the revolutionary intellectuals as a whole had less scholarly or 
professional achievements than the other two kinds of intellectuals, 
therefore the latter considered themselves to be more qualified as the 
"people who have knowledge".4
4 For example, Feng You-lan, the number one Chinese philosopher since the 1930s, 
thought in 1949 that revolutionary intellectuals could change the society, but only 
scholars had the capability to explain it. More discussions about Feng You-lan will be
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The third conflict was the one between those revolutionary intellectuals 
who worked in the Communist Base Areas, such as Yan’an, and those 
revolutionary intellectuals who worked, or had worked, in the KMT 
areas, such as Shanghai. These two kinds of revolutionary intellectuals 
had various differences not merely in style, manner, language, etc., but 
also in their relationship with the leadership, the cadres, and the soldiers.
The last one was amongst the revolutionary intellectuals who lived in the 
KMT areas, which were by no means unimportant. One of the most 
important example can be traced back to the 1930s, when most of the 
established revolutionary writers and artists lived in Shanghai. This 
conflict used to be simply generalised as the conflict between Lu Xun and 
Zhou Yang, two of the main leaders of the Left-wing Association of 
Writers. Many people were involved in this conflict. For example, on Lu 
Xun's side, there were Mao Dun, Ba Jin, Xiao Jun, Hu Feng, and Feng 
Xue-feng, and on Zhou Yang's side, there were Guo Mo-ruo, Xia Yan, 
Tian Han, and Yang Han-sheng. In 1936, however, Lu Xun died. Shortly 
after that, the CCP and the KMT agreed to form a United Front to fight 
against Japan. Because of these two events, the disagreement between Lu 
Xun’s and Zhou Yang's groups reached no definite conclusion, as nearly 
all of the participants either went to Yan'an or joined in the United Front
seen in Chapter Six. Another example is Luo Long-ji, one of the top "Rightists", who 
claimed in 1956 that the main problem in China was the conflict between petty 
intellectuals of the proletariat (i.e., the revolutionary intellectuals) and great intellectuals 
of the petty bourgeoisie (i.e., the democratic personages, and perhaps, the old-type 
intellectuals). Mao once pointed out that many revolutionary intellectuals and CCP 
cadres were very afraid of university professors, especially since the CCP went into 
urban areas in 1949. Mao, 1974: 116.Cf., Feng You-lan, 1973^, and Luo Long-ji, in 
Mao, 1977: 496, 501.
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in KMT areas.5 Since 1942, the CCP had considered Lu Xun to be the 
greatest revolutionary writer. Zhou Yang, and his friends Tian Han, Xia 
Yan, as well as Guo Mo-ruo and many others, had hence felt ashamed to 
have argued with Lu Xun.
Another example developed in 1942 in Yan'an. At the beginning, some of 
Lu Xun's friends or followers, including Wang Shi-wei, Ding Ling, Ai 
Qing, and Xiao Jun, started criticising "the dark side" of Yan'an, such as 
cadres' privileges, the lower position of women, etc. By that time, Zhou 
Yang had already become an important cadre in literature and education 
in Yan'an. He and some other well-known Party intellectuals, including 
philosopher Ai Si-qi and historian Fan Wen-lan, argued that it was not 
fair to emphasise Yan'an's faults, because, compared with other parts of 
China under the KMT it had reached a relatively high level of democracy. 
Later, Mao and other high officials of the CCP, including several army 
generals who were seen as the "peasants in uniform", got involved in the 
argument as well. As a result, Mao made his famous Talks at the Yan'an 
Forum on Literature and Art, in which he concluded that writers and 
artists "must take the class stand of the proletariat and not that of the petty 
bourgeoisie", "they must gradually move their feetnver to the side of the 
workers, peasants and soldiers, to the side of the proletariat, by going into 
their very midst and into the thick of practical struggles."6(My emphasis) 
After that, Mao's Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art 
became the "Revolutionary Bible" for all China's literary writers, artists, 
and other intellectuals including natural scientists for more than three
5 Feng Xue-feng, 1979; Mao Dun, 1979; 1983 ; 1984:307-347; Xia Yan, 1985:296- 
335; Hu Feng, 1987: 3-9, 99-110; Zhao Hao-sheng, 1979;W. J. F. Jenner, 1982:424- 
445.
6 Mao, 1965: 75-79.
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decades. In the end, those who insisted on exposing Yan'an's "dark side" 
were criticised; Wang Shi-wei was even arrested and executed.7
However, the CCP and Mao considered the problem of revolutionary 
intellectuals as a problem which should be resolved by self-education and 
self-remoulding in the process of revolution. Therefore, the conflicts 
amongst revolutionary intellectuals, and the conflict between 
revolutionary intellectuals and the "peasants in uniform", were 
contradictions which existed within the revolutionary ranks. 
Consequently, in 1949, nearly all revolutionary intellectuals, including 
Ding Ling and Ai Qing, were given jobs as high officials in charge of 
educational, cultural and ideological work in various levels of the CCP 
organs or different governmental departments.
This is a fundamental change of their social positions. As appointed 
officials in CCP/state organs, how could they keep their critical or even 
revolutionary spirits became a serious question in both theoretical and 
practical levels. Because of the great shift in their socio-political position, 
it would be hard to still label them "revolutionary intellectuals"; instead, 
Gramsci's "organic intellectuals", or the concept of "establishment 
intellectuals", as used by Timothy Cheek, Carol Lee Hamrin and others, 
would seem more suitable. Here, establishment intellectuals means the 
intellectuals who are "serving and operating within the governing 
institutions of the People's Republic". But all of China's intellectuals are 
state employees in "Communist" China. As John Israel points out, "if you 
are not some kind of establishment intellectual, you are not a legitimate
7 Ding Ling, 1982; Wang De-fen, 1987; Dai Qing, 1989:41-110; M. Goldman, 1964: 
205-228; 1971:18-48.
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intellectual at all."8 Then how can we differentiate these former 
revolutionary intellectuals who now occupied high posts in the CCP from 
those who did not? And if we choose "organic intellectuals", we will later 
find that, because quite a few of these intellectuals after 1949 were 
usually critics of, or even dissenters against, the status quo, they were not 
always "organic" in Gramsci's sense.
Such being the case, I will continue to call them "revolutionary 
intellectuals" , just to remind us that this type of intellectual was deeply 
involved in the Revolution before 1949, but not define them as necessarily 
revolutionary since then.
After 1949, these revolutionary intellectuals on the one hand occupied 
official posts in both the Party and the state institutions, mostly being in 
charge of science and technology, literature and art, education and 
propaganda. On the other hand, as we will show later, many of them 
seemed to be reluctant to obey the CCP's instructions and to be the CCP’s 
"parrot-type spokesmen" passively. They still belonged to certain kinds of 
critical intelligentsia. But unlike the intelligentsia in the democratic 
parties, they held real power, which made them the most difficult men 
and women for the CCP and Mao.
To deal with them, Mao launched a series of political campaigns. 
According to Zhou Yang, China's so-called "Cultural Tsar" from 1949 to 
1966, or Yao Wen-yuan, the main ideological spokesman for the CCP and 
Mao from 1966 to 1976, there were four great political campaigns in the 
field of ideology before the Cultural Revolution: the Criticism of The
8 C.L. Hamrin , T. Cheek, and J.Israel, 1986: x, 3-4, and passim.
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Life of Wu Xun, the Criticism of Hu Shi, the Criticism of Hu Feng, and 
the Anti-Rightist Campaign.9
II. The Criticism of The Life o f Wu Xun
The first was launched in 1951 when a film The Life ofW u Xun was 
shown all over the country. Wu Xun (1838-1896) was a popular figure in 
Shandong Province, who came from a poor family and could not afford to 
go to school. Realising that the children of the vast majority of poor 
Chinese peasants could not improve themselves through education because 
their parents could not afford the fees, he collected money, sometimes by 
begging, and eventually established three free schools in the countryside 
in order to offer these children the opportunity of an education.
The film was so touching that when it was shown to audiences, including 
more than a hundred Party high officials and leaders, many of them were 
moved to tears. From February to May, 1951, 45 articles appeared in 
\htGuangming Daily, theWenhui Daily, and the Dagong Daily, the three 
main newspapers which were not directly controlled by the CCP yet, 
praising the film. At the same time, there were also some articles 
criticising the film in the official press. At this time praise and criticism 
could be more or less freely given.
On 20 May, 1951, however, the People's Daily published an editorial, 
criticising the film and particularly the spate of praise lavished on Wu 
Xun and the film, seeing Wu Xun as Ma fellow who did not lift a finger
9 Zhou Yang, 1966; Yao Wen-yuan, 1971: 89.
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against the old economic base or its superstructure. On the contrary, he 
strove fanatically to spread the old ideology and, in order to gain a 
position for this purpose previously beyond his reach, fawned in every 
way on the reactionary rulers."10 The problem, according to the author of 
the editorial, was not Wu Xun himself, nor the film including its director 
and actor, but the phenomenon that there were so many people including 
not only writers and critics, but also, more seriously, a certain number of 
Party members and even high officials (many of them were revolutionary 
intellectuals), who "claimed to have allegedly grasped Marxism but, when 
it came to specific historical figures (like Wu Xun) and specific ideas 
which ran counter to the trend of history (as in the film and the writings 
about Wu Xun), lost their critical faculties, and even capitulated to these 
reactionary ideas."11
The People's Daily on the same day ordered that "all who ever praised 
Wu Xun or the film The Life ofWu Xun must make serious self-criticism 
in public; Party cadres amongst them would be further given 
organisational conclusion."12
The Campaign was then launched. The two-sided discussion became an 
one-sided criticism. In the People's Daily alone, there were 97 critical 
articles and 40 articles of self-criticism between May and September, 
1951, as Table 4.1. shows.
10 RMRB, 20 May, 1951. Also Mao, 1977:57-58.
11 Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 57-58; RMRB, 20 May, 1951.
12 RMRB, 20 May, 1951. "Organisational Conclusion" (ZU ZHIJIE LUN) is a special 
phrase in the PRC which means an official judgment, usually negative, on a person's 
behaviour in , and attitude toward, a political campaign , written by the cadre in charge 
of CCP organisational matter in his unit and kept in his personal record. Cf. Chapter 
Two.
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Table 4.1. The articles of criticism and self-criticism of The Life ofWu Xun 
in the People's Daily from 16 May to the end of September, 1951.
Criticism Self-criticism Total
May 35 21 56
June 37 6 43
July 7 4 11
August 15 8 23
September 3 1 4
Total 97 40 137
Source: RMRB, 16 May to 30 September, 1951.
Among those who made self-criticisms in public, were:
Zhao Dan, China's best film star who played Wu Xun in the film;
Sun Yu, an American-trained director who directed the film;
Yu Ling, a well-known literary critic and writer;
Tian Han, one of the foremost communist dramatists in China since the 
1930s;
Xia Yan, a prominent writer covering plays, films, novels, essays, and 
literary criticism;
Zhou Yang, a literary theorist and translator of Russian literature, and 
one of CCP's main ideological spokesmen in charge of literature and art 
since 1942; and
Guo Mo-ruo, one of the most famous revolutionary intellectuals who 
wrote a great number of classical and modem poems, many historical 
dramas, and numerous works on history, archaeology, and theory from 
the May Fourth Movement of 1919 to the establishment of the People's 
Republic of China in 1949 .
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All of them were revolutionary intellectuals, and the last four had been 
playing leading roles for more than two decades. To examine their 
official posts in 1951, we find that:
Guo Mo-ruo was Vice-Premier of the Government Administrative 
Council, vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference, Chairman of the All-China Federation 
of Literary and Art Circles,13 and Chairman of the All-China Historians 
Association;
Zhou Yang was a deputy-Director of the Propaganda Department of the 
Central Committee of the CCP, a deputy-minister of, and Party secretary 
in, the Culture Department of the Government Administrative Council, a 
vice-Chairman of, and Party secretary in, the All-China Federation of 
Literary and Art Circles, a member of the Committee for Cultural & 
Educational Affairs of the Government Administration Council, and 
Director of Wenyibao (the Literary Gazette);
Tian Han was a member of the Committee for Cultural & Educational 
Affairs of the Government Administrative Council, Director of the Art 
Administrative Bureau of the Culture Department, the Government 
Administrative Council, a board member of the All-China Federation of 
Literature and Art Circles, and Chairman of the All-China Dramatists 
Association; and
Xia Yan was a board member, and Chairman of the Shanghai Section, of 
the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles, Director of the 
Propaganda Department of the Shanghai Committee of the CCP, and 
Director of the Shanghai Culture Bureau.
13 It is one of the first organisations to be formed by the Party after 1949 to which all 
professionals in literary and art circles belonged.
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Guo Mo-ruo became the first famous intellectual, occupying high posts in 
the state organs, to make a public self-criticism since the establishment of 
the PRC. Guo Mo-ruo self-criticised that he had made ”a typical mistake 
arising from the petty bourgeois habit of speaking and writing without 
previously making a serious study of the subject.”14 Zhou Yang criticised 
himself for not thoroughly recognising and pointing out the serious 
reactionary political nature of the film, and Tian Han and Xia Yan also 
criticised themselves severely.15
That such high officials made self-criticism in public hinted that this 
campaign had been launched by the top leadership. On 4 June, 1951, Ma 
Xu-lun, Minister of Education, recommended that criticism of the film 
should be organised at all levels for a fortnight. Moreover, a special fact­
finding mission was formed and sent to Wu Xun’s birthplace to investigate 
his life story. In A Report on Wu Xun's History, this mission declared: 
Wu Xun had never been a popular figure who tried his best to help poor 
children to be educated as he had been previously presented. Instead, he 
was nothing more than "a big landlord, big creditor and big rogue".16 
When the Report was published, Guo Mo-ruo had to write another self- 
criticism, blaming himself for praising Wu Xun since 1945.17
Only fifteen years later, when the Cultural Revolution was launched, 
could people know through the official press that in 1951 it was Mao 
himself who launched the campaign to criticise The Life o f Wu Xun, and
14 Guo Mo-ruo, 195 l a.
15 Zhou Yang, 1985: 91; Tian Han, in RMRB, 10 June, 1951; Xia Yan, in RMRB, 26 
Aug., 1951.
16 A Report on Wu Xun's History , in RMRB, 23-28, July, 1951.
17 Guo Mo-ruo, 195lh.
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who wrote the editorial for the People's Daily on 20 May, 1951; it was 
Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, who, ordered by Mao, led the fact-finding 
mission to go to Wu Xun's birthplace and to write A Report on Wu Xun's 
H istory , 18 More than thirty-five years later, when some of Mao's 
manuscripts were carefully chosen and then partly published, it was 
revealed that it was Mao who not only wrote the editorial for the People's 
Daily on 20 May, 1951, but also revised, in his own handwritings, and in 
many paragraphs, A Report on Wu Xun's History and other articles of 
criticism. It was also revealed that even Zhou En-lai made self-criticism 
and Zhu De, the father of the Red Army, praised the film too in 1951.19
If the criticism of The Life ofWu Xun was the first campaign to criticise 
China's revolutionary intellectuals since 1949, it was in fact a very mild 
political campaign. No well-known revolutionary intellectuals were 
demoted or suffered any other kind of organisational punishment for 
their praise of the film, although there were indeed some individuals who 
were arrested as a result of the campaign.20
The criticism of The Life o f Wu Xun , however, was a signal that there 
were certain differences within the leadership over literature and art, and 
that China's revolutionary intellectuals, especially revolutionary writers 
and artists, were not an exceptional group which could escape criticism by 
the CCP and Mao. As a matter of fact, as we will see next, these 
revolutionary writers, artists, poets and literary critics were criticised 
more than any other groups of China's established intellectuals in Mao's 
time.
Cf., Yao Wen-yuan, 1971; GMRB, 25 June, 25 July, 1967.
19 Mao, 1988: 374-376, 723-728. Cf., Sun Yu, 1987.
20 Sun Yu, 1987.
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But in 1951, both Mao and those revolutionary intellectuals as his targets 
did not know this. The criticism of The Life o f Wu Xun was considered 
only an individual case. Both Mao and those revolutionary intellectuals, 
who tried to maintain their own independent thinking and critical spirits, 
and thus to maintain their status of critical intelligentsia, did not realise 
that it was a sign that these intellectuals would be paradoxically but 
essentially in conflict with not only certain individual leaders of the CCP, 
but, more significantly, the new "Communist" System which they helped 
to establish as well.
III. The Accusation of Hu Feng, Feng Xue-feng, and Ding Ling
In China, since the Warring States period(475 - 221, B.C.), there has been 
a long tradition of using literature as a political instrument. This could be 
typically seen in LI SAO , one of the greatest Chinese classical literary 
works. In the Ming and Qing periods(1368 - 1911), literati had become 
more and more active in politics, and critical of the status quo.21 Yet it 
was during the May Fourth Movement of 1919, that China's second 
generation of revolutionary intellectuals appeared and since then they 
have played a major role in socio-political development. And, as a result, 
they have themselves become the focus of politics.
Before 1949, literature and art were not only a key battle ground fought 
over by the CCP and the KMT, but a main stage for conflict among the 
Left-wing or revolutionary intellectuals as well. A typical case, for 
example, is the conflict between Lu Xun and Zhou Yang, as we mentioned
21 R.Wagner, 1987: 183-231; F.Wakeman, 1973: 35-70.
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above. After the escape of the KMT from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, 
literature began to reflect the conflict within the CCP. It turned out that 
those revolutionary writers and artists, as well as the revolutionary social 
scientists, became the group most reluctant to give up their ideas to 
pressure from the CCP and Mao, some even sacrificed their lives.
Mao correctly distinguished them from technical experts and natural 
scientists, but he simply blamed them for being divorced from reality and 
reluctant to accept socialist ideas.22 He continued to watch over them since 
the case The Life ofW u Xun (if not earlier, for instance, 1942), but he 
just labelled them as "spokesmen of the bourgeoisie in the CCP", and 
chose increasingly great number of individuals or groups as targets to be 
criticised and punished in the succession of political campaigns.
The first group to be punished after 1949 were followers of Lu Xun. 
They were punished one by one from 1954 to 1957 in the Criticism of Hu 
Shi, the Criticism of Hu Feng, and the Anti-Rightist Campaign. These are: 
Feng Xue-feng, an essayist and literary critic, and one of the famous 
"Lake Poets";
Hu Feng, a poet and well-known Left-wing literary theorist; and 
Ding Ling, China's foremost revolutionary woman-novelist, a Stalin 
Prize winner.
Some scholars claimed that these writers were punished mainly because of 
the personal conflict between Lu Xun and Zhou Yang.23 But I would 
argue in this research that they were criticised and punished more
22 Mao Ze-dong, 1980: 245, 248. I will discuss the theoretical problem of Mao's 
treatment of revolutionary and other intellectuals in Chapter Seven.
23 Cf., M. Goldman,1971.
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essentially because they sought to maintain their critical spirits after the 
"Soviet-type Communist" system was established. If there had not been 
Zhou Yang, they would have experienced more or less the same, sooner 
or later.
It was true that Feng Xue-feng and Hu Feng were Lu Xun's closest friends 
and that they were with Lu Xun when Lu criticised Zhou Yang in the 
1930s. Nevertheless, such a conflict was seen by the CCP leadership as 
being within the revolutionary ranks, and thus a non-antagonistic 
contradiction. Therefore, Feng Xue-feng, Ding Ling, and Hu Feng were 
still considered as outstanding revolutionary writers and appointed as 
leading cadres in literary and art circles in 1949. When the Criticism of 
Hu Shi was launched in 1954, Hu Feng, Feng Xue-feng and Ding Ling 
were members of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles, 
both Feng Xue-feng and Ding Ling were vice-chairpersons of the All- 
China Writers Association, Ding was deputy chief-editor of the magazine 
People's Literature , Feng was chief-editor of the Literary Gazette , and 
director and chief-editor of the People's Literature Press.
Feng Xue-feng (1903- 1976) became a poet in the early 1920s, known as 
one of the "Lake Poets". He joint the CCP in 1927, and became a key 
figure in the China Left-wing Association of Writers in the 1930s. He was 
considered to be a close friend and follower of Lu Xun, who was strongly 
influenced by his mentor's ideas.24 Feng also was one of the three 
established writers when they participated in the Red Army's 12,500 km 
Long March from 1934 to 1935.25 Feng showed his independent way of
24 Xu Guang-ping, 1978: 87-89; Tang Tao, 1986.
25 The other two are Li Yi-mang and Cheng Fang-wu, two of the key figures of the 
Creation Society in the 1920s. Cf. Chapter 6.
1 9 2
thinking and doing even in the 1930s when the CCP and the KMT set up 
the United Front again in order to fight against the Japanese. Like Lu 
Xun, Feng Xue-feng did not fully agree the CCP's policy towards the 
KMT. And, moreover, as a CCP member, he even left the so-called 
"United Front" for his hometown "to take a rest". After that, he spent 
many years in a KMT jail.
In 1954, it was said that Feng Xue-feng, as chief-editor of the Literary 
Gazette, rejected an article written by two young university graduates Li 
Xi-fan and Lan Ling. These two in their article criticised Yu Ping-bo, a 
well-known scholar who shared Hu Shi's opinions regarding The Dream 
of the Red Chamber, one of China's greatest classic novels. After the 
rejection, the two young graduates wrote to their teacher at Shangdong 
University, their alma mater, and received support. As a result, their 
article was published in Literature, History, Philosophy, the academic 
journal of Shangdong University. Then in Peking, the Literary Gazette 
reprinted the article on 30 September 1954, with Feng Xue-feng's 
editorial remark stating that "the views of these writers are not thorough 
enough nor complete enough in certain areas."26
Then it was suggested that the People's Daily should reprint the article in 
order to start a debate. But, as with the first submission to the Literary 
Gazette, it came to nothing because, according to "certain people", the 
article was written by two "nobodies" and the CCP's newspaper was not a 
platform for free debate 27
26 WYB, 30 September, 1954.
27 Feng Xue-feng, in WYB, 1954, Vol. 18. Cf. Mao, 1977: 150-151; Ding Ling, 
1986.
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This time, it was Mao again who launched the nationwide campaign, the 
Criticism of Hu Shi, in which not only Hu Shi's (and Yu Ping-bo's) 
philosophy (and literary theory) was criticised as bourgeois idealism and 
pragmatism, but also Feng Xue-feng's attitude towards Li Xi-fan and Lan 
Ling, the two young literary critics, was sternly condemned.
From October, 1954, to June, 1955, there were 76 articles in the People's 
Daily and Guangming Daily on this subject. Amongst the authors there 
were the Party's theoreticians, including Ai Si-qi, Hu Sheng, Deng Tuo, 
and Wang Ro-shui; well-known revolutionary writers and literary critics, 
such as Guo Mo-ruo, Mao Dun, Zhou Yang, and He Qi-fang; and old-type 
philosophers and social scientists, for example, Feng You-lan, Jin Yue- 
ling, Li Da, and Wu Jing-chao.
The problem was not Yu Ping-bo's and/or Hu Shi's ideas themselves, 
according to Mao, but, as in the case of The Life o f Wu Xun, certain 
people within the CCP, especially certain "bigwigs", who "go in for a 
united front with bourgeois writers on the question of idealism and 
become willing captives of the bourgeoisie."28 On 16 October, 1954, Mao 
wrote a letter to all members of the Politburo and those cadres in charge 
of ideological affairs, asking them to pay attention to the case. In Mao's 
letter, certain persons were blamed as "bigwigs", who ignored and 
distrusted "nobodies" and suppressed their articles. Amongst these, of 
course, was Feng Xue-feng.
On 28 October, 1954, the People's Daily and the Literary Gazette 
published an article Interrogate the Editors of the Literary Gazette. In
28 Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 150-151.
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this article, the author accused Feng Xue-feng and Chen Qi-xia, the 
deputy chief-editor of the Literary Gazette, of having an "aristocratic 
attitude" towards new critics, surrendering to bourgeois ideas, and 
suppressing lively critical essays. This article, signed by Yuan Shui-pai, 
was believed to have expressed Mao's opinions, for before its publication 
Mao had read and corrected it. Shortly after that a series of sessions was 
held to criticise Feng Xue-feng and the Literary Gazette, attended by 
nearly all the well-known writers in Peking, including Guo Mo-ruo, Zhou 
Yang, Ding Ling, and Hu Feng. In November, 1954, Feng Xue-feng made 
a self-criticism. He admitted that he had made an unforgivable anti- 
Marxist mistake. In December, Feng Xue-feng and Chen Qi-xia lost their 
posts in the Literary Gazette .29
Did Feng Xue-feng really make an anti-Marxist mistake and surrender to 
the bourgeois ideas? Did he refuse Li's and Lan's article only because they 
were "nobodies" and their critical target was an leading scholar? Or, 
more significantly, did he still try to show his own independent literary 
and academic judgement in dealing with the article written by Li Xi-fan 
and Lan Ling, and in runing the Literary Gazette ?
As we have seen, Feng Xue-feng is more an independent writer than a 
snobbish editor. He dared argue not merely with persons like Zhou Yang 
in 1936, but also with the CCP leadership in 1938, and even left for 
home. In 1954, it was said thirty years later, when Feng Xue-feng refused 
to publish Li's and Lan's article, he did not show any "aristocratic 
attitude", but rather, personally he treated them very kindly. He saw them
29 Feng Xue-feng, 1954 . Cf. M. Goldman,1971:106-128; Lin Mo-han, 1989; Hou 
Jin-jing, 1957.
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off and even booked a rickshaw and paid the fee for them.30 More 
importantly, even if Feng Xue-feng had really treated the two young 
critics badly, is it only because Feng thought the two were nobodies while 
the target they aimed at was a leading scholar? Or, more profoundly, is it 
because Feng had his own literary judgement which was essentially 
different from the viewpoint of the two critics, and of Mao? From Feng's 
past experience the CCP and Mao should have known that Feng had had 
his own independent way of thinking and doing since the 1930s. Persons 
like Feng Xue-feng actually belonged to the critical intelligentsia who 
should not have been simply blamed for being members of the 
bourgeoisie or surrendering to bourgeois ideas.
Interestingly, Hu Feng was very active in the criticism of Feng Xue-feng. 
Hu Feng (1902-1985) was also seen as a close friend and follower of Lu 
Xun in the 1930s and another key figure who played a major role in the 
conflict between Lu Xun and Zhou Yang. Hu Feng’s literary theory, 
which emphasised subjective spirit, was considered to be profound and 
distinguished understanding of literature and art, and Hu Feng himself 
thus became an outstanding figure in the Left-wing literary circles.
However, after Lu Xun's death (in 1936), especially after Mao made his 
famous Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art (in 1942), Hu 
Feng's independent literary theory was criticised as petty-bourgeois 
idealism by the CCP, although politically he was seen as a Left-wing 
writer. From 1948, there were already critical articles published in Hong 
Kong by other revolutionary intellectuals. They argued with Hu Feng 
about literature and its relationship to reality. In July 1949, Mao Dun,
JO Cf., Ding Ling, 1986.
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Chairman of the All-China Writers Association, made a lengthy report at 
the First National Congress of the All-China Literary and Art Workers. 
In Mao Dun's report, Hu Feng's literary theory was criticised but without 
mentioning Hu's name. This was the first time that Hu Feng's literary 
theory had been criticised in public since the CCP took over Peking.
As an independent literary figure, Hu Feng refused these criticisms, and 
his relation to CCP leading cadres in charge of ideology was thus in crisis. 
Theoretically, Hu Feng was still considered, or claimed, a revolutionary 
writer. But in practice, he could not get on well with most of the CCP's 
ideologues. What is more, unlike most intellectuals, Hu Feng even did not 
obtain a job after 1949.31
In April 1952, Zhou Yang had a long talk with Hu Feng in Shanghai, 
telling Hu that he should not consider the CCP as an abstract thing. That is 
to say, Hu Feng had been supporting Marxism and the CCP's policies in 
theory, but it was not enough, he should be further subordinated to the 
CCP officials in practice. Zhou Yang's suggestion was certainly not 
acceptable for Hu Feng. He saw those leading cadres sectarians who 
actually did not understand literature.
To show his disagreement, on 4 May, 1952, Hu Feng wrote a letter to Mao 
Ze-dong and Zhou En-lai, reporting the content of his talk with Zhou 
Yang and expressing his feelings. It seemed that Zhou En-lai tried to deal 
with this problem mildly and quietly, for he then told the cadres in charge 
of ideology that Hu Feng's problem was not the same as the problem of
31 The CCP arranged jobs for him, but he thought, before getting an official 
conclusion on the difference between Hu's and his critics' literary theories, it was not 
the time to receive the CCP's arrangement and to take these jobs. Cf., Hu Feng, 1988.
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The Life o f Wu Xun, and thus it was not necessary to criticise him in 
public, although it would be good to have a small-scale discussion 
meeting. Only if Hu Feng was not willing to write self-criticism, could 
one or two articles criticising him be then published, for Hu's literary 
theory was still influential.32 But Hu Feng, as an independent literary 
critic, did refuse to write self-criticism. As a result, in 1953, two critical 
articles written by He Qi-fang and Lin Mo-han, two of the leading figures 
in charge of literature and art, were published in the Literary Gazette. As 
it later turned out, these two articles made the issue more complicated.
In July 1954, in response to the two articles in the Literary Gazette, Hu 
Feng, in cooperation with several others, wrote his famous A Report on 
Literary Practice since 1949 (namely, the 300,000-word Report) to the 
Central Committee of the CCP. In this 300,000-word Report, Hu Feng 
made his counter-criticism of He Qi-fang's and Lin Mo-han's criticisms. 
More importantly, he systematically expressing his independent ideas on 
literature and art. Hu Feng accused He Qi-fang and Li Mo-han of putting 
"five daggers over the heads of writers and readers". These were:
(1). Writers who wanted to practise creative writing must first acquire a 
perfect Communist world outlook;
(2). Since only the livelihood of workers, peasants, and soldiers is real, 
writers should be required to penetrate their lives;
(3). Only after writers had successfully remoulded themselves could they 
engage in literary creation;
(4). Only the traditional Chinese form of literature and art could be 
considered the national form, and writers must carry it forward; and
32 Hu Feng 1988:16. a .  Lin Mo-han, 1989; Lu Yuan, 1989; Li Hui, 1989: 152.
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(5). There is a great difference between various themes: some are 
important, others are not. The value of literary production is determined 
by the theme. Therefore, writers must choose important themes as their 
range of subjects, and such important themes must be "the bright side of 
the society ",33 (My emphasis)
Hu Feng insisted that under these "five daggers" there would be no real 
literary and artistic creation at all. The problem, according to Hu Feng, 
was not only these five daggers, but also, more seriously and harmfully, 
the sectarians (i.e., those ideologues of the CCP in charge of literature and 
art, for example, Zhou Yang), who could freely brandish them.
Hu Feng did not realise what a disaster he brought. When he forwarded 
his 300,000-word Report to the Central Committee of the CCP, he 
thought he just complained about those CCP cadres like Zhou Yang, Lin 
Mo-han, and He Qi-fang, to the "wisest leaders". But in fact he criticised 
Mao's literary theory and CCP's leadership over literature and art.
Three months later, when the Criticism of Hu Shi was launched, Hu Feng 
wrongly thought that the campaign was partly because of his 300,000- 
word Report, and the leadership of the CCP, especially Mao, agreed with 
his opinions, and now decided to deal with the sectarianism within literary 
and artistic circles. Thus, when he was invited to attend the sessions to 
criticise Feng Xue-feng and the Literary Gazette, he strongly criticised 
not only Feng Xue-feng, but also the leading cadres in literary and artistic 
circles, especially Zhou Yang; Hu criticised not only Feng Xue-feng’s
33 Hu Feng , 1988: 104. Cf. He Qi-fang, 1953; Lin Mo-han, 1953; Guo Mo-ruo, 
1963: 216-225; Mei Zhi, 1990; and Zhang Guo-min, 1990.
19 9
attitude towards the two young critics, but also the CCP's policy on 
literature and art. Unfortunately Hu Feng did not realise that, as Zhou 
Yang once told him, even if he were ninety-nine per cent right, he could 
be totally wrong if he were not right about the most fundamental point.34
Hu's criticism of the Literary Gazette could not be accepted by the CCP. 
After Hu's speech, many revolutionary intellectuals, for instance, Yuan 
Shui-pai and He Qi-fang, criticised Hu Feng immediately. Moreover, on 8 
December, 1954, Zhou Yang made a lengthy speech to conclude the 
Criticism of Hu Shi. Zhou Yang in his speech officially demonstrated the 
great differences between the CCP and Hu Feng in the cases of the 
Literary Gazette and The Dream of the Red Camber, and further, in the 
entire matter of literature and art. Zhou Yang started and ended his 
speech with a slogan: We Must Fight !
By now, another political campaign, the Criticism of Hu Feng, had begun. 
It turned out to be the most horrifying political campaign in the 1950s, 
and thousands of intellectuals were accused of counter-revolutionaries, 
nearly a hundred of them were even arrested, because they shared similar 
opinions with, or had personal relationship to, Hu Feng.
At first, to carry on the campaign, the CCP decided to publish Hu Feng's
300,000-word Report in the Literary Gazette. Hearing this, Hu Feng 
went to see Zhou Yang, admitting his fault and asking Zhou Yang to
34 Until Hu had spent more than 20 years in gaol he did not understand that the so- 
called "most fundamental point" was that one must keep in line with Mao's Talks at 
the Yan'an Forum On Literature and Art. That is to say, however great and profound 
Hu's understanding of literature, he cannot deviate from the leadership of the CCP and 
Mao. Cf., Hu Feng, 1954; 1988:16; Lu Yuan, 1989; and Xiao Shan, 1990.
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publish his own declaration as well, in which Hu wrote that he had already 
recognised that his own attitude toward the CCP and toward literature in 
the 300,000-word Report was wrong and harmful. But it was too late.
In response to Hu Feng's requirement, Mao wrote to Zhou Yang: "(1) 
Such a declaration cannot be published; (2)We must never permit Hu 
Feng's bourgeois idealism and his literary theory, which stand in 
opposition to the people and to the Party, to get away from us under the 
cover of being merely regarded as a 'petty bourgeois viewpoint'. Instead, 
we ought to criticise and repudiate them thoroughly."35
Accordingly, on 5 and 7 February, 1955, the All-China Writers 
Association held sessions to criticise Hu's theory. Many prominent writers 
and leading cadres in charge of literature and art attended the sessions, 
including Mao Dun, Zhou Yang, Ding Ling , and Feng Xue-feng.
Nevertheless, during this period (December, 1954 - April, 1955), Hu's 
problem was treated as an ideological rather than a political one. All the 
criticisms focused on his literary theory, which was attacked for its 
deviation from Mao's Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art. 
Hu's literary theory was considered as "bourgeois idea", "idealist 
viewpoint", and "anti-Marxist theory".
However, in April 1955, some of Hu Feng's private letters were handed in 
to the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CCP via 
the People's Daily by one of his former close friends. This was the 
turning point of the Campaign. Because of these letters, Hu Feng was then
35 Mao Ze-dong, 1986: 518. Cf. Lin Mo-han, 1989.
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considered not merely an ideologically bourgeois writer, but the head of 
an anti-Party clique as well.
Parts of his private letters were published in three instalments with many 
severe editorial remarks in the People's Daily. Only in the Cultural 
Revolution did it become apparent that these editorial remarks were in 
fact written by Mao himself. After reading Hu's letters, Mao judged him 
and his friends to have already been an anti-Party clique and a counter­
revolutionary clique in the 1940s. Hu Feng and his friends were declared 
to be "spokesmen for all counter-revolutionary classes, groups and 
individuals". Furthermore, they were accused of being "imperialist and 
KMT secret agents, Trotskyists, reactionary army officers, or renegades 
from the CCP."36
Table 4.2. Articles criticising Hu Feng in the People'sDaily, 1955 .
1955
Academic#
ideological
Criticism
Political & 
personal
Selfcriticism Total
Jan. 4 4
Feb. 3 1 4
March 5 1 6
April 3 3
May 1 83 2 86
June 151 151
July 29 29
Aug. 6 6
Total 16 271 2 289
Source: RMRB, 1 January - 23 August, 1955.
From then on, Hu Feng was described as "robber", "snake", "wolf', 
"mouse", "termite", "bad man", and "enemy of the people". Amongst Hu's
36 Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 176-180. Cf., Mei Zhi, 1990.
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critics, there were not only those former foes of Lu Xun and Hu Feng of 
the 1930s, such as Zhou Yang, Guo Mo-ruo, and Mao Dun, but also Hu's 
former friends, such as Zhou Jian-ren (Lu Xun's brother), and Xu 
Guang-ping (Lu Xun's widow). Hu Feng's followers in the provinces, for 
instance, Lu Yuan, Zeng Zuo, Peng Bo-shan, and Wang Yuan-hua, also 
had to get involved in criticising him. As table 4.2 shows, of the 83 
articles published in the People's Daily in May, only one was by an 
academic critic or was an ideological criticism. All the rest were political 
accusations and/or personal attacks.
Before May, 1955, the criticism of Hu Feng was limited to literary and art 
circles. But from May, when Mao had decided that Hu Feng and his 
friends had formed a counter-revolutionary cliquem, ideological 
criticism changed to political accusation. Not merely literary writers and 
critics, but also social scientists, natural scientists, democratic personages, 
businessmen, the leaders of the CCY and mass organisations, and even 
PLA generals got involved in the campaign as Table 4.3. shows.
Table 4.3. Participants in the Criticism of Hu Feng, 1955.
April May June July Aug. T otal %
wnier/
Artist 1 46 47 2 2 98 35.64
Social
scientist 1 9 12 3 25 9.09
Natural
scientist 2 6 2 10 3.64
DP* 4 31 6 41 14.91
Leader of
CCY** 10 10 3.04
CCP
ideologue 1 2 6 2 11 4.0
HA
generals 2 2 0.73
Others 22 38 14 4 78 28.36
Total 3 85 152 29 6 275 100
*: DP stands for the Democratic Personage, including businessman. 
**: This includes leaders of other mass organisations.
Source: RMRB, 1 April - 23 August, 1955.
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Now, according to the CCP, Hu Feng’s problem should be no longer 
considered as a ideological problem within the revolutionary literary and 
artistic circles, but rather, an antagonistic contradiction between the 
people and their enemies. Hence it could be only resolved by using 
instmment of dictatorship like the police. There appeared articles in the 
People's Daily and Guangming Daily, written by well-known leading 
figures of the Left-wing literary and artistic circles, like Guo Mo-ruo, 
which required to punish Hu Feng and his "clique" mercilessly. It was said 
that Hu Feng's "counter-revolutionary clique" consisted of not only 
literary writers, but also some CCP cadres in other circles. Consequently, 
from mid-May, 1955, Hu Feng, as a deputy to the National People's 
Congress, along with 91 his friends and relatives, was sent to gaol, while 
more than 2,000 people were criticised or punished all over the country, 
as Table 4.4. shows.
Table 4.4. Numbers of " elements of the Hu Feng Clique"and types of punishment.
1955 1956 1965
Criticised/ implicated 2,100
Relieved of posts for
self-examination 73
Investigated in
isolation 62
Taken into custody 92
Labelled as
"Hu Feng Element" 78*
"Core Element" 23
Sentenced to more
than  12 -y ea r 3
imprisonment
*: Amongst them 32 were CCP members.
Source: Li Hui, Historical Tragedy, pp.3, 354, Hong Kong, 1989.
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Thirty years later, when Hu Feng and all of his friends were told by the 
CCP that they had been wrongly accused in 1955 and thus should be 
rehabilitated ploitically, he was already mentally ill, and some of his 
friends, such as A Long, Fang Ran, and Peng Bo-sha, had died.37 And 
only in 1989, when Hu Feng had already died, could Hu Feng's literary 
theory be officially acknowledged as an independent and original idea, 
which should not be simply criticised or ignored.
37 Amongst those who were arrested in 1955 as ’’Elements of the Hu Feng Clique”, 
were:
Lu Ling, writer, member of the Presidium of the All-China Association;
Fang Ran, writer, chief of the Editorial and Research Department, the All-China 
Federation of Literary and Artistic Circles;
A Long, writer, member of the Standing Committee of the Tianjin Federation of 
Literary and Artistic Circles;
Lu Li, writer, director of the Tianjin Association of Writers;
Lu Dian, writer, writer, chief secretary of the Tianjin Federation of Literary and 
Artistic Circles;
Liu Xue Wei, president of the New Literature and Art Publishing House;
Wang Yuan-hua, vice-president of the New Literature and Art Publishing House; 
Zhang Zhong-xiao, editor, the New Literature and Art Publishing House;
Luo Luo, editor, the New Literature and Art Publishing House;
Zeng Zhuo, assistant director of the Zhangjiang Daily;
Lu Yuan, editor of the Zhangjiang Daily;
Jia Zhi-fang, professor at Fudan University;
Mei Lin, dean of the Chinese Literature Department, Aurora University;
Xie Tao, assistant director of Department of Research and Teaching on Marxism and 
Leninism, People's University of China; and
Peng Bo-shan, assistant director of the Culture Department of the Eastern China 
Military and Administrative Commission.
Cf. Yang Yi-fang, 1956: 161-167; Li Hui, 1989: 225; Lin Mo-han, 1989. Hu was 
released in 1978. About his life from 1965-1978, Cf. Mei Zhi, 1986-1989. Also Cf. Li 
Hui, 1989: 331-357.
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The Hu Feng Case clearly showed how deeply the CCP and the 
revolutionary intellectuals like Hu Feng misunderstood each other. On the 
one hand, the CCP and Mao did not know that these intellectuals held their 
own independent views of literature and art although being politically 
committed to the Revolution. On the other hand, these intellectuals had 
hardly understood that under the newly established "Soviet-type 
Communist System" to disagree with the establishment ideologically was 
under taboo, no matter how correct and profound they were. If Hu Feng 
was naive when he tried to argued with the leadership of the CCP in his
300,000-word Report, then the CCP was not wise when it used Hu Feng’s 
private letters to accuse Hu Feng of being the KMT's spy and counter­
revolutionary. Intellectuals are producers of ideas, which cannot be 
simply forbidden by using administrative and military means.
However, for the time being, it was horrible. And almost all well-known 
established intellectuals were forced to show their political support to the 
CCP and its decision to arrest Hu Feng. Possibly that is why by that time 
Feng Xue-feng and Ding Ling were also involved in the political 
accusations against Hu Feng.
Feng Xue-feng admitted in the People's Daily on 27 May, 1955, that he 
had been for a long time deceived by Hu Feng. Feng Xue-feng further 
accused Hu Feng of driving a wedge between Lu Xun and the CCP in the 
1930s. Four days earlier Ding Ling wrote: "I can no longer do my daily 
work after reading some of Hu Feng's private letters. Where are the 
enemies? They are right here! They are in front of us, amongst us, and
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beside us."38 But for Ding Ling, it turned out that such a simple show of 
her political attitude was not enough.
Ding Ling (1904-1986) began her literary career in 1927. She was 
involved in the Left-wing Literary Movement in the early 1930s and 
became a CCP member in 1932. Like Feng Xue-feng, Zhou Yang and 
Mao Dun, she was once the secretary of the China Left-wing Association 
of Writers. In the 1940s, she played an active role within the literary and 
art circles in Yan’an, and had a very good relationship with Mao and other 
top leaders of the CCP. Ding Ling was also the only writer whom Mao 
wrote a poem to, although Mao pointed out that she, as well as many other 
writers, lacked the experience of being together with the common 
masses.39
However, in 1942, Ding Ling got involved in criticising Yan’an’s "dark 
side". She published an article Random Thoughts on Women's Day on 8 
March, 1942, in the Liberation Daily, the CCP's newspaper in Yan'an 
during the 1940s. In this article, Ding Ling sympathised with those 
divorced Red Armywomen whose ex-husbands married younger girls 
from the urban areas. Ding Ling concluded that in Yan’an women had not 
enjoyed equal positions with men yet. It was a really sensitive subject 
because many high officials and generals did so. This was the first time 
that Ding Ling showed her critical attitude towards the CCP. 
Dramatically, Ding Ling quickly re-obtained the trust from the leadership 
of the CCP, and even became an activist in the criticism of Wang Shi-wei.
38 Feng Xue-feng, 1955; Ding Ling, 1955.
39 Cf., Ding Ling, 1984:249; Zhu Zheng-ming, 1982; Gan Lu, 1987.
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From 1949 to 1954, Ding Ling occupied the following posts:
A member of the Cultural & Educational Commission of the Government 
Administrative Council;
A vice-chairwoman of , and a deputy Party secretary in, the All-China 
Writers Association (called the All-China Association of Literary 
Workers before 1953);
Head of the Literature Bureau of the Propaganda Department of the CCP 
Central Committee;
Director of the Thought Reform Commission of Literary and Art Circles 
in Peking;
Director of the Central Literary Institute, chief-editor of the Literary 
Gazette (1949-1952); and
Deputy chief-editor of the People's Literature (1952-1953).
In 1954, when the Criticism of Hu Shi was launched, Ding Ling was also 
criticised for her work in the Literary Gazette , though she had left the 
Literary Gazette in 1952. The problematic figure was Chen Qi-xia, 
deputy chief-editor of the Literary Gazette. Chen had been Ding Ling's 
associate when they worked for the Liberation Daily in Yan'an. In 1949, 
it was Ding Ling who asked the CCP to appoint Chen Qi-xia as her deputy 
chief-editor at the Literary Gazette. When Ding left the Literary Gazette 
for the People's Literature, she recommended Feng Xue-feng for her post 
while Chen Qi-xia remained as deputy chief-editor. In 1954, Feng Xue- 
feng was charged with "surrendering to bourgeois ideas and suppressing 
Marxist interpretations of literary questions by new critics", and Chen Qi- 
xia was charged with "dogmatism and the suppression of new voices". 
Ding Ling at the beginning spoke for Chen Qi-xia, later she herself was 
attacked because of her connection with Chen , her defence of Chen, and 
her work in the Literary Gazette. In January 1955, the Party Committee
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of the All-China Writers Association convened a meeting to criticise 
Chen Qi-xia, ending with an official resolution. Ding Ling also wrote 
self-criticisms at least twice. It seemed that Ding and Chen accepted the 
resolution against them meekly at that time. In April, 1955, however, 
three anonymous letters were sent to the leadership of the CCP. In these 
letters, the author, who, it was believed, was either Chen Qi-xia himself 
or one of his close friends, insisted that Ding Ling and Chen Qi-xia had 
been wrongly criticised, and that the case of the Literary Gazette should 
be re-examined.40
Like Hu Feng's 300,000-word Report, these letters made matters worse. 
From August to September, 1955, the Party Committee of the All-China 
Writers Association held 16 enlarged meetings to deal with Ding Ling and 
Chen Qi-xia. It resulted in a report to the Propaganda Department of the 
CCP Central Committee, in which Ding and Chen were attacked for 
"their activities in forming an anti-Party clique". In December 1955, the 
Central Committee of the CCP decided that Ding Ling and Chen Qi-xia 
did form an anti-party clique, and they were accused of (1) refusing the 
CCP's supervision and instruction, (2) disrupting unity and trying to 
cause a split within the literary and art circles, (3) building up a 
personality cult around Ding Ling and (4) promoting bourgeois 
individualism. Chen Qi-xia was even detained for nine months 41 None of 
this was made known to the public until 1957.
During the Hundred Flowers period, encouraged by the CCP's new policy 
towards intellectuals, some writers in the All-China Writers Association
40 Cf. Chen Qi-xia, 1987; Chen Gong-huai, 1989; and WYB, 1957, Vol. 24, pp.7.
41 Li Zi-lian, 1989 ; Chen Gong-huai, 1989.
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wrote letters to the authorities at various levels, expressing their 
disagreement with the resolution on Ding Ling and Chen Qi-xia in 1955. 
This time the leadership of the CCP did send a fact-finding team, led by 
Zhang Ji-chun, a Deputy Director of the Propaganda Department, to re­
examine the case. Based on careful investigations, this team almost 
reached the conclusion that the resolution on Ding Ling and Chen Qi-xia 
in 1955 was not fair.
On 6 June, 1957, the Party Commission of the All-China Writers 
Association held another enlarged meeting. At the meeting, several CCP 
officials including Zhou Yang, who had been in charge of criticising 
Ding and Chen since 1952 and was now a member of the fact-finding 
team, declared that Ding and Chen had been wrongly accused in 1955. He 
said that the so-called "Anti-Party Clique" did not exist, and the officials 
made a public apology to Ding Ling.42 However, when the political 
climate changed and the leadership of the CCP launched the Anti-rightist 
Campaign, Ding Ling and Chen Qi-xia were once again accused of 
organising an Anti-Party Clique in which, it was said then, Feng Xue-feng 
had been a key figure.
Writers in various groups from August 1957 started condemning Ding 
Ling, Feng Xue-feng, and Chen Qi-xia in public. Amongst them, there 
were: (1). Zhou Yang’s colleagues, such as Shao Quan-lin, Lin Mo-han, 
Yuan Shui-pai, and He Qi-fang; (2). Lu Xun's relatives Xu Guang-ping 
and Zhou Jian-ren; and (3). prominent Chinese writers, for example, 
Guo Mo-ruo, Mao Dun, Lao She, Ba Jin, and many others.
42 Li Zi-lian, 1989; Chen Gong-huai, 1989.
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What is more, in January, 1958, the CCP called for the "re-criticism of 
the poisonous weeds" written by Ding Ling, Ai Qing, Xiao Jun, Luo Feng, 
and Wang Shi-wei in 1942. The Literary Gazette reprinted Wang Shi- 
wei's Wild Lily, Ding Ling's Random Thoughts on Women's Day, Ai 
Qing's Understanding Writers & Respecting Writers, Xiao Jun's On 
'Love' and 1Forbearance' amongst Comrades, and Luo Feng's It Is still 
the Time for the Satiric Essay. All of them were originally printed in the 
Liberation Daily in Yan'an when Ding Ling worked there as the editor of 
its Literary Supplement. The purpose of reprinting these articles, 
according to the editorial remarks, was to let people know how Ding Ling 
and others "wrote counter-revolutionary articles under the name of the 
Revolution."43 In February, 1958, Zhou Yang made the concluding 
report: A Great Debate in Literary and Art Circles , which signalled the 
end of the criticism.
Both Ding Ling and Feng Xue-feng were described by their critics as 
being anti-Party elements since the 1930s. It was said that Ding Ling in 
1933 actually surrendered to the KMT when she was arrested, that in 
1942 she wrote an anti-Party article Random Thoughts on Women's Day, 
and that she published Wang Shi-wei's Wild Lily and others' articles 
mentioned above. Feng Xue-feng was attacked for creating , like Hu Feng, 
a split between Lu Xun and the CCP in 1936, and for deserting the 
Revolution and the CCP in 1937 and 1939. Many other writers were also 
labelled as members of the "Anti-Party Clique of Ding-Chen", and Feng. 
The numbers increased from 2 (Ding and Chen Qi-xia) in 1955 to more
43 WYB, 1958, Vol.2. This later turned out to be written by Mao. See below.
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than 400 in 1957.44 Were they really anti-Party elements? Or were they 
wrongly labelled, like Hu Feng, just because of their personal conflict 
with Zhou Yang, or more importantly, besides such conflict, because of 
their independent ideas and critical spirits which could no longer accepted 
by the authorities under the New "Communist" System?
It is certainly true that, before they were punished, they had been 
attacking, or at least, complaining about, Zhou Yang and his group since 
the 1930s. When the PRC was established, it became common knowledge 
within the literary and art circles that Feng Xue-feng, Hu Feng, and Ding 
Ling did not respect Zhou Yang. Because of such a conflict, in 1949 when 
Zhou En-lai appointed Feng Xue-feng as director of the People's 
Literature Press, Feng complained that it was hard to work effectively 
under Zhou Yang, who was a deputy director of the Propaganda 
Department which controlled ideology including publication. Another 
example is that, when the Central Committee of the CCP sent a fact­
finding team to look into Ding Ling Case in 1956, Zhou En-lai 
emphatically instructed the team that because Zhou Yang and Ding Ling 
had had serious personal conflicts, Zhou Yang as a member of the team 
should not directly take part in the interviews with Ding Ling. As far as 
Hu Feng Case is concerned, it has been widely known that Hu Feng was
44 Amongst them, were: Ai Qing, one of China's most eminent poets, and one of 
those who were criticised in Yan'an in 1942, together with Ding Ling and Wang Shi- 
wei;
Xiao Jun, novelist, one of Lu Xun's close friends in the 1930s, and one of those 
criticised in Yan'an in 1942;
Luo Feng, writer, one of those criticised in Yan'an in 1942;
Li You-ran, writer;
Chen Ming, Ding Ling's husband; and 
Bai Lang, Luo Feng's wife.
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always critical towards Zhou Yang since the 1930s when Zhou Yang and 
Lu Xun argued each other. In the 1950s, such a critical attitude could be 
clearly seen in both his speech to criticise the Literary Gazette in 1954 
and his 300,000-word Report. Later on, Zhou Yang and his friends had 
indeed played a very active role in the criticism of Feng Xue-feng, Hu 
Feng and Ding Ling. It was Zhou Yang who in 1957 told the director of 
the Propaganda Department that he did not agree with the report in which 
the fact-finding team concluded that Ding Ling was not a traitor. It was 
Zhou Yang as well who in 1955 decided to send Hu Feng’s private letters 
to Mao and to publish them.45 If it were not for Zhou Yang, we may 
suppose, Ding Ling, Hu Feng, and Feng Xue-feng would have suffered 
much less.
On the other hand, in a "Soviet-type Communist” society, ruled by a 
Leninist Party which always considered ideology as a crucial factor of its 
leadership, it is hard to imagine that any nationwide political campaign, 
such as the Criticism of Hu Shi, the Criticism of Hu Feng, or the Anti- 
Rightist Campaign, could be launched without the permission of the top 
leaders, and it is difficult to suppose that members of the critical 
intelligentsia such as Hu Feng could escape from criticism and/or 
punishment.
As a matter of fact, it was Mao himself who not only launched those 
political campaigns, but also decided that Hu Feng, Ding Ling, and Feng 
Xue-feng were labelled heads of counter-revolutionary or anti-Party 
cliques, and then criticised and punished. Mao not only made decisions at
45 Bao Zi-yan & Yuan Shao-fa, 1986:75; Li Zi-lian, 1989; Hu Feng, 1954, 1988; 
WYB, 1958, Vol.2; Ding Ling , 1984: 280-281.
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the high level in general, but also directed the campaign in particular. For 
instance, it was Mao who in 1958 decided to re-criticise the articles 
written by Ding Ling and others in 1942 as negative examples, and Mao 
himself wrote the editorial remarks.46
Zhou Yang, as a key leading cadre with direct control over literature and 
art, took part in carrying out the CCP’s policies in each of these political 
campaigns on the one hand, but on the other, as an official who was 
thought to be partly responsible for all of the "mistakes" within the 
literary and art circles, he was also required on each occasion to make 
self-criticism. The relationship between Zhou Yang and those targets of 
criticism was more complicated than it seemed.
For example, in 1954, when the Criticism of Hu Shi was launched, Zhou 
Yang told Mao that Feng Xue-feng suffered a lot from the criticism, but 
Mao answered: "That is what I wanted!" Zhou Yang tried to share Feng's 
responsibility, saying that he himself was not on the alert against Hu Shi's 
bourgeois idealism which still dominated research into Chinese classical 
literature. Mao angrily answered:
"It is not true that you are not on the alert. You are very much on the alert.
Your inclination is very clear: you protect bourgeois ideas, you like anti- 
Marxist things, but hate Marxism."47
Then Zhou Yang had to admit that "the problem of the Literary Gazette 
was not only with one or two editors. We gave up the criticism and 
struggle against bourgeois idealism, it in fact means that we surrendered
46 WYB, 1958, Vol. 2. Cf., WEN YI SI XIANG ZHAN XIAN SAN SHI NIAN, 
pp.60; Li Rui, 1987.
47 Cf., Li Hui, 1989: 174.
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to the bourgeoisie. This is the biggest mistake we made. I myself am the 
man who made it."48
In the Cultural Revolution, when Zhou Yang was criticised, this self- 
criticism on the part of Zhou Yang was even accused of pleading for Feng 
Xue-feng. More interestingly, in 1975 when Zhou was just released from 
gaol after staying there for more than eight years, Feng Xue-feng was the 
first man he visited. The two old men were so pleased and touched that 
they burst into tears when they saw each other. After their meeting, Zhou 
Yang wrote a letter to Mao in which he insisted that Feng Xue-feng was a 
good Communist and thus should be re-recruited as a CCP member, 
although Zhou Yang himself at that time was still considered as the head 
of a revisionist line in literature and art, and therefore had not yet been 
reinstated to the CCP.49
Was Zhou Yang indeed Feng Xue-feng's friend, and thus did he try to 
help Feng, as Zhou was accused by Yao Wen-yuan in the Cultural 
Revolution? Or more likely, did Zhou Yang, after being in gaol for eight 
years, just feel guilty for Feng Xue-feng's experience since 1954-57 
mainly because of Feng's critical spirits? It is hard to see Zhou and Feng 
as friends though Zhou Yang indeed tried to help Feng even in 1954 when 
Mao decided to criticise Feng. The more important factor is that, no 
matter whether Feng Xue-feng had personal conflict with Zhou Yang, he 
would have few opportunities to escape from criticism if he tried to show 
his own independent thinking under the "Soviet-type Communist" System.
48 Zhou Yang , 1985:312; Lin Mo-han,1989.
49 Zhou Yang, 1980; Tang Tao, in Bao & Yuan, 1986: 122; Zhen Yu-zhi, 1986: 78.
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Just after Zhou Yang's visit, Feng Xue-feng wrote his last fable in which 
he described their meeting as following:
A golden pheasant called on another one. When they said goodbye to each 
other, both sent the most beautiful plumages of their own to the other in 
memory of their time together. A crowd of sparrows saw it, laughing at 
them: "Is it nothing but lauding each other?" "No! sparrows," I must say,
"you are totally wrong. Whatever their shortcomings they are golden 
pheasants which belong to beautiful birds, and their plumages are gorgeous 
indeed."50
By this Feng Xue-feng tried to tell his readers indirectly that his 
relationship to Zhou Yang was, unlike many people thought, more 
complecated than personal conflict, and in fact, in spite of such conflicts, 
they shared something in common intellectually, which those non­
intellectuals could not understand. As we shall see later, they did share 
certain sorts of critical spirits in common.
Another evidence that Zhou Yang should not be blamed to be totally 
responsible for the punishment of Feng Xue-feng, Ding Ling, and Hu 
Feng can be seen from the relationship between Zhou Yang and Hu Feng. 
As early as 1945, Zhou Yang, who was already a high official in charge of 
literature and art in Yan'an, had justified Hu Feng's literary practice when 
he deliberately called to see Hu Feng in Shanghai. In the 1950s, when the 
CCP decided to criticise Hu Feng's literary theory, it was Zhou Yang who 
insisted on limiting the definition of Hu Feng’s problem to a "petty 
bourgeois viewpoint" while considering Hu as a man who politically 
supported Mao and was with the CCP in its major political struggles. 
Zhou Yang even named Hu Feng as a "non-Party Communist And when
50 Feng Xue-feng , 1981: 553.
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Mao decided that Hu's theory should no longer be seen as a petty 
bourgeois viewpoint, but instead, as the anti-Party idealism of the 
bourgeoisie, Zhou Yang still instructed: "Do not deal with Hu's pre-1949 
publications, it is enough to criticise Hu's articles since 1949. But Hu's 
counter-criticism should also be published."51
Zhou Yang never expected that Hu's problem in the end would be dealt 
with as that of a counter-revolutionary clique, this is why Mao criticised 
Zhou Yang as bookish and naive in 1955. More than twenty years later, 
when both men were released from imprisonment, Zhou Yang told Hu 
Feng and Hu's friends that in China nobody has ever understood literature 
more profoundly than Hu Feng, and that Zhou himself personally 
admired Hu very much.52
More significantly, even if Zhou Yang had not had such a complicated 
relationship to Feng Xue-feng, Ding Ling, and Hu Feng, even if they had 
been best friends of Zhou Yang, could they have escaped being criticised 
and punished under a "Soviet-type Communist System"? As we will see 
soon, even Zhou Yang’s best friends, for example, Xia Yan, Tian Han, 
Hang Han-sheng, and Zhou Yang himself, could not have a narrow escape 
from criticism and punishment if they wanted to show their independent 
thinking. The experiences of critical intelligentsia within the CCP under 
the "New System" resulted more from the system itself than from their 
personal relationship to certain important persons.
51 a . ,  Yao Wen-Yuan, 1971:101; and WEN YI SI XIANG ZHAN XIAN SAN SHI 
NIAN, pp. 143.
52 Hu Feng, 1990; Lin Mo-han,1989. Lu Yuan, 1989 ; Mao Ze-dong, 1977:180; Li 
Hui, 1989: 417-420; Zhou Yang, in Xiao Shan, 1990.
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IV. The Purge of Zhou Yang and the "Four Villains"
As a Japanese-trained student, Zhou Yang (1907-1989) got involved in the 
Left-wing literary movement in the late 1920s. Concentrating on literary 
theories, Zhou Yang, unlike most other intellectuals in literary and art 
circles, never published a novel, short story, poem, or play, although he 
did many translations from Western literature, especially from Russian 
literature, such as Tolstoy and Chemyshevsky.
Zhou Yang became Party secretary of the China Left-wing Association of 
Writers in Shanghai in the 1930s, where he could not successfully co­
operate with Lu Xun. Partly because of Lu Xun's merciless criticism of 
Zhou Yang, especially the criticism made in public before Lu Xun's death 
in 1936, he had to leave Shanghai for Yan'an next year in 1937. In 
Yan'an, he became one of the high officials in charge of education and 
literature whom Mao trusted very much then.
Since the establishment of the PRC, as showed before, Zhou Yang 
occupied several key posts in the CCP in charge of literature and art until 
the Cultural Revolution was launched in 1966. Zhou Yang's posts since 
1949 in no way signified the power he wielded, as M. Goldman points out, 
for not until 1956 was he appointed to his highest post: that of alternate 
member of the Central Committee of the CCP.53
However, Zhou Yang should not be considered as China's "Cultural 
Tsar". Above him, the high officials in charge of ideology and 
propaganda were: Chen Bo-da and Hu Qiao-mu, who had both been
53 M . Goldman, 1966: 133; 1981: 39.
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Mao’s secretaries and ghost-writers since the early 1940s, and the CCP's 
ideological spokesmen since 1949; and Lu Ding-yi, who occupied the post 
of Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of 
the CCP during the entire period from 1942 to 1966. They not only held 
much more powerful posts than Zhou Yang, for instance, members of the 
Politburo, and/or Vice-premier, but also had much more say in policy­
making.
Nevertheless, since the Anti-Rightist Campaign(1957-1958), especially 
after the Great Leap Forward(1958-1959), Zhou Yang was getting more 
critical towards Mao's radical policies. During the Hundred Rowers 
period, Zhou Yang in his official speeches agreed that the democratic 
personages had posts in the state organs but without real power, that 
citizens had the right to publicise idealist and bourgeois ideas, and that 
laymen cannot lead experts.54
After the Great Leap Forward, Zhou Yang and his colleagues started 
openly criticising Mao's radical policy towards literature and art. One 
example was Yang Han-sheng.55 As a CCP member since 1925, Yang Han- 
sheng had been writing a great number of Left-wing dramas, scripts 
under the supervision of the CCP. But in the 1960s he began openly to 
complain about the CCP's strict limits on literary creation. Like Hu Feng 
who described such limits as "Five Daggers", Yang Han-sheng 
summarised the leadership of the CCP in the kingdom of literature and art
54 He even declared that a man should not been necessarily labelled as a counter­
revolutionary if he said something counter-revolutionary. Zhou Yang, 1985: 500-508.
55 Yang Han-sheng got actively involved in both Communist Revolution and literature. 
He was one of the initiators of China Left-wing Association of Writers, and, before 
Ding Ling and Zhou Yang, became its Party secretary in the 1930s.
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as "Ten Strings"(SHI TIAO SHENG ZI): "five ’Musts'" and "five 
'Cannots'". More precisely, limited by these "ten strings", literary writers
(1) must write on significant subject such as the Revolution;
(2) must eulogise revolutionary heroes;
(3) must join collective creation;
(4) must finish their works within the given period, and
(5) must get permission from the leadership.
While at the same time, they
(1) cannot write about the conflict among the people, especially the 
conflict between leaders and the led;
(2) cannot write satirical works;
(3) cannot write tragedy;
(4) cannot write about failure and weakness of heroes; and
(5) cannot write on the shortcomings of CCP members and leaders.56
Under such limits, Yang Han-sheng claimed, there would be no real 
literary creation, and the so-called "literary works" were actually 
produced by collective power: leaders who decided ideas, masses of 
workers and peasants who supplied details, and writers who used their 
techniques, as a result, everybody got involved in creating nothing.57
To change this, Zhou Yang ordered Lin Mo-han (who was the key critic 
of Hu Feng in 1948-1955) and others to draft Some Proposals concerning 
the Current Situation in Literary and Art Circles. In this Some Proposals, 
the authors listed eight suggestions, which were later called "Black Eight 
Suggestions". These were:
56 Cf., RMRB, 27 December, 1966.
57 Ibid.
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(1). Literature and art should be considered as something with its own 
independence, rather than simple means to publicise certain specific 
policies of the CCP;
(2). There should be no limits in terms of range of subjects, and literature 
was mainly based on individual creation;
(3). Socialist literary workers should assimilate the cultural heritage 
created by the bourgeoisie;
(4). Literary writers and artists should not take part in too much manual 
work and too many social activities, in order to concentrate on their 
professional creation, and if it was necessary, they should have "creation- 
holidays", i.e., have time away from their units;
(5). Literary critics should not pay their attention exclusively to politics 
when they viewed literary works, but instead, they should carefully 
distinguish between matters of politics, ideology, and literature;
(6). Those people who were absorbed in their professional creation 
should not be criticised as "experts without red colour";
(7). Writers and artists with CCP membership should co-operate with, 
and leam from, non-Party writers and artists; and
(8). The Party Branches in literary units should not be in charge of 
everything, and CCP cadres in these units should study harder in order to 
change themselves from laymen to experts', . . . 58 (My emphasis)
It is interesting to compare this Eight Proposals, or Yang Han-sheng's 
"Ten Strings", with Hu Feng's 300,000-word Report, or those opinions of 
the democratic personages during the Hundred Flowers period.
58 Cf., Hsuan Mou, 1978: 204-208.
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Firstly, like Hu Feng, both Yang Han-sheng and the authors of the Eight 
Suggestions complained that, under the CCP's ideological limits, "real 
literary creation" was hardly possible. Secondly, like some "Rightist 
appeals for scientists" in 1957, the Eight Suggestions asked the CCP to 
give literary writers more individual freedom and independence, but less 
social activities and manual work. Thirdly, like the "Rightists", Yang 
Han-sheng and the authors of the Eight Suggestions claimed that "laymen" 
("peasants in uniform", or more generally, CCP cadres) should not lead 
"experts" (literary writers and artists, or in general, "intellectuals"), and 
that the leadership of the CCP did not mean it could/should be in charge of 
everything. And finally, they demanded to draw a line between politics 
and literary creation (for the "Rightists", scientific research).59
But unlike Hu Feng and the "Rightists", Yang Han-sheng's criticism was 
more acrimonious and incisive, and the Eight Suggestions were more 
systematic. What is more, such criticism and suggestions were made after 
the stem punishment of Hu Feng (and his friends) and hundreds of 
thousands of the "Rightists".
Did they leam any lesson from the Hu Feng Case and Anti-Rightist 
Campaign? Why were they still so brave? Is that only because, unlike Hu 
Feng who had no post and the "Rightists" who held posts without real 
power, they occupied certain high posts and had real power? Or, perhaps 
more importantly, is it also because they were the ones who, taking 
advantage of holding power, could play the critical role of intelligentsia 
after the punishment of "Hu Feng Clique" and the "Rightists"?
59 Cf., Chapters Three and Five.
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Whatever answers, Zhou Yang and his friends' criticism of the CCP in 
the end resulted in Mao’s distrust of Zhou Yang and Zhou Yang's 
dismissal from all his posts.
Mao had been very angry with the Ministry of Culture, accusing it of 
portraying emperors, generals, ministers, gifted scholars, beautiful 
ladies, or foreign figures, instead of workers, peasants and soldiers, in the 
theatre, cinema, dance and opera. In 1963, Mao said that if they were not 
changed, the Ministry of Culture should then be named as the Ministry of 
Emperors and Generals, of Gifted Scholars and Beautiful Ladies, or of 
the Foreign Dead. In December, 1963, and June, 1964, Mao wrote two 
pieces of instruction:
Problems abound in all forms of art, such as the opera,ballads, music and 
fine arts, dance, the cinema, poetry and literature, and the people involved 
are numerous; in many units [in literary and art circles] very little has been 
achieved so far in socialist transformation. 'The dead1 still dominate in 
many units. ... Is it a monstrous absurdity that many Communists are 
enthusiastic about promoting feudalist and capitalist arts rather than socialist 
ones?
In the last fifteen years, Associations of Literature and Art, most of their 
publications , and by and large the people in them ( but not all of them) have 
not carried out the Party's policies. They have acted as high and mighty 
bureaucrats and overlords who have stood above workers, peasants and 
soldiers, and who have not reflected socialist revolution and socialist 
construction. In recent years, they slid right down to the brink of 
revisionism. Unless they remould themselves in real earnest, at some future 
date they are bound to become like the Hungarian Petofi Club. 60
60 HQ, 1967, Vol.9, P.8-9.
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Mao thought that the cinema and theatre were entirely in the service of the 
bourgeoisie and not in the service of the majority of the people. He 
angrily asked: "Who is in charge of the Ministry of Culture?"61 As a 
result, many of Zhou Yang's closest colleagues in literary and art circles, 
including Xia Yan, Tian Han, and Yang Han-sheng, were dismissed, 
together with Mao Dun, the Minister of Culture, and China's foremost 
Left-wing (but non-Party) novelist. In the meantime, there was 
nationwide criticism of their literary works, especially Xia Yan's film 
The Lin Family Shop (based on Mao Dun's novel), Tian Han's play Miss 
Xie Yao-huan, and Yang Han-sheng's film The Rich Land in the North .
This time, in the eyes of Mao, it was not a problem of several individual 
cases, but instead, a problem that encompassed all literature and art 
circles. In February, 1966, Jiang Qing, Mao's wife, went to Shanghai, 
where she held a forum on the work in literature and art. Consequently, a 
summary of the forum was sent to Mao, and then, after Mao's careful 
correction and full agreement, it was read nationwide as an official 
document. In this summary, Jiang Qing concluded that China's literature 
and art circles "have been under the dictatorship of a black anti-Party and 
anti-socialist line, which is diametrically opposed to Chairman Mao's 
thought." 62
In the summer of 1966, when the Cultural Revolution was launched, Zhou 
Yang and his group, including Xia Yan, Tian Han, and Yang Han-sheng, 
the so-called "Four Villains", as they were named by Lu Xun in 1936, 
became the main public targets. The CCP declared that since 1942, "for
61 Mao Ze-dong, 1974: 243.
62 Jiang Qing, 1968:7. Cf., Hu Hua, 1985: 262; M. Goldman, 1981: 125.
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24 years Zhou Yang and company have consistently refused to carry out 
Chairman Mao's line on literature and art, and stubbornly adhered to the 
bourgeois revisionist black line on literature and art."63
Yao Wen-yuan, who then became an ideological spokesman for Mao, 
further accused Zhou Yang of being the head of this "black line". Under 
Zhou Yang, Yao Wen-yuan declared, Hu Feng, Feng Xue-feng, Ding 
Ling, Xia Yan, Tian Han, Yang Han-sheng, and many others gathered and 
were protected. It was said that in all the past four great political 
campaigns, i.e., the Criticism of The Life ofWu Xun , the Criticism of Hu 
Shi, the Criticism of Hu Feng, and the Anti-rightist Campaign, Zhou Yang 
refused to carry out Mao's policies on each occasion. Yao Wen-yuan even 
revealed that in 1951 and 1954, when Mao decided to criticise The Life of 
Wu Xun and the Literary Gazette, it was Zhou Yang whom Mao 
criticised as the head of "certain numbers of Communists who claimed to 
have grasped Marxism but had lost their critical faculties and even 
capitulated to reactionary ideas", and the head of "certain bigwigs who go 
in for a united front with bourgeois writers on the question of idealism 
and have become willing captives of the bourgeoisie". Yao Wen-yuan also 
described Zhou Yang as the man who shared the ideas of Hu Feng and the 
Rightists. Yao Wen-Yuan concluded that Zhou Yang had been a "Counter­
revolutionary Double-dealer".64 Yao's article, corrected and approved by 
Mao, officially announced that Zhou Yang's political career was end.
In 1966, Zhou Yang's activities in his conflict with Lu Xun were also 
condemned in public. On 31 October, 1966, more than seventy thousand
63 HQ, 1966, Vol.7.
64 Yao Wen-yuan, 1971: 89-135; Cf., Mao, 1977: 57-58, 150-151; Li Hui, 1989: 174; 
Zhou Yang, 1985:486-512.
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people, including nearly all the CCP leaders at that time except Mao, 
attended a meeting in memory of Lu Xun in Peking. Amongst the 
speakers, there were:
Xu Guang-ping, Lu Xun's widow;
Guo Mo-ruo, the only famous writer who had not been criticised in 
public during the Cultural Revolution;
Yao Wen-yuan, a young literary critic who now became one of Mao's 
main ideological spokesmen; and
Chen Bo-da, Mao's secretary and one of the CCP's top ideologues since 
the 1940s, and now the Director of the Central Commission of the 
Cultural Revolution, the number four man in the CCP's leadership.
Since 1966, Zhou Yang's and his group’s activities and ideas were 
denounced as criminal behaviour, including their :
(1). flattery of the Western literary theories, for example, those from the 
Renaissance, from the Enlightenment, and especially, from Belinsky, 
Chernyshevsky, and Dobrolyubov;
(2). attack on Lu Xun in the 1930s;
(3). co-operation with Ding Ling, Wang Shi-wei, and others, to write 
anti-Party "poisonous weeds" in Yan’an in the 1940s;
(4). protection of Feng Xue-feng, Hu Feng, Ding Ling, Xia Yan, Tian 
Han, and many others during all past political campaigns;
(5). advertisement of Rightist opinions during the Hundred Flowers 
period, such as the idea that "a layman cannot lead an expert";
(6). deviation from Mao's Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and 
A r t , for instance, the maintenance of "the literature of the whole people", 
objection to the repeated mentioning of Mao’s name in literary and artistic 
works, vilification of the CCP's policies over literature and art as "ten 
strings", and advocating the "depiction of middle man (wavering between
2 2 6
the old and new societies)", "departing from the classics and rebelling 
against orthodoxy", and "widening the range of subjects";... 65
Zhou Yang and other members of the so-called "Four Villains", that is, 
Xia Yan, Tian Han and Yang Han-sheng, were then called "traitors", 
"spies", and "counter-revolutionaries". Moreover, they were arrested and 
put into gaol. Not until 1975, when Mao wrote that "it seems to me that 
the Zhou Yang Case could be handled leniently", could they be released, 
by which time Tian Han was already dead, and Xia Yan was crippled.
Before Zhou Yang and his associates, all targets in the past four great 
political campaigns had nevertheless been treated as individual cases. 
Although they could be accused of forming an anti-Party clique like Ding 
Ling and Feng Xue-feng, or even operating a counter-revolutionary 
clique like Hu Feng, and consequently be sternly denounced all over the 
country and even put into gaol(Hu Feng), the literary and artistic circles 
as a whole, however, had never previously been denounced by the CCP. 
But when Zhou Yang was condemned, he was not seen as an individual or 
a head of a small clique, but instead, as a representative of the whole 
literary and art kingdom ruled by so-called "revisionists".
Even now no one knows the exact number of writers, artists, literary 
critics, and officials in charge of literature and art, who were punished as 
followers of Zhou Yang throughout the whole country. 66
65 cf., CHE DI PI PAN ZHOU YANG DE FAN GE MING XU ZHENG ZHU YI 
WEN YI HEI XIAN.
66 Those whom we can list here were some of Zhou Yang's close friends:
Xia Yan, playwright and journalist, vice-chairman of All-China Federation of Literary 
and Artistic Circles, and vice-minister of Culture Department, the State Council;
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Why was Zhou Yang, who since 1942 had been carrying out Mao's 
policies in literary and art circles, accused of being "the head of an anti- 
Party & anti-socialist revisionist line over literature and art"? How could 
Zhou Yang, who at least since 1942 had been deeply involved in directing 
the political campaigns in literary and art circles, be attacked as the key 
figure who protected Hu Feng, Ding Ling, Feng Xue-feng, and others?
One of the reasons can be found in the conflict between Jiang Qing and 
the "Four Villains" in the 1930s, when Jiang Qing was only a young 
actress who felt her gifted talent in performances was not fully 
appreciated by the "Four Villains". Jiang Qing herself repeatedly 
emphasised her personal hostility towards the "Four Villains" because of 
their lack of great attention to her in the 1930s when she was interviewed 
by Witke in 1972.67
Yang Han-sheng, writer, vice-chairman of All-China Federation of Literary and 
Artistic Circles;
Tian Han, playwright, chairman of All-China Association of the Stage Artists;
Lin Mo-han, literary critic, deputy director of the Propaganda Department of the 
Central Committee, CCP;
Shao Quan-lin, literary critic, deputy director of the Propaganda Department;
Chen Huang-mei, writer, director of Film Bureau, and vice-minister of Culture 
Department, the State Council;
Qi Yan-ming, vice-minister of Culture Department, the State Council;
Zhang Guang-nian, poet, chief-editor of the Literary Gazette;
He Qi-fang, poet, chief-editor of the Literary Review;
Zhao Shu-li, novelist;
Zhou Li-bo, novelist; and 
Meng Chao, playwright.
67 Witke, 1977: 108 -115, 158-159, 310-311, 327-328, 337-338, etc.; Cf. Xia Yan, 
1985: 335-336.
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Such a personal desire for revenge, however, cannot explain the facts that, 
besides the ’’Four Villains”, there were so many other writers, artists, 
literary critics who were punished, and that all literary and art circles 
were denounced as led by a counter-revolutionary black line. There must 
be other explanations beyond that of personal animosity.
The first lies in the fact that, as M. Goldman points out, after almost 
twenty-five years of unceasing indoctrination and thought reform since 
1942, China's intellectuals , especially those revolutionary intellectuals in 
literary and artistic circles, were still reluctant to remould themselves into 
the new model of working men/women: intellectual workers who share 
common language with manual workers and peasants. Zhou Yang as the 
key official in charge of the entire literary kingdom should hence be 
responsible according to the CCP's discipline, no matter whether he was 
really "a loyal chief guardian of Mao's literary policies” or a "big red 
umbrella covering all monsters”.68
Another reason is that Zhou Yang , at least since the Hundred Flowers 
period (1956-1957), and especially after the Great Leap Forward 
Campaign (1958-1959), became more and more openly critical towards 
the status quo. Therefore, most of the criticisms of Zhou Yang focused on 
his words and deeds during the period 1957-1965. He and his associates 
were described as the men who, facing the economic disaster that resulted 
from the Great Leap Forward, gradually began to realise that Mao's 
radical ideas were the cause of the failure in both economic and cultural 
development, and thus, taking advantage of their powerful positions, i.e.,
68 M. Goldman, 1966, 132-148; 1981: 129-130.
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officials in charge of literary and art, started playing the critical role of 
intellectual dissidents.69
The third reason was that Zhou Yang had indeed had his independent 
literary ideas which deviated from Mao's directions for a long time. 
Because of his political position and thus his influence on literary and art 
circles, however, Zhou Yang was not so easily punished as Hu Feng, Ding 
Ling, and Feng Xue-feng. Political position did protect him for years. But 
when such a protection was gone, he had to receive heavier attacks. Firstly 
we can compare the length of the criticisms of Feng Xue-feng, Hu Feng, 
Ding Ling, and Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains". Each of the criticisms, 
except that of Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains" , lasted less than a year. 
By contrast, the criticism of Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains" continued 
for at least 7 years as Table 4.5. shows.
Table 4.5. The length of the public Criticisms of Feng Xue-feng, Hu Feng, Ding Ling, 
and Zhou Yang or the " Four Villains" in the People's Daily .
The Criticism of Length Date/Month/Year
Feng Xue-feng 3 months 28 Oct., - 9 Dec., 1954
Hu Feng 8 months 2 Jan., - 23 Aug., 1955
Ding Ling & Feng Xue-feng 8 months 11 Aug.,1957-9 April, 1958
Zhou Yang&"Four Villains" 7 years Jan., 1966 - Jan., 1973
Source: RMRB, 1954 - 1973.
Secondly, we can compare the Criticism of Zhou Yang or the "Four 
Villains" with other criticisms before/during/after the Cultural 
Revolution since 1960. Of course Zhou Yang and his group were not the 
only targets in the Cultural Revolution: above them, there were Liu Shao- 
qi, Deng Xiao-ping, Peng Zhen, and Lu Ding-yi, and many others; at the
69 Hsuan Mou,1978: 201-204; Yao Wen-yuan, 1971:110-127; Goldman, 1981:39-42.
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same level, there were large numbers of officials; and at lower levels, 
local cadres, university professors, writers and artists, and even scientists, 
were criticised as well. Before/during/after the Cultural Revolution, 
besides the Criticism of Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains", there were 
numerous public criticisms, including mainly:
1. the Criticism of Yang Xian-zhen [CCP philosopher], 1962,1964;
2. the Criticism of Zhou Gu-cheng [old-type historian], 1964;
3. the Criticism of Feng Ding [CCP philosopher], 1964;
4. the Criticism of Shao Quan-lin [CCP literary critic, Zhou Yang's 
close friend], 1964;
5. the Criticism of the "Three Family Village" (Wu Han, Deng Tuo, 
Liao Mo-sha [CCP historian, journalist, and essayist]), 1966;
6. the Criticism of the "Bourgeois Leading Scholars" (Jian Bo-zhan 
[CCP historian], Li Da [CCP philosopher], Sun Ye-fang [CCP 
economist], and others), 1966;
7. the Criticism of Peng Zhen [CCP leader], 1966;
8. the Criticism of Tao Zhu [CCP leader], 1967;
9. the Criticism of Liu Shao-qi [CCP leader], 1968 -1970;
10. the Criticism of Chen Bo-da [CCP top ideologue and leader],1970;
11. the Criticism of Lin Biao [CCP leader] (and Confucius), 1973- 
1974;
12. the Criticism of Deng Xiao-ping [CCP leader], 1976; and
13. the Criticism of the "Gang of Four"(Jiang Qing, Zhang Chun- 
qiao, Yao Wen-yuan, Wang Hong-wen [CCP leaders]), 1977.
Compared with these, the Criticism of Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains" 
was still a long-lasting campaign, although it was never as nationwide as 
the criticisms of Liu Shao-qi, of Lin Biao, of Deng Xiao-ping, and of the 
"Gang of Four". Nevertheless, Zhou Yang, or the "Four Villains", had
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been denounced as main targets all over the country throughout the 
Cultural Revolution. They were considered not only to have influenced 
literary and artistic circles, but also the press, historical and educational 
fields, and even scientific and technical circles. For instance, the People's 
Daily in 1970 declared that "the colleges of humanities and social sciences 
are still controlled by the ideology of the ruling class which dominated 
people's minds for thousands of years, and by an anti-party, anti-socialist 
black line, which opposes Mao's Thought. The main representatives of 
this black line are the 'Four Villains' Zhou Yang, Xia Yan, Tian Han, and 
Yang Han-sheng."70
Thirdly, we can make comparisons between the critics who got involved 
in the criticisms of Feng Xue-feng, Hu Feng, Ding Ling, and Zhou Yang 
or the "Four Villains". As we have shown, when Hu Feng, Ding Ling, and 
Feng Xue-feng were criticised in 1954, 1955, and 1957-58, their critics 
were mainly China's established writers, artists, literary critics, the CCP's 
theorists, social scientists, and (especially when Hu Feng was accused of 
being the head of a counter-revolutionary clique) even democratic 
personages and natural scientists. In the People's Daily and the Literary 
Gazette alone, their critics numbered more than 40 (Feng Xue-feng in 
1954), 50 (Ding Ling, Feng Xue-feng, Ai Qing, Xiao Jun, et al in 1957- 
58) and 100 (Hu Feng in 1955). In contrast, as Table 4. 6.shows, during 
the long period (1966-1973) of the criticism of Zhou Yang or the "Four 
Villains", amongst 169 articles, less than 10 were written by well-known 
intellectuals in the People's Daily , and the Literary Gazette was banned.
70 RMRB, 11 Feb., 1970. Even in 1976, when Mao was already dead and his wife 
Jiang Qing and her fellows were arrested, Zhou Yang was still accused of ordering 
Zhang Chun-qiao, one of the "Gang of Four", to attack Lu Xun in the 1930s. Cf., 
RMRB, 26, October, 1976.
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Table 4.6. The critics of Zhou Yang and " Four Villains,, in the People's Daily, January 
1966 - January 1973.
Criticism Accusation Total
Writer, Artist 2 2
Democratic personages 2 2
CCP ideologue 5 5
Unknown persons 160 160
Total 2 267 169
Source: RMRB, January, 1966 - January, 1973.
Examining these critics more carefully, we find that besides He Qi-fang, 
who wrote two articles to criticise Xia Yan and Tian Han in February and 
April of 1966 when the Cultural Revolution had not yet been launched 
(and who was then himself accused of sham denunciations but real 
protection of the "Four Villains” and thus purged as a member in Zhou 
Yang's black line in the Cultural Revolution), and Xu Guang-ping and 
Zhou Jian-ren, who were Lu Xun's relatives, all other well-known critics 
were actually members of the Central Commission of the Cultural 
Revolution, that is to say, the ideological spokesmen of the CCP and Mao. 
These were: Chen Bo-da, Yao Wen-yuan, Qi Ben-yu, and others. Guo 
Mo-ruo did make a speech at the meeting in memory of Lu Xun in 1966, 
but, unlike others, he did not specifically attack Zhou Yang and the other 
"Four Villains".
Where were the well-known established intellectuals, who had been 
actively involved in the criticisms of Feng Xue-feng, Hu Feng, and Ding 
Ling? Were they all unwilling to co-operate with the Party this time? Or 
were they all now unqualified as revolutionary critics?
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The answer is simple: they were not qualified. If they were unwilling to 
comply, they could be forced to do so, as in the case of Ding Ling's and 
Feng Xue-feng's criticism of Hu Feng, or He Qi-fang's criticism of Xia 
Yan and Yang Han-sheng. As a matter of fact, even if they had been 
willing, they would not have had the "right” to show their attitude. 
During the Cultural Revolution, all the well-known established 
intellectuals, especially writers, artists, and social scientists, were labelled 
as either members of the black counter-revolutionary revisionist line led 
by Zhou Yang or the "Four Villains", or members of the bourgeoisie who 
must remould themselves completely through integrating themselves with 
workers, peasants, and soldiers. The consequence is that, whereas in 
previous political campaigns writers, artists, literary critics, and social 
scientists were generally called to remould themselves, or to participate in 
those campaigns, in the Cultural Revolution they were sent to the 
countryside.
The idea that intellectuals should be integrated with the masses of workers 
and peasants could be found in Mao’s writings in the 1930s. But only in 
1964, when most intellectuals, especially writers and artists, had been 
"state cadres" who remained in office for more than 10 years, did Mao 
get angry with them, instructing that
we must drive actors, poets, dramatists, and writers out of the cities, and 
pack them all off to the countryside. ... Only when they go down will they 
be fed.71
71 According to Mao, only when intellectuals get down to reality can writers write 
novels, historians produce history, and philosophers turn out philosophy. Mao Ze­
dong, 1969: 624-626; 1974: 207, 237.
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In the Cultural Revolution, Mao's instruction was put into practice. 
Consequently, intellectuals, as well as many officials, were sent to the 
countryside, if not to gaol, either as members of the People's Commune, 
or members of the "May 7 School" (a special kind of labour camp where 
cadres and intellectuals did manual work).72
Ironically, during this period, China's intellectuals as a whole lost their 
right or opportunity to create intellectual works, or even to co-operate 
with the CCP with their words in political campaigns, as they did before. 
From 1966 to 1976, they could neither denounce Zhou Yang or the "Four 
Villains", and other targets, nor could they attack themselves in the 
official press. They simply disappeared from the official press.
The only exceptions to this, perhaps, were the Criticism of Lin Biao and 
Confucius in 1974, and the Criticism of Deng Xiao-ping in 1976, in which 
several well-known intellectuals were actively or passively involved each 
time, as Table 4.7. shows. Comparatively, the number was too few.
Table 4.7. The numbers of well-known intellectuals who got actively involved in the 
criticisms of Lin Biao and Confucius (1973-74), and of Deng Xiao-ping (1975-76).
Democratic 
personages 
Literary writer
Lin Biao 
1
Criticism of
Deng Xiao-ping
1
2
Total
1
3
Poet 3 4 7
Literary critic 1 1 2
Social scientist 5 5 10
Natural scientist 1 8 9
Total 11 21 32
Source: RMRB, GMRB, HQ, Jan.,1974 - Oct.,1976.
72 Yang Jiang, one of China's distinguished woman-intellectuals, has given an original 
picture of intellectuals' life in such "May 7 Schools". Cf., Yang Jiang, 1984.
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From the criticism and punishment of China's established revolutionary 
intellectuals, we can see clearly how Mao and the CCP rashly push these 
intellectuals, from some individuals to nearly all of them as a whole, from 
"our comrades" to the "enemies of the people". Here again, if there was 
any problem, it would be the problem of how independent intelligentsia 
could play their critical role under the "New Communist System".
But such an independent intelligentsia, if it still existed, consisted of only a 
few intellectuals, as we have argued and showed. If it was concluded that, 
because these critical intelligentsia, all the revolutionary intellectuals, 
who were at the same time CCP officials, were anti-Party, anti- 
Communist revisionists, and thus the "enemies of the people", it would 
undoubtedly produce many self-made enemies unnecessarily. And such a 
simplistic and confused analysis of intellectuals would only result in "self­
isolation" from its supporters in practice.
V. The Rise and Fall of the Radical Intellectuals around Mao
When most revolutionary intellectuals as well as old-type intellectuals and 
democratic personages were either denounced as anti-Party, anti- 
Communist revisionists or labelled as "reactionary leading bourgeois 
scholars", who were thus sent to jail or labour camp, there were a few 
other intellectuals, however, who became key figures during the Cultural 
Revolution.
This was the small group in the Central Commission of the Cultural 
Revolution. From 1966 to 1969, it was functionally analogous to a 
combination of the CCP Central Secretariat (1956-1966) led by Deng
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Xiao-ping and the Propaganda Department led by Lu Ding-yi. Besides 
Mao's wife Jiang Qing, the leaders of this Commission were persons 
number four and five listed in the CCP's leadership after Mao, Lin Biao, 
and Zhou En-lai. They were Chen Bo-da, and Kang Sheng, the man in 
charge of organisational affairs including public security matters since the 
1930s, especially during the Yan'an Rectification in the 1940s, and of 
ideology and propaganda including the Sino-Soviet polemics on 
international Communism during the period 1956-1964.
However, Jiang Qing was the key figure who acted as a connection 
between Mao and these radical intellectuals, especially Zhang Chun-qiao 
and Yao Wen-yuan. Jiang Qing herself had been active in the political 
campaigns since the Criticism of The Life o f Wu Xun. Under Mao's 
supervision, she acted as a spy in the literary and art circles. It was Jiang 
Qing who, instructed by Mao, told Zhou Yang that The Life ofWu Xun 
should be criticised because of its reformist tendency in 1951, and that the 
article to challenge Yu Ping-bo's idealist opinion about The Dream of 
Red Chamber written by Li Xi-fang and Lan Ling should be published in 
1954. In both cases, Zhou Yang did not realise that Jiang Qing's 
suggestions were actually from Mao, and thus refused her. What is more, 
from 1964, Jiang Qing became more and more active in literary and 
artistic circles. It was she who, again instructed by Mao, plotted in 
Shanghai to prepare Yao Wen-yuan's article whose publication later 
signalled the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. She also held the 
literary forum in which Zhou Yang was accused of being the head of a 
"counter-revolutionary revisionist black line which ruled the literary and 
artistic circles for 17 years". Later on, she played a leading role in the
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criticism of Tao Zhu, of Liu Shao-qi, of Lin Biao (and Confucius), and of 
Deng Xiao-ping.73
The members of the Central Commission mainly came from (1) the 
Chinese Academy of Science, in which Chen Bo-da had been Party 
Secretary and vice-president since it was established, and (2) the Shanghai 
Propaganda Department, with which Jiang Qing had a close connection. 
These members were: Wang Li, Guang Feng, Qi Ben-yu, Zhang 
Chun-qiao, and Yao Wen-yuan.
It is interesting to compare this small group of intellectuals with the others 
we have been discussing. Whereas Hu Feng, Feng Xue-feng, and Ding 
Ling, or Zhou Yang, Xia Yan, Tian Han, and Yang Han-sheng, and many 
others, had been outstanding members of both intellectual and 
revolutionary circles since the 1920s-1930s, most members of the Central 
Commission of the Cultural Revolution started their intellectual careers 
after 1949, and therefore did not belong to the category of the 
"revolutionary intellectuals". Instead, they were members of the "new 
generation of intellectuals". Until the Cultural Revolution (1966), they 
had achieved little professionally. As a matter of fact, the reason that 
many Chinese knew them was not because of their intellectual 
accomplishment, but rather, because of their political posts in the Cultural 
Revolution. These posts were to a great extent given by Mao. It was this 
small group of intellectuals in the Central Commission of the Cultural 
Revolution who directly obtained instructions from Mao and controlled 
the Red Guards. Hu Feng, Feng Xue-feng, Ding Ling, Zhou Yang, Xia 
Yan, Tian Han, and Yang Han-sheng had been joined the Revolution and
73 Cf., Witke, 1977; Yao Wen-yuan, 1971; and Jiang Qing, 1968.
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establishA their intellectual prestige since the 1920s or 1930s, but never 
been given such powerful posts and been involved in policy-making so 
deeply.
On the other hand, because of their lack of achievements in intellectual 
creation and their insufficient revolutionary careers, plus their radical 
policies towards the established intellectuals as well as Mao’s "old 
guards", the radical intellectuals around Mao and Jiang Qing could neither 
get real reputation in the intellectual community, nor could they have 
actual power when faced with the bureaucracy.
As a result, even before Chen Bo-da was purged in 1970, some of them, 
including Wang Li, Guang Feng, and Qi Ben-yu, were dismissed. Zhang 
Chun-qiao and Yao Wen-yuan were able to stay in power much longer 
only because of Mao's personal trust. Even before Mao died, hundreds of 
thousands people in Peking, including many intellectuals, started 
complaining Zhang Chun-qiao, Yao Wen-yuan, and Jiang Qing in public.
An extraordinary example is the April Fifth Event of 1976. It is 
extraordinary because, for the first time since Mao took power in 1949, 
several hundreds of thousands of masses of people in Peking, ignoring the 
official prohibition, gathered at Tian An Men Square in memery of Zhou 
En-lai, and at the same time, openly criticised Mao's wife and the "Gang 
of Four".
Immediately after Mao's death, Zhang Chun-qiao and Yao Wen-yuan, 
together with Mao's wife Jiang Qing, disappeared from officialdom. 
Shortly after, it was officially announced that they were "under 
investigation", namely, arrested. The immediate and direct response to
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this piece of news was a nationwide celebration, both official and, more 
significantly, non-official.
From 1977, China’s intellectuals as a whole were again officially 
declared members of the working class, while nearly all the targets in the 
past political campaigns were gradually rehabilitated. They included:
Ding Ling, Feng Xue-feng, Ai Qing, Xiao Jun, et al;
Hu Feng, and all the members of "Hu Feng Clique";
Zhou Yang, Xia Yan, Tian Han, Yang Han-sheng, and many others; and 
Most of so-called "Elements of the Rightists" ( more than 540,000 out of 
550,000); ..74
From 1979 onwards, "rehabilitation of wrong cases" became a popular 
phrase in Chinese, while most of the well-known established intellectuals 
gradually reappeared if they were still alive.
VI. Conclusion
Like the old-type intellectuals and the democratic personages, the 
revolutionary intellectuals in China since 1949 were bound to the unit 
system. But more importantly, unlike the former two kinds of 
intellectuals, these revolutionary intellectuals usually held important posts 
and thus enjoyed actual power under the "New System". Because of such 
an important difference, simply to treat these three kinds of intellectuals
74 RMRB, 1978-1989. Zhang Bo-jun, Lo Long-ji, Chu An-ping were amongst the 
exceptional individuals who were not rehabilitated. The CCP insisted that, despite that 
more than ninety per cent of the "Rightists" were actually wrong labelled, the Anti- 
Rightist Campaign was still basically necessary.
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the same, as the CCP did in most cases, will cause confusions theoretically 
and practically.
As CCP officials, the revolutionary intellectuals obtained position, power, 
reputation, and other vested interests from the system, and thus they had 
to obey the CCP and carry out its policies and instructions. But at the same 
time, as intellectuals or even members of the critical intelligentsia, they 
cannot just simply abide by the CCP's discipline without their own 
judgement. Paradoxically, there is a structural contradiction between 
their political and intellectual roles. Officials under any system, especially 
the "Soviet-type Communist System", should symbolically represent the 
interests of officialdom and functionally carry out decisions made by the 
ruling party. But intellectuals are producers of ideas, which cannot be in 
accordance with officialdom or the establishment in any case. Moreover, 
members of the critical intelligentsia are always critical towards the status 
quo, and thus they are essentially isolated from the establishment. How an 
intellectual-official could maintain his/her critical spirits in a "Soviet-type 
Communist" society while still keeping his/her position thus becomes a 
real dilemma. Official and intellectual are essentially contradictory.
On the other hand, the revolutionary intellectuals, when they still keep 
their posts and power, can take more opportunities to pursue and practise 
their intellectual and political ideas. Under a "Soviet-type Communist" 
system, the more and higher posts an intellectual obtains, the more active 
and influential he/she is. Not all intellectuals within the establishment are 
just the parrots of the ruling party. But not all intellectuals within the 
establishment should be considered members of the critical intelligentsia. 
Only those who still maintain a critical perspective after the revolution 
should be considered as such. These usually consisted of a small number.
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There is little need to point out that it is more difficult for the ruling party 
to deal with such revolutionary intellectuals because of their double face. 
If the CCP had successfully controlled the old-type intellectuals by only 
launching a relatively short and mild campaign (Thought Reform in 
1951-1952) as far as their political behaviour was concerned, and if the 
CCP had socially destroyed the democratic personages after a stormy 
Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957-1958) in terms of their socio-political 
influence on intellectuals, then it had never managed to force the 
revolutionary intellectuals within the CCP to stop criticising its "dark 
side", although it had carried out a series of criticisms and purges since 
1951. In the end, it was Mao who was, nationwide, criticised and blamed. 
One of the most serious mistakes Mao committed in the Cultural 
Revolution is that he simply ignored the great difference amongst 
different kinds of intellectuals, and labelled almost all of the 
revolutionary intellectuals as the "enemies of the people".
In the post-Mao period since 1978, China’s intellectuals are still the most 
problematic people to deal with for the CCP, though it relocated them as 
members of the working class. Theoretically, there is no great difference 
if they were considered as members of one class, no matter what class it 
is. Can they thus be united or won over more easily? If it is so, how can we 
explain the most tragic event that happened in Tian An Men Square in 
1989?This research stops at 1976. The developments following will be the 
subject of another piece of research, although logically it is closely 
connected with the present one. The next two chapters will focus on 
several individual intellectuals, from whom we will further get some 
details of several kinds of established intellectuals in political campaigns 
in Mao's China.
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CHAPTER 5 CASE STUDIES®: Natural and Social Scientists
as "Democratic Personages"
In Chapters Three and Four we have examined the various roles of 
China's different kinds of established intellectuals, especially those of 
"democratic personages" during the Hundred Flowers period and the 
Anti-Rightist Campaign period, and those of "revolutionary intellectuals" 
(Hu Feng's and Zhou Yang's groups in particular) in and after the 1950s.
Based on this, I shall in the following two chapters choose some individual 
intellectuals as the objects of my case studies. The purpose of these case 
studies is, through exploring several individual established intellectuals' 
experiences, especially their experience in those political campaigns, to 
examine further in detail whether China's established intellectuals, in 
Mao’s time at least, should be considered members of one certain specific 
social class or stratum.
These individual established intellectuals were
(1) chosen from various social groups: the old-type intellectuals, the 
democratic personages, and the revolutionary intellectuals;
(2) involved in one or more of the continual political campaigns during 
the period of 1949-1976, and played different roles in those campaigns: 
from activists, through yes-men, to targets;
(3) already recognised, nationally, if not internationally, as famous 
established natural and social scientists, traditional scholar, or modem 
literary writer, before 1949; and
(4). still alive and thus had the opportunity to re-explain themselves after 
1976.
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Very rarely have these established intellectuals been sociologically studied 
in both China and the West, and much more seldom have they been studied 
comparatively.1 However, such a sociological comparative study is 
necessary for us to have a better understanding of intellectuals’ socio­
political variability.
This chapter will focus on the naturalist Hua Luo-geng and the social 
scientist Fei Xiao-tong, both of whom were given the title of "Democratic 
Personages" by the Chinese authorities, but, as we will see soon, had very 
different experiences.
I. Natural Scientist HUA LUO-GENG
Hua Luo-geng (1910-1985) was one of China’s foremost natural scientists 
in mathematics from the 1930s. Unlike most well-known scientists in his 
time, he had not even finished his secondary education when he had to 
leave school, for his father was reluctant to pay for his studying. 
Unluckily, when he was twenty years old, Hua contracted rheumatic 
fever, which left him lame.
About 1929, however, his independent papers on mathematics attracted 
the attention of professor Xiong Qing-lai of Qinghua University in 
Peking. Like Peking University, Qinghua is one of the most famous 
universities in China. As head of the Department of Mathematics at
1 Fei Xiao-tong perhaps is an exceptional one, for he, as a social anthropologist well- 
known in West, has been given attention by some Western sociologists. There were 
also Guo Mo-ruo's biographies in both China and the West, but these are mainly about 
his literary career.
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Qinghua, Xiong Qing-lai invited Hua Luo-geng to serve as departmental 
librarian and act as research assistant to Xiong himself. Within five years, 
Hua had become a lecturer at Qinghua, and after 1934 he began to publish 
papers on algebra, number-theory, and functions of several complex 
variables, in mathematical journals such as the Transactions o f the Science 
Society o f China, the Tohuku Mathematical Journal, the Bulletin o f the 
Calcutta Mathematical Society, the Mathematische Zeitschrift, the Journal 
of the London Mathematical Society, and the Doklady Akademii Nauk 
SSSR.
In 1936 Hua Luo-geng went to England to continue his studies under G.H. 
Hardy at Cambridge. Hua returned to China in 1938 and became a 
professor at the National Southwest Associated University at Kunming, a 
united university made up of Peking University, Qinghua University of 
Peking, and Nankai University of Tianjin. In 1945, he went to the Soviet 
Union by invitation for a two-month visit, and in the spring of 1946 he 
was invited to the United States by the Department of State. Hua stayed in 
the U.S.A. for four years, where he was a member of the institute for 
Advanced Study at Princeton, New Jersey, and a visiting research 
professor in mathematics at the University of Illinois.
As a mathematician, Hua Luo-geng published a great number of papers 
which won him international recognition. From 1934 to 1944, he dealt 
almost exclusively with number-theory. Because of the war, his important 
treatise in this field, completed in 1941, did not appear until 1947 when it 
was published in Leningrad after being translated into Russian. This work 
was translated from Russian into English and published in 1965 by the 
American Mathematical Society as Additive Theory o f Prime Numbers. 
The work was a detailed exposition of the Waring-Goldbach problem of
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representing positive integers as the sum of a given number of k?h powers 
of primes. He improved the Vinogradou mean-value theorem and 
extended the Waring problem to the representation of integers as the sum 
of polynomials with integral coefficients. After 1944, Hua concentrated 
on the geometry of matrices. He also contributed a supplement to Jean 
Dievdonne's On the Automorphisms of the Classical Groups, which was 
published by the American Mathematical Society in 1951.
After World War II, many of China’s old-type intellectuals including 
scholars and scientists were getting more and more disappointed with the 
Chinese Nationalist Government due to its incapacity to decrease inflation 
and to restrain its officials from corruption. Unlike their predecessors, 
ever since the time of Confucius, who saw employment as officials or 
close connection with officialdom as the token of their superior morality 
and intelligence, these intellectuals tried to hold themselves aloof from 
politics. They either continued their studies in China or went abroad. But 
when the CCP and its Red Army gained one military victory after another 
and prepared to take over China, these intellectuals were enthusiastic, 
thinking that a new China was to be bom. Hua Luo-geng was one of them. 
Shortly after the victory of Mao's armies throughout China, Hua returned 
to Peking where he was reappointed professor of mathematics at Qinghua 
University, and, a year later, at Peking University.
Like most of the Chinese scientists who came back from the West before 
and after the Revolution of 1949, Hua Luo-geng was highly praised by the 
CCP. He was immediately appointed head of the Mathematics Department 
at Qinghua University, director of the Institute of Mathematics at the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, and president of the China Mathematics 
Society. Yet he, like others, was not considered a "red expert". He had to
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get involved in "taking a bath in front of others" in the Thought Reform 
Campaign. Nonetheless, he was not criticised in public in the Campaign, 
Amongst the 123 self-critical articles by leading intellectuals (listed in 
Chapter Three) in the People's Daily and the Guangming Daily during 
the Thought Reform period, none of them was written by Hua Luo-geng. 
In contrast, Hua published an article in both the People's Daily and the 
Guangming Daily to criticise the so-called "Qinghua Tradition", entitled 
We Should Have A Single Tradition: to Serve the People. Hua Luo-geng 
claimed that "there are a lot of filthy dregs in the Qinghua Tradition: 
there is no struggle spirit, not to speak of the ardent love of our 
motherland. Frankly speaking, it is by no means the one to serve the 
people." Taking the Mathematics Department as an example, Hua pointed 
out that, for nearly twenty years since it was set up, there were only 61 
graduates and 7 post-graduates from it. From this Hua concluded that "the 
old Qinghua was designed to serve the minority."2
Another problem of the Qinghua Tradition, Hua maintained, was its 
"comprador spirit". As a former missionary school for talented young 
Chinese candidates to study in the U.S.A., and then a university ruled by 
the American Embassy and the Chinese Foreign Office, instead of the 
Chinese Education Ministry, "hardly had students been admitted to 
Qinghua University when they started dreaming of studying in the West", 
and "few teachers had not received doctoral degrees in the West." 
Moreover, "look at how we taught our post-graduates and teaching 
assistants: it was nothing more than semi-colonialist research. For 
instance, we drew materials from foreign magazines, we plagiarised 
foreign methods, we sent our research results to foreign journals, and if
2 Hua Luo-geng, 1951.
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they were published, we were smug and complacent." Since the idea of 
Westernisation, especially pro-Americanism, was the main target set to be 
wiped out from Western-educated intellectuals through the campaign, 
Hua's article must have been very satisfactory to the CCP. Hua’s criticism 
of the Qinghua Tradition was considered as the beginning of his 
transformation of attitude towards the people.
During the Thought Reform Campaign, the CCP did not consider that Hua 
was a person who could not be changed, but instead, it wanted to win him 
over. At the beginning, Hua resented being asked to remould himself, 
believing that he had already made up his mind to follow the Party when 
he decided to return from the United States in 1950 while many others 
were still waiting to see what would happen. He even saw those cadres 
who were in charge of the Thought Reform Campaign as men who 
brought problems to him rather than resolved his own problems. "For 
quite a period," Hua later recalled, "when I saw them, I felt nervous and 
antagonistic." As to other colleagues, "I saw their good intention was evil 
intention, exposing was slandering, and criticising attacking."3 There was 
a story that he attempted to commit suicide when his colleagues found that 
he still kept the old passport given to him by the Nationalist Government. 
"Does this mean that Hua still thinks of leaving for the West ?" asked the 
colleagues. But the CCP did not criticise him, and only after the Thought 
Reform Campaign, did Hua recognise that the CCP in fact trusted him.
Hua Luo-geng joined the Democratic League in 1951 and became a deputy 
director of its Commission of Culture, Education, Science, and 
Technology in 1953. Of the four articles he published in the Guangming
3 Hua Luo-geng, 1958.
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Daily in 1954, only one concerned mathematics, entitled How Did I 
Gradually Understand Mathematics? In the other three articles he talked 
about "some reflections from the study of the Party's General Guide", 
about "collectivism which educates me", and about "the heroic People's 
Liberation Army I love". In 1955, he was one of the 10 famous natural 
scientists who joined the massive campaign of accusations against Hu 
Feng.4
Hua's tone was not as sharp as many others, however. He demanded that 
"natural scientists should not ignore politics". According to Hua, "when 
scientists are absorbed in their research, they are very likely to ignore 
politics and lose their vigilance." Hua admitted that he used to think that 
the Hu Feng Case had nothing to do with natural scientists, but rather, it 
was a business of literary and artistic workers. For example, he wrote, "I 
do not know Hu Feng personally, nor do I read Hu's works. ... Not until 
the publication of Hu Feng's counter-revolutionary materials, did I realise 
angrily the features of Hu Feng's group."5 Such articles were written in 
support of the CCP and its policies but were not meant to be actively 
political.
In 1956, Hua Luo-geng was appointed as a member of the Standing 
Committee of the Democratic League, and a member of the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress. As a famous scientist, as 
well as a well-known democratic personage, he was invited to join in 
"blooming and contending" and to help the CCP to rectify its 
bureaucracy. This time, however, it seemed that he was on the verge of 
being labelled the "Rightist".
4 Cf., Chapter Four.
5 Hua Luo-geng, 1955.
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After Mao's invitation to the democratic parties and its personages "to 
help the Party to rectify its mistakes" on May Day 1957 in Tian An Men 
Square, the Democratic League decided to set up four specific teams 
concerning "long co-existence and mutual supervision", "the Party system 
in higher institutes of learning", "the posts of democratic personages with 
actual power", and "the development programme of sciences". The 
members of the Science Programme Team were:
Zeng Zhao-lun, chemist, deputy minister of Higher Education of the 
State Council, a member of the Standing Committee of the Democratic 
League and director of its Propaganda Department, and a member of the 
Department of Mathematics, Physics, and Chemistry under the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences;
Qian Wei-chang, physician, vice-president of Qinghua University, a 
member of the Central Committee of the Democratic League, a member 
of the Commission for Science Planning under the State Council, and a 
member of the Department of Mathematics, Physics, and Chemistry 
under the Chinese Academy of Sciences;
Qian Jia-ju, economist, deputy director of the State Administration 
Bureau of Industry and Commerce under the State Council, a member of 
the Central Committee of the Democratic League, a member of the 
Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences under the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, and deputy director of the Socialist Institute;
Tong Di-zhou, biologist, a member of the Central Committee of the 
Democratic League, a member of the Department of Mathematics, 
Physics, and Chemistry under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and 
director of its Biology Section; and
Hua Luo-geng, a member of the Standing Committee of the People's 
Congress, a member of the Standing Committee of the Democratic
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League, a member of the Department of Mathematics, Physics, and 
Chemistry under the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and director of its 
Mathematics Section.
During several discussions, they wrote a proposal: Several Suggestions 
Concerning the System of Science in China . In these suggestions, they put 
forward the following points to the Commission for Science Planning 
Commission under the State Council:6
A. The "Protection of Scientists".
The first suggestion was that that scientists, or more strictly, natural 
scientists, should be protected. This included: (1) scientists should have a 
definite period each year to do their scientific research work 
uninterruptedly; (2) they should be granted a long-term holiday from 
social activities and administrative work; (3) all scientists should have 
professional jobs related to their specific researches; (4) all scientific 
materials, except those concerning military and diplomatic matters, or 
new discoveries, should not be kept secret from scientists; (5) the leading 
scientists should as far as possible avoid administrative work; (6) they 
should be provided with suitable assistants of their own choosing;...
B. The "Attitude towards Social Sciences".
The second suggestion was about social sciences and the attitude towards 
them. According to the authors of the Several Suggestions, it was all right 
to consider the development of natural sciences as a question of the first 
importance for the sake of industrialisation. However, it did not mean that
6 The following content is selected from this Several Suggestions, which was in Hua 
Luo-geng, et al, 1957a. English translation is partly adopted from MacFarquhar (ed.), 
1960: 112-113.
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social sciences were not important. Moreover, it was wrong to say that 
there were no social sciences in capitalist society at all, and that, hence, the 
social sciences in socialist society must be established from the beginning. 
Otherwise, as it happened, some branches of learning, for instance, 
sociology, political science, and law, either have been in fact dispensed 
with since the early 1950s, or have ceased to be independent subjects; and 
those scholars in these fields had to transfer to other fields when they were 
more or less depressed. In the Several Suggestions, the authors claimed 
that treatment of the social sciences in capitalist society should be question 
of reform rather than of abolition. Therefore they suggested to take 
appropriate steps to reinstate these subjects. Another problem in social 
sciences was that the official policies were usually considered as truths and 
therefore scholars could only explain or publicise these policies. This was 
not good enough.
C. The "Equal Treatment of Students".
The third suggestion was that all students, no matter how different in 
terms of their social background, should be treated equally. They 
complained that in the past there was a tendency to overemphasise 
political qualifications in the enrolment of university students and the 
recruitment of postgraduates. They suggested that, within the rank of the 
people, as much importance should be laid on specialised subjects as on 
politics, and the students, whatever family backgrounds they had, should 
have equal opportunities to be selected.
D. The "Leadership of Scientific Research".
The last suggestion was more sensitive. The authors of the Several 
Suggestions even complained the CCP, which appointed the leadership of 
scientific and academic circles. They maintained that the leadership of
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scientific research should be naturally set up during the process of actual 
scientific and academic practice. They thought it was harmful to stipulate 
a prior leadership. (My emphasis.)
This Several Suggestions was unexpectedly published in the Guangming 
Daily with positive remarks after the Anti-Rightist Campaign was 
launched. However, shortly after its publication, the CCP decided to 
criticise it. The question for the CCP was whether or not all the five 
members of this team should be labelled as the "Rightist". They were all 
famous scientists, some of them had been co-operative with the CCP for 
years, and since the beginning of the Anti-Rightist Campaign people like 
Hua Luo-geng and Qian Jia-ju had already followed the CCP in criticising 
the "Rightist" opinions. In the end, the CCP decided to save three of them: 
Hua Luo-geng, Tong Di-zhou, and Qian Jia-ju.
Just before Lu Ding-yi, director of the Propaganda Department of the 
CCP's Central Committee, made a speech to condemn the Several 
Suggestions in front of all the representatives of the National People's 
Congress, Hua Luo-geng, Tong Di-zhou, and Qian Jia-ju were informed 
that they could be saved. But as a recompense, they had to write a 
declaration in the official press. Consequently, We too Were Used Once 
by the Rightists was published in the Guangming Daily on 26 June.7
In this declaration, on the one hand, they criticised the suggestions that 
scientists be protected, that some branches of social sciences be 
reestablished, and that students be treated equally. On the other hand, they 
explained that the "leadership of scientific research" did not mean the
2 Hua Luo-geng, et al, 1957c. Cf., Jian Jia-ju, 1987: 248-251.
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leadership of the CCP, but of the concrete direction of scientists 
themselves.
They also claimed that they did not attend all the discussions of the 
proposal because of either illness or business, nor did they get involved in 
writing the proposal. They even revealed that it was Fei Xiao-tong who 
was invited to write the final draft and who used words which were not in 
the first draft such as "reestablish the branches of social learning".8
On 6 July, 1957, Guo Mo-ruo, president of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences, made a speech in the People’s Congress, in which he judged the 
Several Suggestions "an anti-socialist proposal".9 The suggestion that 
scientists be protected was seen as a complaint that the Party did not 
protect them, the suggestion that some branches of social learning be 
reestablished as an attempt to restore bourgeois social sciences, the 
suggestion that students be treated equally as a slander against the Party's 
policy of giving priority to the enrolment of workers, peasants, worker- 
peasant cadres, demobilised soldiers, and the children of revolutionary 
martyrs. And above all, the suggestion that the leadership be set up 
naturally was seen as a scheme to get rid of the leadership of the CCP.
It then seemed that the declaration of Hua Luo-geng, Qian Jia-ju, and 
Tong Di-zhou that they "too were used once by the Rightists" was not 
enough. As a matter of fact, before the Several Suggestions was 
criticised, Hua Luo-geng had already published Some Words on Common 
Sense in the People's Daily . In this article, Hua accused some leaders of
8 More details about Fei Xiao-tong's role in drafting the Several Suggestions will be 
seen in section "Social Scientist Fei Xiao-tong".
9 Guo Mo-ruo, 1957^.
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democratic parties such as Zhang Bo-jun, Luo Long-ji, Zhang Nai-qi, and 
Chu An-ping of trying to challenge the leadership of the CCP. "Even 
natural scientists who did not pay attention to politics before the 
Liberation now realise that the leadership of the CCP results from 
Chinese history since 1840s."10
After Guo Mo-ruo's speech, Hua published another article in the People's 
Daily with a long tide: The Party is capable of leading sciences, o f leading 
education, and o f leading intellectuals. In his article, Hua not only 
repeated what Lu Ding-yi and Guo Mo-ruo said earlier, but also admitted 
having committed a mistake, by not voting against the draft proposal of 
the Several Suggestions when he read it, although he had already realised 
that there were some serious mistakes in it. Hua further used his own 
experiences during the War of Resistance against Japan period in the 
National Southwest Associated University in Kunming, where both 
research and living conditions were terrible because of the war, to justify 
that only under the leadership of the CCP could scientists have books, 
magazines, assistants, and opportunities to publish their research, an 
opportunity which they did not have under the Nationalist Government.11
Hua Luo-geng luckily escaped from being labelled as the "Rightist". This 
is partially because he "trimmed his sails" in time, but more importantly, 
as we will see soon, because the CCP decided not to punish him, hoping 
that he would be a "red scientist" who may make a mistake but, more 
significantly, as soon as the CCP pointed it out, would correct it and go on 
following the CCP more firmly.
10 Hu Luo-geng, 1957^
11 Hua Luo-geng, 1957^
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After the Anti-Rightist Campaign, in 1958 the CCP called on those 
intellectuals who had survived it to be both red and professional. Hua 
Luo-geng then became an example of the old-type intellectuals who had 
successfully remoulded themselves into "red experts". In June, 1958, Hua 
Luo-geng published I  Will Firmly Be o f One Mind with the Party in the 
People's Daily. He ended up his article with his declaration that "I am 
determined to be an intellectual of the working class, to be both red and 
professional,... and to join the CCP."12
For Hua Luo-geng, as well as other intellectuals who were said to have 
been changed into "new-type mental workers", the next task to be 
undertaken was to devote his life to building a new China. At the end of 
the 1950s, Hua transferred his research from pure to applied 
mathematics, linking theoretical mathematics with practical production 
problems in China's economic development. In 1960, he became the head 
of Department of Applied Mathematics and Electronic Calculating 
Machines at China University of Science & Technology, and director of 
the Institute of Electronic Calculating Techniques at the Chinese Academy 
of Sciences. A year later, he was appointed vice-president of China 
University of Science & Technology. He invented the optimum seeking 
method and overall planning method, both of which were directly used in 
production. While the reasons for his transformation could be various, 
one is clear: following the CCP's call to serve the people and serve the 
nation, Hua decided to contribute to China's construction with something 
more empirically practical and useful.13
12 Hua Luo-geng, 1958.
1  ^Hua Luo-geng, 1986: 392-393.
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Yet the CCP did not let Hua Luo-geng join in the 1960s. However, Hua 
became one of the privileged persons who had mail communications with 
Mao. We still do not know at what time Hua and Mao started writing to 
each other and how long it lasted. But in 1964, Hua wrote a letter to Mao 
in which he confessed that, although he had changed in the processes of 
political campaigns, there were filthy bourgeois ideas in the recesses of 
his heart. Hua promised that he would study Mao's works diligently and 
remould himself completely. Mao was pleased to read Hua's letter and 
replied: "congratulating you on having cherished soaring aspirations." In 
1965, Mao replied to another letter of Hua's: "I am very happy to know 
that you are now exerting yourself and making great progress to serve the 
people rather than yourself."14 "To Serve the People" then became Hua 
Luo-geng’s motto.
During the Cultural Revolution, China’s well-known natural scientists 
were not the main targets although many of them were labelled as the 
"leading bourgeois scholars" and hence forced to do manual work. An 
example was Tong Di-zhou, the biologist who joined the team to write the 
Several Suggestions in 1957. Tong became a toilet cleaner for years. Hua 
was luckily protected by Mao and Zhou En-lai. At the beginning, he was 
criticised at China University of Science & Technology, but under Mao's 
direction, Hua was released from the attack. He was then amongst the 
several scientists whose names appeared in the press from time to time, 
especially during the period when May Day or National Day were 
celebrated. Furthermore, Hua even published an article in the People's 
Daily in 1969, in which he expressed his great gratefulness to Mao, who
14 Hua Luo-geng, 1986: 5; Mao Ze-dong, 1983: 595, 606.
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"released me and asked me to study from the beginning." Hua repeated the 
official accusation that education including intellectuals' self-education 
and thought reform during the period of 1949-1966 was ruled by Liu 
Shao-qi's reactionary line. "Under such a rule," Hua further said, "people 
like me in fact had no real future."15 This article showed clearly that Hua 
Luo-geng "had passed the test".
In 1970, Hua's original mathematical manuscript was stolen. Such a case 
could have been one of those during the Cultural Revolution which were 
too common to be noticed by the top leadership. But because of Hua’s 
privileged position, no sooner did Zhou En-lai hear about this than he 
wrote the following instmction:
Firstly, Hua Luo-geng should be protected from being persecuted by 
evildoers. Secondly, the clue to the loss of his manuscript should be 
sought, and if possible, found. Thirdly, Hua Luo-geng's materials sealed 
up by the Institute of Mathematics under the Academy of Sciences should 
be checked to see if anything has been stolen, and then, as far as they are 
safe, they should be returned to him. Finally, Hua Luo-geng is no longer 
suitable to go down to " May 7 School" or anywhere outside Peking.16
After Zhou's instruction, Hua's personal files including his payroll were 
transferred to the Personnel Department of the Administrative Bureau of 
the State Council, and thus Hua stayed in Peking to do his research. 
Whereas most of his colleagues had to either move to Hefei in Anhui 
Province along with the China University of Science & Technology, or 
go down to the so-called "May 7 Schools", the special labour camps for 
cadres and intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution because of Mao's
Hua Luo-geng, 1969.
16 Zhou En-lai, 1984: 455.
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letter of May 7, 1966, in which Mao demanded that everybody should 
undertake manual work.
In 1978, Hua became vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
and a year later, vice-chairman of the Democratic League. He was only 
permitted to join the Communist Party in June of 1979. Six years later, he 
died.
Hua Luo-geng's experience typically illustrated that in "Communist" 
China under Mao, natural scientists in most occasions were considered 
the ones who should/could be won over. On the one hand, the CCP needed 
these "experts" in its economic construction, on the other hand, these 
scientists were comparatively more obedient, and less dangerous, to the 
the authorities.
Carefully analysing, we should notice that Hua Luo-geng was not like 
those "democratic personages" who had been deeply involved in politics 
since 1945 (if not earlier) and had their own independent political 
orientation between the CCP and the KMT. It was arranged for Hua Luo- 
geng to be a member, and then leader, of the Democratic League by the 
CCP after 1949. Hua Luo-geng and the like were essentially non-political 
scientists, who should be considered more members of the "old-type 
intellectuals" than members of the "democratic personages".
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II. Social Scientist FEI XIAO-TONG
Social scientists were functionally different from natural scientists in 
socio-political development and political campaigns. Among them of 
course there were people who, like natural scientists, belonged to the old- 
type intellectuals. But generally speaking, they were instinctively close to 
politics. Accordingly, they usually held their own independent 
understanding of society, and that is why they were more problematic for 
the CCP than natural scientists.
One example is Fei Xiao-tong (1910- ), one of China's most prominent 
social scientists and the best known in the West. In 1922, Fei attended an 
American missionary school in Suzhou where he studied for six years. 
And then, after two years of study at Suzhou University, Fei became a 
sociology student at Yanjing University in Peking. Yanjing was another 
university well-known in China like Peking University and Qinghua 
University (in 1953 it became a part of Peking University). At Yanjing, 
Fei studied under both Wu Wen-zao, head of the Department of Sociology 
there, and Robert E. Park, a visiting Chicago sociologist at the time. In 
1933, Fei finished his study at Yanjing and went on to Qinghua 
University, where he studied physical anthropology under S. M. 
Shirokogoroff, a Russian Manchu specialist.
After getting his M.A., Fei and his new wife went to Guangxi Province to 
do field research amongst minority nationalities. The tragic price of this 
field work was that Fei's wife died and Fei himself was seriously injured.
In 1936, Fei was given a Qinghua University Fellowship to pursue 
anthropological studies at the London School of Economics. Under the
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supervision of Bronislaw Malinowski, Fei got a doctorate in 1938 and 
published his Peasant Life in China in 1939. It was Peasant Life in China 
for which Malinowski expressed his genuine admiration, and by which 
Fei obtained his international reputation.
During the war, Fei was in Yunnan Province where he joined his former 
teacher Wu Wen-zao, doing field work for the Yanjing-Yunnan Station 
for Sociological Research near Kunming from 1939 to 1943. Fei was a 
visiting scholar at Harvard University, the University of Chicago, and the 
Institute of Pacific Relations in New York from 1943 to 1944, and a 
professor of anthropology at Qinghua University afterwards. In 1946, he 
went to England again for a three-month visit.
Fei had been a man who had kept a distance from politics for decades. In 
the 1940s, however, like many other Chinese scholars , Fei Xiao-tong 
started watching political situation under the KMT, and shifted to the 
Left. As R. David Arkush, his biographer, summarises, "Fei and many 
others became increasingly repelled by the Nationalists - by their pursuit 
of civil war instead of a negotiated settlement and economic 
reconstruction; by their corruption, brutality, and suppression of dissent; 
and by their seeming unconcern for the suffering of the masses."17 In 
1946, Fei Xiao-tong joined the Democratic League.
Since then, publishing articles, making public speeches, and signing open 
letters, Fei was getting more outspoken and critical over political issues 
under the KMT. When Li Gong-pu and Wen Yi-duo, professors of the 
Southwest Associated University, two active Left-wing and professionally
R. D. Arkush, 1981: 175.
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outstanding scholars, and Fei's close friends, were assassinated on 11 and 
15 July, 1946, Fei lost all hope that under the Nationalist Government 
there could be a democratic China.
Nonetheless, he was neither a Communist Party member, nor a Marxist, 
despite the fact that, as he admitted, he had "always been sympathetic with 
their ideals".18 In 1948, Fei, like most intellectuals, awaited the coming of 
Mao's army to Qinghua University with hope: "I hope I will not be lost to 
social science, instead I do think the future is rather bright."19
With the establishment of the PRC, Fei Xiao-tong was highly appreciated 
by the CCP for his Left-wing activities since 1945. He was appointed a 
member of the Culture and Education Commission of the Government 
Administration Council, a member of the Congress of Representatives of 
Various Circles in Peking, a delegate to the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference, director of the Chinese People's Foreign 
Affairs Institute, and a deputy director of the Commission of Culture, 
Education, Science, and Technology of the Democratic League.
Shortly after the CCP came to power, Fei began publishing articles in 
newspapers and magazines. As a leading social scientist, he was asked to 
remould himself through the study of Marxism and participation in the 
administrative affairs of Qinghua University. In January, 1950, two years 
before the Thought Reform Campaign, Fei Xiao-tong published This 
Year for Me in the People's Daily , concerning his own thought reform.
1  ^Fei Xiao-tong, in Arkush, 1981: 208-210.
19 Ibid., pp. 210.
2 6 2
A half year earlier, Fei wrote to Margaret Park Redfield, the editor of 
Fei’s China's Gentry :
I think my decision to stay at Beiping was correct. I have been gaining 
much, very fundamental, precious experience from the process of 
liberation. It is altogether unusual and marvellous. It at least gives me an 
opportunity to reflect on my many fundamental problems and criticise my 
own work that I had done before. I have again become a student and 
enjoyed deeply the 'reintegration' process of my own thought reform.20
In This Year for Me , Fei expressed his feelings in 1949. Before the Red 
Army came to Peking (called Beiping then), Fei went to Shijiazhuang, the 
temporary capital of the CCP, where he was introduced to Mao, and 
where he, for the first time, realised the strength of the people:
The great potentialities [among the people] was unfamiliar, unclear, and 
even non-understandable to the intellectuals like me who did not ever 
actively participate in the Revolution. Thus I was not sure about the 
historical development, and also lacked confidence in the emancipation of 
the people. A miss is as good as a mile. Such a miss made me fail to foresee 
the situation of the world, and made me feel conceited as well,... 21
But when he saw the strength of the people, Fei continued, he suddenly 
felt confused and self-worthies s. In the past, he spoke with fervour and 
assurance, but at that time he was tonguetied. After a period of struggle, 
he made up his mind: to remould himself.
It seemed that Fei remoulded himself very sincerely. He not only 
criticised the selfish individualism of China’s intellectuals including 
himself, and explained the necessity of the political study of Marxism, but
20 Fei Xiao-tong, in Arkush, 1981: 215.
21 Fei Xiao-tong, 1950a.
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also actively got involved in the reform and arrangement of the 
universities/departments, and participated in the criticism of The Life of 
Wu Xun. Above all, during the Thought Reform Campaign, unlike many 
others, he did not have to criticise himself in public. Thirty five years 
later, when Fei talked about his writing on the thought reform of 
intellectuals in the early 1950s, he still thought that those articles indeed 
reflected intellectuals' feelings during that period.22
In late 1956, under the slogan "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a 
hundred schools of thought contend", intellectuals including Fei were for 
the first time since 1949 outspoken over the status quo. Fei wrote an 
article Old Friends and A New Understanding in the People's China, a 
magazine published in English by the authorities, in which he explained 
the thought reform amongst China's intellectuals to his foreign friends:
After 'thought reform' we found that many of our ideas and views were 
wrong, that is to say, not in the interests of our country and people. ...
When people talk about loss of freedom of thought, they really mean that 
rulers arrest, imprison, humiliate and even kill those who think in their own 
way. ... In New China such a thing is impermissible and unthinkable, and 
nothing of the sort has ever happened. Nobody, be he never so much an 
'expert' ,  can cite a single case of any Chinese intellectual being persecuted 
for his beliefs of thoughts. .. 23
Fei here took Liang Shu-ming, the man who challenged Mao and his 
industrialisation policy in front of nearly all the other state-level leaders 
including democratic personages in 1953, as an example. It is still not 
clear why Fei did not mention the Hu Feng Case in 1955. Did Fei lack the
22 Cf., Fei Xiao-tong, 1950b; 1950c; 1951; 1988: 398.
23 Fei Xiao-tong, 1956.
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courage to mention Hu Feng, or did he think that Hu Feng's problem was 
not a matter of freedom of thought?24
Anyhow, as a result of the reform of the universities and the 
rearrangement of departments and colleges, sociology (including 
anthropology in China) as a branch of learning was eliminated from 
university curriculums in 1952, and even before that time, Fei, as well as 
Wu Wen-zao and some others, was already transferred to the Central 
Institute of National Minorities, becoming its vice-president.
But Fei's hope that sociology could be used to serve the New China had 
not yet completely vanished. During the Hundred Flowers period, Fei in 
February of 1957 published an article in the Wenhui Daily, A Few Words 
on Sociology. Following Wu Jing-chao, his colleague in the Department 
of Sociology at Qinghua University, Fei made a suggestion that 
sociological research in China would be helpful, not because the Soviet 
Union had sent a delegate to the International Sociology Society, but 
because the new relationships between the people would be developed and 
new questions would arise in the process of social change within Chinese 
society. Therefore, Fei cautiously suggested, scientific knowledge was 
needed, specialised research was needed. It did not matter if it was named 
"sociology" or something else, for example, "social survey". What is 
more, because the old sociologists had carried out this kind of research
24 The answer is most likely both. Hu Feng was accused of committing "counter­
revolutionary crime", the most horrible accusation in Mao's China (and even 
nowadays). Whatever intellectuals thought about Hu, nobody ever spoke for him. On 
the other hand, many intellectuals, including Fei Xiao-tong, really believed what the 
CCP said in the early 1950s, and that Hu Feng was a KMT spy. Therefore, it was not 
only a matter of freedom of thought. Cf., Chapter Four.
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work in the past, the techniques of their original profession, interviewing, 
observation, recording, statistics, analysis, etc., were still useful.25
After March, 1957, Fei became more audacious: he openly called for a 
change in the official attitude towards old sociology at the National 
Propaganda Conference of the CCP on 12 March; he chaired a forum on 
problems connected with restoring sociology, which was attended by 
nearly all of the well-known old sociologists, in April; he wrote several 
short articles, arguing for the usefulness of the old sociologists in April 
and May; he went back to Jiangcun, the small village where he did field 
research in the 1930s (after which he wrote The Peasant Life in China ), 
to do his anthropological research; and above all, he got involved in 
drafting the Several Suggestions Concerning the System o f Sciences, 
contributing the main ideas about social sciences 26
Fei's most significant article during this period is the one entitled The 
Early Spring for Intellectuals. Before he wrote the article, he had already 
done some research on the problem of intellectuals. As both an intellectual 
leader representing the Democratic League and later as a high official in 
charge of solving administrative questions concerning the treatment of 
intellectuals (i.e., deputy director of the Experts Bureau under the State 
Council), Fei travelled through many parts of the country, especially the 
Southwest, to investigate the problems of intellectuals since late 1955.
In early February, 1957, after coming back from the Southwest, Fei was 
asked to give talks about his investigation to the Central Committee of the
25 Fei Xiao-tong, 1957a; Cf., McGough, 1979.
26 See Hu Luo-geng Section above.
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Democratic League. In these talks, Fei said that there were two ’’lids" or 
constrictions on intellectuals: the one under which intellectuals' initiative 
in academic research was restricted, and the one under which their zeal 
for politics was suppressed. Fei thought that the policy of "Let a hundred 
schools of thought contend" could take the first lid off, and the policy of 
"Mutual supervision" between the CCP and the democratic parties could 
remove the second.27 However, Fei continued, "the first lid has not been 
completely taken off, for many CCP's leading comrades are not interested 
in it, whilst the second lid seems still there,..." Fei called the resulting 
situation "the cold in the spring". By mid February, he finished drafting 
the Early Spring, but, as he said later,"had no courage to send it to the 
press." Instead, he rewrote it several times, and then sent quite a few 
copies to his friends in the Democratic League including Zhang Bo-jun, 
asking them to give critiques. In the end, on the day Mao made his famous 
speech On the Correct Handling o f the Contradictions among the People , 
Fei sent the article to the People's Daily 28
In this article, Fei on the one hand said that Zhou En-lai's speech On the 
Problems of Intellectuals in January 1956 was like thunder in the spring, 
and some intellectuals even saw Zhou's speech as "re-liberation". Since 
then, the living conditions of intellectuals had improved. On the other 
hand, intellectuals still had problems. The first was their academic 
research. Although around 75 per cent of them could already use five 
sixth of their time in the week to do their research, i.e., the political study 
and other social activities should only occupy one day from Monday to
27 More details about these two policies can be seen in Chapter Three.
28 Fei Xiao-tong, 1957c.
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Saturday, the intellectuals needed concrete support and direction from the 
leaders and cadres of the CCP.
The second problem concerned "Let a hundred schools of thought 
contend". On the one hand, most intellectuals welcomed this policy in 
their hearts whilst their lips were still shut. Many of them were afraid of 
losing face if they opened their mouths and were then labelled as 
backward elements or idealists. Moreover, it was not just a question of 
saving face, but a question of ensuring their actual lives: salary, 
promotion, going abroad, and even getting married. Some further feared 
that the policy was just a trap by which intellectuals would be later 
punished. On the other hand, the cadres who directly supervised 
intellectuals either limited the contending exclusively to academic 
questions in classroom only, or thought that the policy was all right but 
not suitable to their units.
The third problem was that intellectuals, especially those "senior 
intellectuals "(GAO JI ZHI SHI FEN ZI) or, as Fei called them, "old 
intellectuals"(LAO ZHI SHI FEN ZI), who were old not only interms of 
their age, but also in terms of their social location ("old-type 
intellectuals") and their intellectual reputation, had been for a long time 
treating political matters in both China and the outside world with 
indifference. For instance, in 1956, they talked about the incidents in 
Poland and Hungary apathetically. The reason was not that these "old 
intellectuals" simply concentrated on their "pure academic research", and 
ignored socio-political development, but that they thought they were not 
qualified in the "New Communist Society" under the leadership of the 
CCP:
268
The old intellectuals yearn for socialism warmheartedly when they 
understand what it is, but they found that it is a bit too late, and that it seems 
there is no place for them in the masses moving forward , therefore they 
cannot help feeling lonely. 29
In a word, the political climate was like the early spring in which 
intellectuals felt uncertain. The article was published in the People's Daily 
on 24 March, 1957, when the political climate had already changed and 
seemed unusually mild. In April, Zhou En-lai spoke approvingly of Fei's 
Early Spring, in which, Zhou said, Fei "expressed all the opinions inside 
intellectuals' hearts". Zhou even further complained that "there are quite 
a few intellectuals who are capable of writing within the Communist Party 
too, but I do not think they are able to write such an article, even they 
share Fei's opinions."30 After Zhou’s speech, Fei was appointed vice- 
chairman of the Nationalities Affairs Commission under the State Council 
in May, 1957.
Interestingly, during the period from late April to the end of May, that is, 
the period during which China's intellectuals for the first time and the 
only time since 1949 got involved in open criticism of the CCP's policies, 
Fei was not in Peking. Only on 31 May, 1957, did Fei return from 
Jiangcun where he did his anthropological field research. At this time, 
Mao had made up his mind to launch a campaign "to counterattack the 
Rightists". Like many others, Fei did not know Mao's decision until 8 
June, on which day Mao's What Is This for was published in the People's 
Daily. But two days earlier, on 6 June, Fei attended a meeting with 
another five professors convened by Zhang Bo-jun, the first vice-
29 Fei Xiao-tong, 1957&
30 Zhou En-lai, 1985: 349.
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chairman of the Democratic League. It was later called "6-6-6 Anti-Party 
Meeting" (six professors on the sixth of June). It was said that Fei, talking 
about the student movement at Peking University and other colleges, 
pointed out that the problems which resulted in the student movement was 
"not a question of some individuals' style of work, but a question of 
system." Further, said Fei, "of course it is easy to put it [the student 
movement] down. Three million soldiers would put it down, but public 
support [of the Party] would evaporate and the Party’s prestige amongst 
the masses would be finished." He even declared that he would not join the 
Communist Party as an expression of his attitude.31
At the beginning, Fei could still suggest that freedom of speech should be 
protected and intellectuals should continue to speak out. But a week later, 
he had to start criticising himself and others, and a month later, he was 
accused of being a hard-core leader of the so-called Zhang-Luo Alliance. 
He was nationally denounced for speaking out for intellectuals in The 
Early Spring for the Intellectuals, for talking at the 6-6-6 Meeting, for 
attempting to restore sociology, for involvement in the drafting of the 
Several Suggestions On Sciences, for social anthropological research 
before and after 1949, for connections with Western scholars, and even 
for his personality and his private life. The Early Spring was seen as the 
first anti-Party and anti-socialist shell fired from the Zhang-Luo Alliance, 
and Fei became the strategist of the Alliance. He was labelled "a 
bourgeois, individualistic, political opportunist, posing as a 'scholar', and 
an obsequious loyal stooge of imperialism". There are about a hundred 
articles criticising him, and amongst his critics, there were not only Party
31 RMRB, 4 July, 1957. Cf., MacFarquhar, (ed.), 1960: 167-168.
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intellectual men, but also well-known scholars, his colleagues, and close 
friends.32
On 13 July, 1957, Fei had to make a confession to the National People's 
Congress, entitled Admitting My Guilt to the People :
I was serving the interests of those two adventurers Zhang [Bo-jun] and 
Luo [Long-ji], and I was serving the interests of the bourgeoisie, of the 
ghosts of that already defunct class. I endangered the Party, and I 
endangered the masses. Under the direction and influence of the Zhang-Luo 
Alliance, I made use of the organisation of the Democratic League, and from 
the standpoint of the bourgeoisie I followed the anti-Party, anti-socialist 
political road, committing a series of crimes endangering the Party and the 
masses.33
After the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Fei was relieved of all his posts in the 
National People's Congress, the State Council, the Democratic League, 
and the Central Institute of Nationalities.
However, like many other democratic personages and well-known 
scholars who were labelled as the "Rightist”, Fei was not put in gaol, nor 
was he sent down to the countryside to receive labour reform. Was he 
protected by his high reputation or by some leaders, for example, Mao 
and Zhou?
As we have seen in Chapters Three and Four, the democratic personages 
held high posts without real power before they were purged, and they 
suffered less than those targets from the revolutionary intellectuals. No
32 Cf., Li Da, 1957; Lin Yue-hua, 1957. Also Cf., McGough, 1979: 113-151; and 
Arkush, 1981: 260-275.
33 Fei Xiao-tong, 1957d. Cf., McGough, 1979: 83.
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matter what personal relations of Fei to Mao and Zhou, Fei's and other 
democratic personages' escape from being sent to jail to labour camp was 
more because for the CCP it was not necessary. To let them be silent was 
enough.
Nevertheless, once in early June, 1957, Mao asked Fei to reject his group 
of two hundred friends within the circles of high intellectuals and seek 
another two hundred friends amongst workers and peasants. Mao told the 
CCP officials that it was good for them to have some Rightist friends in 
order to understand their psychological state. After the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign, Mao himself invited Fei and other well-known Rightist for 
dinner twice, saying that "you are the Rightists, but it does not matter, we 
are still friends."34
On 4 December, 1959, Fei Xiao-tong's label of the "Rightist" was 
removed, for he, as well as some others, it was said, had corrected his 
mistakes and reformed. In the same year, Fei was reelected a member of 
the Central Committee of the Democratic League, and appointed as a 
member of the Third National Committee of the Chinese Political 
Consultative Conference.
From 1959 to 1966, Fei was a member of the National Minorities 
Research Team under the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Working with 
Wu Wen-zao, he proofread and revised several historical annals of 
minority nationalities, and collected English materials on history,
34 Mao Ze-dong, 1977: 505. Cf., 1980: 136-137; Arkush, 1981: 320. Arkush asked: 
"Did Mao then consider Fei a friend, and have talks with him from time to time?" As 
a matter of fact, Fei had never become one of Mao's friends, although he was indeed 
invited by Mao to have dinners and talks after 1957.
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geography, and custom around the Pamirs area. Nearly all of them were 
for restricted reference only.35
During the Cultural Revolution, Fei, like many other well-known 
scholars, suffered from being wrongly treated, although they were not 
amongst the main targets. Fei became a street-cleaner, and he also did 
Pan Guang-dan’s "job": to clean a public toilet.36 Fei survived but Pan 
committed suicide. Fei later said he attempted to do so too during that 
period, but he failed. Fei was then sent to a "May 7 School" where he spent 
two years doing manual work in the fields.37
In 1972, under the protection and arrangement of Zhou En-lai, Fei Xiao- 
tong came back to Peking and reemerged. In an interview with John King 
Fairbank and other visitors from the United States in 1972, Fei looked 
cheerful and ebullient, but what he said seemed not so simple:
We have to adopt an attitude of criticising the bourgeois anthropology that 
we learned in the past.... I can't even read the works I have written on the 
Chinese peasant in the past.... My ideas and feelings were different from 
the labouring people.... What they want to know is how to make their lives 
better.38
Noticeably, however, Fei still insisted, as he did in 1957, that sociological 
methods he learned from the West could be useful to serve the working 
class and the New China. "Everything can be good if it serves the working 
class."39
35 Cf., Wu Wen-zao, 1985: 135.
36 Fei's former teacher in Yanjing University.
37 Cf., Fei, 1988:1; Arkush, 1981: 277-278.
3  ^Fei Xiao-tong, in Cooper, 1973: 480-482, and in Mirsky, 1972: 89-90.
3^ Cf., Liu Xiao-xiao, 1972.
2 7 3
From 1972 to 1976, Fei received visits of dozens of foreigners, together 
with Wu Wen-zao and Bing Xin, Wu's wife and Fei's close friend, an 
outstanding woman writer before 1949. During that period, these three 
friends mainly stayed in Peking, doing translations of H.G. Wells' Outline 
of History (published in 1920) and World History (by C .J.H. Hayes, et al, 
1932), into Chinese.
In 1980, Fei's designation as the "Rightist" was finally declared to have 
been in error. Since then, Fei had been more and more active in both 
academic and social activities. Even before that, in 1979, sociology as a 
branch of learning was officially declared to be reestablished, and Fei 
became president of the Chinese Society of Sociology. After the remove 
of his "Rightist" label, Fei was appointed director of the Institute of 
Sociology under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In the 
meantime, he became a vice-chairman of the Democratic League, and a 
vice-chairman of the Central Committee of Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference. In short, after Mao's death, Fei reappeared as a 
leading social scientist and a well-known "democratic personage".
From 1981 onwards, Fei Xiao-tong published his works of collected 
writings almost every year. These works were mainly on sociology and 
social anthropology.40 Fei Xiao-tong again became a key sociologist 
whose works were seen as text-books for sociology and anthropology 
students in China. Talking about his writing career, Fei said,
Since 1924, my writing has not been interrupted for a very long period.
Even during the detestable two decades, I had to write 'confessions',
40 Cf., Fei Xiao-tong, 198la, 1981b, 1983, 1984, 1985®, 1985b, 1986,1987, 1988b.
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'thought reports', and posters criticising others frequently. When I really 
could not write, I did translations. I never stopped writing.41
Of course writing in the "two detestable decades" for Fei was not 
relaxing. Instead, Fei later recalled,
I could not gain ground in the torrent of society. What is worse, I lost my 
spiritual pillar, being confused and even lost in seeking for truth. 'An 
aspiration of an intellectual should never be taken away by force'. But my 
aspiration was taken away. Year after year, the criticism of my writings 
from all quarters made me lose self-confidence: at the beginning, I had to 
'admit my guilt to the people'; then I really felt that my writings were 
poisonous weeds; in the end I even learned to attack others, using the 
expressions and logic which were used by others to criticise m e.... I had a 
twenty-year nightmare, without knowing anything. ... I hate my life, my 
words and deeds, in those twenty years,... 42
Fei is now chairman of the Democratic League and a vice-chairman of the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China. People 
may ask if "democratic personages" like Fei can still play a role in Chinese 
politics now. One thing should be mentioned here before we leave this 
question: in 1989, when students went on a hunger strike in Tian An Men 
Square, Fei called the Chairmen of three democratic parties together to 
discuss the situation. As a result, these four Chairmen signed an open 
letter to the CCP, in which they asked its leaders to have a direct dialogue 
with the students as soon as possible.43
41 Fei Xiao-tong, 1988a: VI.
42 Fei Xiao-tong, 1988a: HI-IV.
43 RMRB, May, 1989.
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III. Conclusion
The democratic personages and their critical function, or in CCP's 
words, "supervisory" role, socially ended as a result of the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign in 1957-1958, though the so-called "democratic parties" still 
existed in name. Personages (like Fei Xiao-tong) whom we named as 
members of the critical intelligentsia outside the CCP were either 
labelled as the "Rightists"and then lost their posts in state organs, or 
forced to be silent over political and ideological issues if they could keep 
their posts in officialdom. The democratic parties were no longer 
"supervisory bodies", if they used to be to a certain extent, of the CCP. 
After the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the democratic personages in Mao’s 
time could hardly voice any critical sound in Chinese socio-economic and 
political development. The critical intelligentsia outside the ruling party 
was socially damaged.
At the same time, persons (like Hua Luo-geng) who had scientific 
knowledge and skills and therefore used to be considered old-type 
intellectuals rather than democratic personages either joined the 
democratic parties or the CCP, or were promoted in state/party organs. 
This kind of persons then were honoured "democratic personages" but in 
fact were more yesmen than activists in political campaigns. They had 
seldom been critical of the status quo, and had never been politically 
problematic for the CCP. When the CCP tried to win over Hua Lo-geng- 
type natural scientists (i.e., passive yesmen with scientific skills and 
knowledge) through a relatively mild criticism and self-criticism in the 
Thought Reform Campaign of 1951-1952, it successfully obtained 
positive response from them afterwards. And when the CCP distinguished 
these natural scientists and technicans from Fei Xiao-tong-type social
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scientists (i.e., active non-CCP intellectuals with critical spirits) in the 
Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957-1958, sociologically and politically it 
was quite right, for the former were more useful as far as the "economic 
constmction of a New China" was concerned, but the latter might be more 
dangerous in terms of their critical spirits.
However, since the 1960s, especially in the period of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), Mao simply put these two groups together and 
named them "reactionary bourgeois leading scholars". Like social 
scientists, most natural scientists were also sent to the "May 7 Schools" in 
the countryside, where they had to forget their scientific research and do 
peasants' manual work. Personages like Hua Luo-geng were excused from 
it only because of Zhou En-lai's personal protection.
In this chapter, we saw the great difference between Hua Luo-geng and 
Fei Xiao-tong. The former was a non-political person while the later was 
engaged in politics but tried to maintain his own independent point of 
view about it. To treat them simply as members of the bourgeoisie would 
only lead confusion in both theory and practice.
The next chapter will further look at some cases chosen from traditional 
scholars and revolutionary intellectuals, who, as we will see soon, were 
socio-politically different not only from one another, but also from both 
Hua Luo-geng-type natural scientists and Fei Xiao-tong-type social 
scientists.
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CHAPTER 6 CASE STUDIES(II): Traditional Scholar and 
Left-wing Writer as Old-type & Revolutionary Intellectuals
As we have seen in previous chapters, the critical intelligentsia in the 
democratic parties was socially destroyed as a consequence of the Anti- 
Rightist Campaign of 1957-1958. Since 1958, it was revolutionary 
intellectuals within the CCP, especially Zhou Yang and his friends, who 
continued to speak out, following Hu Feng, and the "Rightists". Unlike 
those democratic personages like Fei Xiao-tong, these revolutionary 
intellectuals held actual power and thus played a more influential role.
However, these revolutionary intellectuals had a problem which those 
democratic personages did not share. That is: they were also real officials 
of the establishment. As we saw in Chapter Four, they were actually in the 
dilemma of being officials and intellectuals/intelligentsia. Facing this, like 
the so-called "democratic personages" whose members did not all 
necessarily belong to the intelligentsia, not all the "revolutionary 
intellectuals" remained critical.
From this chapter, we will further see that there was another kind of 
revolutionary intellectuals who were actually playing a double role of 
being ideologue and target during the period of 1949-1976. Of course  ^we 
cannot say that Ding Ling and Zhou Yang did not have such a position. 
But in Chapter Four we saw that they were punished mainly because of 
their critical spirits. In this chapter, however, we will see that, from the 
case of Guo Mo-ruo, there were revolutionary intellectuals in those 
political campaigns who suffered not just from being critical but also 
from their double positions of being both official and intellectual.
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Before we start following Guo Mo-ruo's tracks, the experience of 
philosopher Feng You-lan will be first explored. This is not only for the 
sake of comparison, but also for the sake of some more detailed 
exploration of the Chinese traditional scholar, to whom we paid a little 
attention in Chapter Three when looking through the Thought Reform 
Campaign in 1951-1952. By studying Feng You-lan, we will further find 
that this kind of traditional scholar is different not only from members of 
the critical intelligentsia such as literary figure Zhou Yang, and social 
scientist Fei Xiao-tong, but also from natural scientist Hua Luo-geng.
I. Philosopher FENG YOU-LAN
Feng You-lan(l 895-1990) is one of the most noted Chinese philosophers 
this century, best known in the West for his New Neo-Confucianist 
System, which combined the Chen-Zhu School’s Neo-Confucianism with 
Western Neo-Positivist ideas and logic, and for his profound study on the 
history of Chinese philosophy.
Like Fei Xiao-tong, Feng You-lan was bom into a gentry family. His 
father was a scholar-official, who supervised Feng's study on Chinese 
classics. In 1915, Feng You-lan became a philosophy student at Peking 
University, where he began to study Chinese philosophy and Western 
logic.
After graduating in 1918, Feng was granted a scholarship by the Chinese 
government in 1919, to continue his philosophical study abroad. To join 
his brother who was already in the United States, Feng chose Columbia 
University and was admitted to its graduate school. From 1920 to 1923,
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Feng studied Western philosophy and did his research at Columbia, 
receiving instruction from John Dewey and Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, 
two of America’s most eminent philosophers of that time. In 1923, Feng 
obtained a doctorate degree and then went back to China.
In 1927, Feng taught Chinese philosophical history at Yanjing University, 
and the following year he was appointed as director of the Philosophy 
Department, and then dean of the College of Arts, at Qinghua University. 
From 1931 to 1934, he published his widely-recognised A History of 
Chinese Philosophy (I-II).1 In 1934, Feng visited England where he taught 
Chinese philosophy at several universities or colleges. On his way home, 
Feng visited the Soviet Union.
During the War of Resistance against Japan, Feng You-lan was dean of the 
College of Arts at the National Southwest Associated University in 
Kunming. During this period as well, Feng became an established 
philosopher, i.e., a New Neo-Confucianist, by systematically publishing 
his six books, in which his own philosophical system was expressed. These 
are: New Neo-Confucianism (1939), New Culture and Society (1940), 
New Teachings o f the World (1940), New Origin of Men (1943), New 
Origin of Truth (1944), and New Scholarship (1946).2 From 1946 to 
1947, Feng You-lan was a visiting professor on a Rockefeller Grant at the 
University of Pennsylvania. He came back to Qinghua University in 
Peking in 1948, and waited there for the coming of the Red Army.
1 Feng You-lan, 1961.
2 Cf., Feng You-lan, 1986.
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Feng You-lan was a man who was politically caught up with the 
Nationalist Government. He was one of those scholars who were invited 
to be senior lecturers by the KMT, and to be Chiang Kai-shek's guests to 
have dinner after lectures during the period 1937-1945. In 1945, Feng 
became a delegate to the Fifth National Congress of the KMT and was 
even considered to be a member of its Central Committee.3
On the other hand, when Mao and his army reached Peking, Feng was 
thought to be one of those great scholars whom the CCP should win over 
through criticism and self-criticism. Feng was firstly appointed chairman 
of the Administrative Commission of Qinghua University, but at the same 
time, his New Neo-Confucianist philosophy was denounced as an idealistic 
system. Secondly, in September, 1949, like many other well-known 
distinguished old-type intellectuals, Feng You-lan wrote a letter to Mao, 
in which he admitted that in the past he preached feudalist philosophy. 
And Feng now realised that his New Neo-Confucianism was actually in 
the service of the KMT. Feng said that he had made up his mind to 
remould himself, to learn Marxism, and to plan on finishing a New  
History o f Chinese Philosophy according to Marxist stand, viewpoint, 
and method within five years.
Several days later, Feng received a latter from Mao, in which Feng was 
told:
Personages' progress is welcome to us. It is fine that people like you who 
made mistakes in the past hope to correct them now, if they can carry that 
out in practice. However, they should not be overanxious for quick results.
3 Feng was also arrested once in 1935 for his visit to the Soviet Union and for his 
lecture on the "historical philosophy of the Qin-Han period(221 B.C-A.D.220)", which
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They can correct their mistakes gradually. Anyway, it is better to adopt an 
honest attitude.4
The first step Feng You-lan adopted "to correct his mistakes in practice" 
was to participate in the Land Reform Campaign. He signed up for land 
reform work in the countryside, and joined a work team in a suburb of 
Peking from the winter of 1949 to the spring of 1950. Through the Land 
Reform Campaign, Feng for the first time understood the real meaning of 
exploitation as a Marxist concept, and realised that he, in his sentiments, 
shared the feelings of the landowners, and belonged more to them than to 
the labouring people, though he had been a salary-earning professor for 
more than two decades. He admitted that it was wrong to consider his 
academic work as a thing transcending class. Secondly, he recognised the 
necessity for "thought reform". He used to think that old-type intellectuals 
did not have to remould themselves, and if they had to do so, they could 
quickly attain enlightenment. There was no reason to ask them to undergo 
a long and even painful process of tempering. Looking back on these 
ideas, Feng found that they were idealistic, for a person could continue 
discovering his ideological defects for an indefinite period. Finally, Feng 
acknowledged that it was nonsense to boast of finishing A New History of 
Chinese Philosophy according to Marxism within five years, because 
Marxism as a "guide to action" should be applied to society and to self- 
criticism, the mere manipulation of words and phrases was a waste of time
expressed something like Marxist historical materialism. Cf. Feng You-lan, 1984: 92- 
95, 110-116,234-241.
4 Mao Ze-dong, 1983: 344. Feng was not very pleased to receive Mao's letter then. 
"Am I not honest?" he asked to himself. Feng also did not fully understand the meaning 
of "cooperation" used by the CCP when he was asked to be co-operated in 1949 by 
Xu Te-li, one of the five personages who were respected as CCP's old generation of 
revolutionary intellectuals . Cf. Feng You-lan, 1985: 124-125,147.
282
and effort. Feng admitted that he himself, equipped with mere bookish 
knowledge, was not qualified to write it.5
By participating in the Land Reform Campaign, Feng You-lan declared 
that he "had joined the Revolution" (CAN JIA GE MING LE) and 
"discovered Marxism-Leninism". He started criticising his New Neo- 
Confucianism, saying that there was nothing new in his so-called "'New' 
philosophical system", which was in fact trammelled within the old 
Confucianist scheme. He admitted that his philosophy was basically 
idealistic and resistant to the Revolution. On the other hand, he explained 
that his philosophical system was at least partly influenced by Marxist 
historical materialism. Feng used to think that the difference of cultures 
between East and West resulted from the difference of philosophies. 
Then, in the 1920s, he considered that it was a question of time: 
modernisation meant Westernisation, today’s West would be tomorrow's 
China. In 1933, however, Feng read some Marxist books when he was in 
England. After that, he no longer saw the difference between West and 
East as a question of national tradition of philosophies, nor a question of 
time, but a question of socio-economic formations. In 1950, Feng 
admitted that his understanding of Marxism was superficial in the 1930s, 
but his New Neo-Conficianism was indeed inspired by this 
understanding.6
Obviously, in the view of the CCP, as far as the thought reform of an old 
type intellectual was concerned, a three-month participation in the Land 
Reform and the self-criticism based on this was insufficient. The second
5 Feng You-lan, 1950a, 1950b, Cf. Feng You-lan, 1985: 148.
6 Feng You-lan, 1950a, 1950b, 1950c, and 1985: 240-242.
283
step Feng You-lan should adopt was to be active in a series of political 
campaigns. When The Life ofWu Xun was criticised in 1951, Feng wrote 
an article in which he admitted that he, like a lot of university academics 
and middle school teachers, made mistakes similar to those of Wu Xun 
from the May Fourth Movement of 1919 till the Revolution of 1949. That 
is to say, not only did he not directly or indirectly join the Revolution, but 
he also serviced the reactionary rulers. "Using the methods of bourgeois 
science of history and bourgeois philosophy, I went from doing research 
on Chinese feudalist philosophy to developing it, and as a result, I got to 
the place where the Chinese idealism of feudalism and the Western 
idealism of capitalism were combined as a double idealism."7 Feng said 
that his work therefore became an obstruction to the Revolution, and that 
it was the reason why the reactionary government flattered him so much 
and backward readers supported him so much.
In the Thought Reform Campaign, Feng You-lan further criticised 
himself not only academically, but also politically. "Through Thought 
Reform," wrote Feng You-lan, "I gradually realised what I used to call 
'my academic research’ is in fact the most reactionary political action.... 
I was a key war criminal in the ideological battlefield between 
revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries."8 Feng accused himself of 
writing books to support the Anti-Japanese forces in words, but to oppose 
the Communist forces in deeds in the period of 1937-1945.
Feng recalled that, when he wrote those books to elaborate his New Neo- 
Confucianist System in the 1940s, he was wildly arrogant, thinking that 
his philosophy was not only the theoretical basis for fighting the Japanese
7 Feng You-lan, 1951.
8 Feng You-lan, 1952.
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and building up a new China, but an absolute truth of all ages and all lands 
as well. With such a feeling, Feng lectured and tutored in the KMT's 
senior class for its key figures, and became Chiang Kai-shek’s guest, 
regarding himself "teacher of the emperor", as the ancient Chinese 
philosophers dreamt of being. Feng also admitted that in 1949, when he 
was told to be a student of Mao, he felt uncomfortable, wondering why a 
political leader should automatically be a great master of philosophy. But 
now he was grateful to Mao for launching the Thought Reform and other 
political campaigns, by which Feng realised that his deeds and words in 
the past were reactionary and pernicious.9
After the Thought Reform Campaign, it seemed that Feng You-lan was 
ideologically obedient to the CCP. He was not criticised by the authorities 
from 1952 to 1956, in the meantime, he wrote articles to criticise Liang 
Shu-ming, Hu Shi, and Hu Feng.10 Of these political targets, Liang Shu- 
ming and Hu Shi were his teachers in the 1920s. Without doubt, this kind 
of criticism was more a passive attitude show than an active political 
involvement. In this period, Feng mainly stayed at Peking University, 
doing his academic research, though little of it was published.
Feng got a little more active after the Hundred Flowers policy was put 
forward. He advocated letting a hundred schools of thought contend, and 
carefully joined the speakers. On the one hand, he insisted that the 
leadership of the CCP over scientific research and artistic creation was 
necessary and correct, on the other hand, he explained that it did not mean 
the Party could guide scientists on how to go through a concrete
9 Feng You-lan, 1952.
10 Cf., Feng You-lan, 1955a, 1955b, 1955c, 1955d, 1955e, 1955f, 19558.
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procedure of specific research, or direct writers on how to begin writing 
a piece of work. It was necessary to learn dialectical materialism and 
historical materialism, to read the works of Marx and Lenin, but this was 
not enough. On the one hand, there could be some side effects during the 
process of airing of views, for instance, some opinions might be 
incorrect, and some bad labels might be wrongly put on some speakers, on 
the other hand, there was no need to worry about such things. Enjoying 
freedom of speech, people would be no longer frightened by being 
wrongly labelled. If there was something wrong, it would be very natural, 
and only through equal discussion and free contention could it be 
corrected.11
These ideas of Feng's were not attacked during the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign. Feng even denounced some other labelled "Rightists'. For 
example, Luo Long-ji, Feng's superior in the Democratic League. 
However, just after the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Feng You-lan was 
criticised for his articles on the inheritance of China's philosophical 
legacy and on the relationship between theory and practice.
On 8 January, 1957, Feng You-lan published an article in the Guangming 
Daily, entitled On the Question o f Inheriting China's Philosophical 
Legacy. In this article, he complained that for several years China's 
ancient philosophy seemed to have been negated in teaching and studying. 
The more it was negated, the less it could be inherited. Feng claimed that 
China's ancient philosophical ideas should be viewed from all angles. 
According to Feng, some propositions of Chinese philosophy have 
abstract meaning on the one hand, and concrete meaning on the other. He
11 Feng You-lan, 1957^ 1957c.
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took the proposition of 'It is a pleasure, having learned something, to try 
it out at due intervals’ as an example. In terms of its concrete meaning, 
Confucius asked his students to leam the traditional knowledge such as 
The Five Classics. In this sense, this proposition was not very meaningful, 
nor should people inherit it, for they did not leam the traditional 
knowledge in Mao's China. However, if its abstract meaning was 
considered, Feng argued, this proposition means that people would be 
pleased if they reviewed whatever they learned promptly and regularly. 
Thus abstractly the proposition was still correct and useful to people 
under the New System.12
From here Feng You-lan further maintained that there is something 
universally applicable in Chinese philosophy. That is to say, it can be used 
by all classes. If it was true, Feng argued, that could mean those 
propositions did not belong to Marx’s superstructure or ideology.
Some Party ideologues wrote articles to disagree with Feng. For example, 
Hu Sheng published a lengthy piece in the People's Daily on 29-30 March, 
1957: On the Research of Philosophical History. But this should not be 
seen as evidence that Mao had already decided to launch a criticism of 
Feng You-lan. Firstly, after the publication of Hu Sheng's article, Feng 
too wrote a lengthy piece in the Philosophical Research, entitled Once 
Again on the Question of Inheriting China's Philosophical Legacy. In this 
article, Feng You-lan pointed out that the reason for Hu Sheng's 
disagreement was partially due to Hu's misunderstanding of the concept of
12 Feng You-lan, 1957a. The Five Classics are: The Book o f Songs, The Book of 
History, The Book of Changes, The Book o f Rites, and The Spring and Autumn 
Annals. Confucius' quotation is in The Analects. Cf. Lau's English translation 
(Confucius, 1979: 59).
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abstract, and partially due to Hu's confusion of the question of what we 
should inherit with the question of how we should inherit it.13
Secondly, and more convincingly, in February, 1957, Feng as a member 
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference attended the 
meeting, in which Mao made his famous speech On the Correct Handling 
of the Conflicts among the People; in March, as a non-Party personage 
Feng was invited to take part in the National Conference of Propaganda 
Works of the CCP. In this conference, both Feng and Mao were members 
of a small group which held its group discussion at Mao's home. When he 
saw Feng coming, Mao quoted the passage of Confucius which Feng used 
as an example in his article: "Is it not a pleasure, having learned 
something, to try it out at due intervals?" Asked by Mao, Feng gave a talk 
about the research on the history of Chinese philosophy. Feng complained 
that it was too difficult to understand some philosophical problems 
according to prevalent theories at that time. Mao commented that "it was 
a simplistic way, but we cannot treat these problems too simplistically." 
Shaking Feng's hands, Mao encouraged him: "Do speak out in contending 
please. Yours is one of the hundred schools of thought, and I have been 
reading whatever you write." Moreover, in April, 1957, Mao invited 
Feng You-lan and other leading scholars to have dinner with him, 
accompanied by Hu Sheng. Mao said to Feng and Hu that "you have 
fought each other with pens."14 But Mao did not imply who was right and 
who was not.
13 Hu Sheng, 1957; Feng You-lan, 1957d .
14 Feng You-lan, 1984: 158-161; 1985: 149-150.
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In late April, that is, just after the dinner, Mao dramatically changed his 
attitude towards intellectuals and their opinions, as we have seen in 
Chapter Three. As a result, thousands of intellectuals were labelled as 
elements of the Rightist. Luckily, Feng You-lan survived the Campaign: 
he was not labelled as the "Rightist", nor was he criticised. In January, 
1958, however, Mao asked all members of the Central Committee of the 
CCP to read Feng's Once again on the Question o f Inheriting China's 
Legacy .15 It seemed that Mao did not agree with Feng on the question of 
inheritance, for just after Mao asked people to read Feng's article, the 
criticism of Feng You-lan was launched in the press, especially in the 
Philosophical Research. When Feng listened to these criticisms, he 
thought that "I should not have responded to the Party's call and should 
have written nothing." In May, Feng had to make a self-criticism, in 
which he located himself amongst "the hidden hibernated animals who 
attempted to start showing themselves in the early spring since the policy 
of letting a hundred schools of thought contend was put forward". He saw 
his idea as a reactionary one, which pretended to be one of the hundred 
school of thought, and which was used to contend against Marxism and to 
"correct" Marxism. He even accused himself of being used by the 
Rightists at Peking University, who declared that they (abstractly, Feng 
thought) inherited the May Fourth Tradition, a tradition of fighting for 
freedom and democracy.16
Unlike the former criticisms of Hu Feng, Ding Ling, and of the Rightists, 
Feng You-lan was not politically accused this time. He even published 
another article on the relationship between theory and practice in the
15 Mao Ze-dong, 1989: 382.
16 Feng You-lan, 1958a.
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Guangming Daily on 8 June, 1958: Create an Antithesis. Before Feng, 
Mao wrote his On Practice in 1937 and published it in 1950. Mao 
summarised that knowledge starts with practice, reaches the theoretical 
plane via practice, and then has to return to practice: to serve practice on 
the one hand, and through practice, to verify and develop theory on the 
other.17 In 1950, Feng You-lan praised Mao for his On Practice, which, 
Feng claimed, developed Marxism and solved the traditional problem of 
Chinese philosophy, i.e., the relationship between generality and 
specificity, which lasted through the history of Chinese philosophy.18 But 
in 1958, Feng put forward the question on the relationship between theory 
and practice from another angle: Who are philosophers? Whom should be 
trained in the philosophy department at universities?
Firstly, Feng agreed that a Marxist should both grasp theory and apply 
theory to practical problems. But, Feng argued, there was still a division 
of labour in Chinese society, and thus some people would specifically, or 
mainly, be doing theoretical work, while some others would specifically, 
or mainly, be doing practical work.
Secondly, there were various jobs under the name of theoretical work. 
Feng distinguished 'philosopher' from 'philosophical worker' by defining 
the former as a person who has his own philosophical system and the latter 
as someone who has not. Therefore, a philosopher does not have to be a 
philosophical worker, and a philosophical worker by no means is 
necessarily a philosopher. There was a difference between a person's 
ideas and his profession. A philosophical worker could be a good
1? Mao Ze-dong, 1954*: 284,292,297.
18 Feng You-lan, 1950*1.
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professor in philosophy, but he may not qualify as a philosopher under 
Feng’s definition. Philosophers cannot be trained or fostered, they' are 
gifted geniuses.
Thirdly, a philosophy department at a university should accordingly train 
and foster philosophical workers. The main task of these philosophical 
workers was not to carry out ideological education or political 
propaganda in a village or a factory, but instead, to study theories 
assiduously.
Finally, Feng insisted that Chinese society did need a large number of this 
kind of philosophical workers, who should be trained over a 
comparatively long time and thus should be trained as soon as they 
enroled as first-year students.19
After Feng published his article on practice and theory, the CCP decided 
to criticise him severely. On 30 June, 1958, Chen Bo-da, Mao’s ghost­
writer and secretary in charge of ideology, made a public speech at the 
Conference to Celebrate the CCP’s 37th Anniversary at Peking 
University. In front of thousands of students and staff, Chen Bo-da 
declared that Feng You-lan actually put forward a formula of "from 
theory, via practice, to theory ", in order to oppose Mao’s formula of 
"from practice, via theory, to practice ’’. Chen Bo-da told his audience:
Having been emancipated for eight years, you are still shackled by 
idealism. You are being trained to be armchair philosophers who, from the 
theory to the theory which is meditated in study, are useless to the people
19 Feng You-lan, 1958^.
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at a ll. Does Mr Feng You-lan's anti-materialist formula not actually express 
such an attempt? 20
Chen Bo-da's speech was entitled Under Comrade Mao Ze-dong's Flag 
and published in the Red Flag, a theoretical magazine of the Central 
Committee of the CCP whose chief-editor was, appointed by Mao, Chen 
Bo-da himself 21 Chen Bo-da also criticised Feng's idea on the inheritance 
of China’s philosophical legacy in the Red Flag a year later. He attacked 
Feng as a man who "sought to reserve the ancient Chinese idealist system 
in a certain form, and to inherit the Chinese feudal morality of the ruling 
class as an eternal morality" 22
After Chen Bo-da's speech at Peking University, Feng You-lan had to 
criticise himself more sternly. He admitted that he had tried to qualify the 
fact of philosophers being divorced from practice in his article on theory 
and practice, and to reserve a place for idealism in his article on inheriting 
China’s legacy. It was not only a serious struggle in philosophical and 
educational fields, "but a grim class struggle as well." He accused himself 
of being a key figure amongst Chinese bourgeois philosophers who, 
being unwilling to see their philosophical and educational ideas dying, 
launched a counter-attack against Marxism during the Hundred Rowers 
Period.23
Only in the 1980s, was Feng You-lan able to say that, of all his articles 
since 1949, the majority of which were mainly taken up with reporting
20 Chen Bo-da, 1958.
21 Cf., Mao Ze-dong, 1969:173-175.
22 Chen Bo-da, 1959.
23 Feng You-lan, 1958°, 1958^.
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what he had written in the 1940s, only the exceptional ones on "theory and 
practice" and on "inheritance of China's legacy" expressed his ideas.24
But in those days, he could not make any counter-criticism. On the other 
hand, unlike the criticism of Hu Feng, of Ding Ling, of Zhou Yang, or the 
criticism of the Rightists, the criticism of Feng You-lan never developed 
into a real political campaign. From 1959 to 1966, Feng You-lan was still 
officially treated as a distinguished scholar, who could attend certain high 
level meetings and talk to Mao and other CCP leaders from time to time, 
and who could also write his A New History o f Chinese Philosophy, and 
publish his academic research, including 2-volume of his A New History 
of Chinese Philosophy ,25
In 1966, like many others, Feng You-lan became labelled as one of the 
"reactionary bourgeois leading scholars" at Peking University, although 
he was not a main target of the Cultural Revolution. Like many other 
well-known intellectuals, Feng underwent a series of punishments: his 
salary was cut down from ¥335 to ¥24 per month, another five families 
moved into his house, his private collection of books was sealed up (but 
fortunately, not damaged), and he himself was denounced at public 
meetings and kept apart from his family and society to receive the so- 
called "isolated examination".
In 1968, Mao mentioned Feng You-lan once in a speech at a high level 
meeting. Mao said: "There is a man called Feng You-lan at Peking 
University, who teaches idealist philosophy. We only know materialism,
24 Feng You-lan, 1985: 261-291.
25 Cf., Feng You-lan, 1963, 1964.
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but not idealism. If we want to know a little bit of the latter, we should go 
to see him [Feng You-lan]. ... Feng is still useful. Intellectuals should be 
esteemed as far as their dignity is concerned.”26 Feng You-lan was thus 
released and went home. He was asked to write a letter of thanks to Mao.
In 1971, Xie Jing-yi, one of Mao's favourites during the Cultural 
Revolution and then one of his "commissioners” at Peking University, 
visited Feng You-lan. Xie told Feng that Mao was thankful for Feng's 
letter of 1968, and Mao also asked Xie to send his regards to Feng. 
Responding to Mao's concern with another letter of thanks, Feng 
eulogised Mao as "the philanthropist who does not abandon anyone," and 
promised that he, as a rotten stump, would germinate under the influence 
of Mao’s "spring wind”.27
Feng did germinate. In 1973, Mao decided to launch another campaign, 
the Criticism of Lin Biao & Confucius. The purpose of the campaign was 
not simply as the campaign-makers including the Gang of Four declared, 
to criticise Confucius who had died thousands of years before, or to 
criticise Lin Biao who had died two years previously. But instead, its 
purpose was to criticise "the Modem Confucian", which was Zhou En- 
lai, as later known. People like Guo Mo-mo came under fire first.
Thinking that he would be targetted for his pro-Confucianist ideas since 
the 1920s, Feng You-lan was initially nervous about the Campaign. He 
remembered that when Mao saw him in 1964, he had pointed out that "you 
and Guo Mo-ruo are on one side in terms of your attitude towards
26 Feng You-lan, 1985: 172-173.
27 Ibid., p. 174.
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Confucius."28 To escape the fire, Feng made up his mind to join in with 
the Criticism of Confucius. He made two speeches at public meetings, 
which were later published in the Journal o f Peking University. Feng 
You-lan in his articles criticised not only Confucianism and his own New 
Neo-Confucianism, but also his "abstract inheritance". He considered 
Confucianism as a reactionary ideological system even in Confucius' time, 
and his own pro-Confucianism as "a series of ideas which was in the 
service of the big landlord class, the big bourgeoisie, the KMT's 
reactionaries, before 1949, and in the service of the counter­
revolutionary revisionists like Liu Shao-qi after 1949". As to his "abstract 
inheritance", Feng admitted that, despite some superficial self-criticisms, 
he actually abided by it when he wrote his A New History o f Chinese 
Philosophy,29
Feng's articles attracted Mao's attention. After a careful reading of them 
including several changes in wording and marking, Mao ordered that 
Feng's articles be printed in the Guangming Daily with a short editorial 
note on 3-4 December, 1973. The day after, they were reprinted in nearly 
all newspapers. Feeling that the editorial note must be written by Mao 
himself or some other important person such as Jiang Qing, Feng You-lan 
was really grateful and became more and more active in the Campaign.30 
Whereas nearly all China's established intellectuals kept their distance 
from politics or were forced to be silent on it in those days, Feng became a 
new star who, unfortunately, came onto the stage too late. He wrote
28 Feng You-lan, 1985:151,174-175.
29 Feng You-lan, 1973a, 1973b .
30 Cf., Feng You-lan, 1975b: 1-6; 1976; also Feng You-lan, 1985: 174-176. Feng 
You-lan was actually misled, that editorial note was written by a deputy chief-editor of 
the Guangming Daily rather than Mao or Jiang Qing or any other important person.
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articles, he composed poetry On History, he published a new book On 
Confucius , and above all, he became a high-level consultant of the famous 
Liang Xiao (Two Universities), i.e., the Critical Writer Team of Peking 
University and Qinghua University.31
From 1974 to 1976, Feng You-lan was a unique privileged intellectual 
who was visited by Jiang Qing, and even accompanied her on a trip to 
Tianjin. Following Jiang Qing, Feng You-lan claimed that "whether pro- 
Confucianism or anti-Confucianism was not a question of academic 
research, but rather, a question of current political struggle."32
It is not clear if Feng knew that Jiang Qing and others were actually 
criticising Zhou En-lai, but Feng did know that "Jiang Qing is on behalf 
of, and speaks for, Chairman Mao".33 In his poetry, Feng expressed his 
deep thankfulness to Mao who brought a spring wind.
It turned out that Feng was not absolutely right, for once the campaign 
had started Mao said that "Jiang Qing does not speak for me." Anyway 
Mao's or Jiang Qing's spring wind did not blow onto everyone. One 
example was Liang Shu-ming. Like Feng You-lan, Liang was one of the 
few traditional Confucians to survive in modem China. In the Criticism 
of Confucius, he was asked to follow Feng You-lan to change his attitude 
towards Confucianism. But unlike Feng, he refused, quoting Confucius 
that "the Three Armies can be deprived of their commanding officer, but 
even a common man cannot be deprived of his purpose." As a result,
31 Feng You-lan, 1974,1975b.
32 Feng You-lan, 1973b, 1975a, 1975b
33 Cf., Feng You-lan, 1975a; 1975b: 1-6; 1985: 176, 180-182.
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Liang was nearly accused of being a counter-revolutionary.34 Ironically, 
when the Gang of Four were arrested in October, 1976, Feng You-lan lost 
face while Liang Shu-ming was highly praised. Feng himself admitted in 
1985 that in fact he just tried to "please the public and the leaders with 
claptrap" during the period of the Criticism of Confucius.35
For a certain period after 1977, Feng’s words and deeds were not 
acceptable to most of China's intellectuals and to the regime, though even 
then Feng You-lan was recognised as China's most outstanding 
philosopher this century by China's intellectuals and the Chinese 
authorities. Before his death in December 1990, Feng at last finished his 
8-volume A New History o f Chinese Philosophy, which had been 
rewritten after 1977.36
From Feng You-lan's experience, we can see that he, as a member of the 
old-type intellectuals, had been always passively following the CCP, 
except one or two occasions. The CCP, on the other hand, indeed used
34 Liang Shu-ming, in Wang Dong-lin, 1987, Vol.5, pp. 102-108; Cf., Alitto,1979: 
332. The English translation of Confucius' quotation is adopted from Confucius, 1979: 
99.
35 Feng You-lan, 1985: 148, 176, 183.
36 Feng had begun rewriting his The History o f Chinese Philosophy since 1950, 
according to orthodox ideas. But because of continual political and ideological struggle, 
the "orthodox ideas" were always changing, and until 1966, Feng could only finish 
two volumes of it. In the Criticism of Confucius (1974-1975), Feng had to rewrite it, 
and published Volume One, in which Feng greatly pandered to the Gang of Four. 
Therefore, after 1978, he had to rewrite it again. In the newly finished A New History 
of Chinese Philosophy, Feng still declared that he followed Marxist philosophy rather 
than his New Neo-Confucianism. But totally unlike the two volumes published in the 
1960s, and the one published in 1975, it adopted a critical attitude towards Mao's 
ideas. Cf., Feng You-lan, 1963, 1964, 1975c, 1982-1989.
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Feng when he was thought useful, but never actually treated him as 
dangerous as Fei Xiao-tong, Zhang Bo-jun, Luo Long-ji, and as Hu Feng, 
Ding Ling, Zhou Yang. The old-type intellectuals could be useful for the 
CCP both technically and politically, like the cases of Hua Luo-geng and 
Feng You-lan, but they experienced less trouble than the revolutionary 
intellectuals.
II. Left-wing Writer GUO MO-RUO
Guo Mo-ruo (1892-1978) was a prolific man of letters in modem China 
who was active and prominent in both academic research and literary 
creation, especially in ancient Chinese history, palaeography, 
archaeology, in poetry, drama, and also in translation of foreign 
literature. Since the 1930s, he had been playing the role of the CCP's 
mouthpiece in ideological and cultural circles, and in 1938, suggested by 
Zhou En-lai, Guo Mo-ruo became CCP set-up number one intellectual.
After being strictly trained in Chinese classics at the family school, 13- 
year-old Guo Mo-ruo attended a newly established Westem-style school, 
and in 1914, when he was twenty he left China for Japan, where he stayed 
for ten years to study medicine. It was in Japan that he started reading 
Western literature, especially the works of Whitman, Goethe, and 
Nietzsche, which affected him so deeply that before he finished his 
medical study he had already become a famous poet for his fresh and 
original free verse written in the vernacular. In 1921, Guo published The 
Goddesses, the first collection of his poems written in 1919-1921. The 
Goddesses was widely considered amongst the modem classics of Chinese
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poetry, which made Guo Mo-mo a pioneer of romantic poetry during the 
May Fourth Era.37
Also in 1921, Guo Mo-ruo and his close Chinese friends in Japan formed 
the Creation Society , a romantic and individualistic literary group to 
promote the slogan of "art for art's sake".38 Its key figures included 
Cheng Fang-wu, Yu Da-fu, Zhang Zi-ping, Tian Han, and Zhen Bo-qi. 
All became famous men of letters. At the suggestion of Guo Mo-mo, the 
Society published the Creation Quarterly in 1922, and the Creation 
Weekly in 1923.
In 1924, by reading and translating Japanese Marxist Kawakami Hajime's 
Social Organisation and Social Revolution, Guo Mo-mo claimed to be 
converted to Marxism, and then the Creation Society turned to the Left. 
Guo Mo-mo felt it ridiculous for intellectuals to appeal for individual 
freedom for themselves in a society where the majority of the people had 
no freedom at all. He maintained that intellectuals had to sacrifice their 
own individuality and freedom temporarily in order to plead the case for 
the freedom of the masses. After that, Guo Mo-mo and his friends in the 
Creation Society became more and more radical, in either criticising 
intellectuals as members of the bourgeoisie, appealing to them to 
"aufheben"(sublate) themselves to leave the bourgeoisie and to identify 
themselves with the proletariat, or in arguing that everything that was
37 Cf., "My Childhood", in Guo Mo-ruo, 1958b; "Before an after the Revolution", 
"Student Days" , in Guo Mo-ruo, 1958c; "The Goddesses", in Guo Mo-ruo, 1957 .^ 
Also Cf., Roy, 1971; Yuan, 1979; Sun Dang-bo, 1987: 10-170.
38 "Ten Creative Years" , Guo Mo-ruo, 1961; Zheng Bo-qi, 1959.
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revolutionary was good, and that, therefore, a good piece of literary work 
should be revolutionary.39
In February, 1926, Guo Mo-ruo left Shanghai for Canton, the 
revolutionary centre at that time. Guo Mo-ruo obtained the post of dean 
of the Faculty of Arts at Guangzhou University. Later, he abandoned his 
liberal individualistic career and became the first writer to get involved in 
the Northern Expedition against warlords in North China. He was 
appointed as chief of the Propaganda Section, and then, deputy director of 
the General Political Department, in the Northern Expedition Army led 
by Chiang Kai-shek. Guo left his family for the Northern Expedition. 
However, during the Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek started cleaning up the 
Army by getting rid of all Communists. As a result, Zhou En-lai and 
others had to withdraw from the Army. Guo Mo-ruo was becoming angry 
with what Chiang had done, and on 31 March, 1927, that is, two weeks 
before Chiang butchered Communists in Shanghai, published his widely- 
read Please Look at Today's Chiang Kai-shek in the Central Daily . Guo 
accused Chiang of being "the key figure at the core of counter­
revolutionary forces: gangsters and local ruffians, local tyrants and evil 
gentry, corrupt officials and traitorous warlords, all kinds of 
reactionaries."40 In May, Chiang issued a wanted circular to arrest and 
punish Guo Mo-ruo.
39 Guo Mo-ruo, "A Preface to Collected Literary Essays", "The Awakening of Artists 
and Writers" , and "Revolution and Literature", in Guo Mo-ruo, 1959 c: 3-4, 302-311, 
312-322; Cheng Fang-wu, 1981. Also Cf., Yuan, 1979, chapter II; Schuarcz, 1986: 
174-175, 190; Lee, in Fairbank and Feuerwerker(ed.), 1986: 422-423; and Sun, 1987: 
250-256.
40 Guo Mo-ruo, " Please Look at Today's Chiang Kai-shek " , 1958^: 122.
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In August, 1927, Guo joined the communist Nanchang Uprising led by 
Zhou En-lai, and was elected as one of the seven leading members. 
Introduced by Zhou, Guo became a CCP member. If he had not had a 
serious case of typhus, Guo might have been sent to the USSR by the CCP. 
In the end, he left China for Japan, where he spent another ten years.41 
But this time, his career was changed into academic research on ancient 
Chinese history, on interpreting inscriptions on bones, tortoise shells, or 
bronze objects. By writing plenty of academic works, including A Study 
of Ancient Chinese Society (1929), A Study of the Writing o f Oracle 
Bones (1929), and A Collection o f the Studies on Bronze Inscriptions 
(1932), from 1928 to 1937, Guo Mo-ruo was known not only a romantic 
poet, a revolutionary figure, but also a scholar who, for the first time in 
China, tried to do research on Chinese ancient history from the Marxist 
point of view.
In Japan, Guo also wrote four volumes of his own autobiography, some 
satire, essays on Chinese literary affairs, especially on the argument 
between Lu Xun and Zhou Yang, and translated literary and academic 
works, including Marx's German Ideology. Guo's scholarly life was 
interrupted when the Japanese army invaded China and the War of 
Resistance Against Japan broke out in 1937. He could no longer stay at his 
study, and, with the assistance of his friends, quietly left his Japanese wife 
and children, and escaped from Japan. "Once again it is my turn to 
renounce the pen for the sword and to request a cord for a military 
assignment, I have to leave my wife and children and to cut my 
sentimental ties with them." Nobody knows how many Chinese 
intellectuals were deeply moved by Guo's sentences at that time.
41 Guo Mo-ruo," A Night at Nanchang ", 1958d: 213-226; Sun, 1987: 290-297.
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Shortly after his arrival, the CCP got in touch with him and he became a 
secret Party member. Persuaded by Zhou En-lai on behalf of the CCP, 
Guo in the end unwillingly agreed to take up the post of the head of the 
Culture Section in the Nationalist Government. Guo Mo-ruo then played 
the role of a non-party personage occupying the middle ground between 
the CCP and the KMT in appearance, but in fact, he was an intellectual 
leader within Left-wing literary and cultural circles appointed by the 
CCP.42 During the Resistance against Japan, Guo Mo-mo gathered nearly 
all of the prominent Left-wing writers and artists in the KMT area to 
follow the CCP. Guo's house became the place where Zhou En-lai met 
these intellectuals frequently, instructing them and listening to them.
Guo himself as China's best-known intellectual became a high official in 
the Nationalist Government. He spread the KMT’s propaganda about its 
policy in the course of the Resistance against Japan on the one hand, and 
acted as the CCP's loudspeaker to criticise the KMT on the other. He 
wrote historical plays, published historical works, considering the past as 
an illumination of the present. His works and plays were highly praised by 
the CCP including Mao and Zhou, who not only generally considered that 
Guo's historical plays and researches were greatly beneficial to the 
people and the revolution, but also concretely polished his works,
42 Cf., Zhou En-lai, 1988: 140-143; Guo Mo-ruo," Song of the Rolling Billows " in 
Guo Mo-ruo, 1959^:16-26, 37-44; Xia Yian, 1985: 375-392. Guo’s Party membership 
was not revealed to the public until 1958 when it was announced that he had joined the 
CCP, and only in 1978, when he died, were people told that he had been a CCP 
member since 1927. Cf., RMRB,28 December, 1958; Deng Xiao-ping, 1978; Wu Qi- 
ru, 1980; and Wang Ting-fang, 1986.
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attended the performances, and publicised them.43 Amongst Guo's works 
in the 1940s, the most influential ones were the historical play Qu Yuan 
and the academic work Ten Critical Treatises .
After Japan's surrender in 1945, the conflict between the CCP and the 
KMT was further intensified. Guo Mo-ruo became more outspoken for 
the CCP during the KMT-CCP negotiation period in KMT areas, and, 
together with some other well-known personages, he was even beaten up 
by the KMT's plainclothes men at public meetings. When civil war broke 
out in 1946, Guo and many other revolutionary intellectuals in the KMT 
area were in danger, and he was still playing his unique role, i.e., on the 
surface a non-party personage but in fact a loudspeaker for the CCP, who 
was trying to win over those intellectuals in the middle, and help to build 
up the so-called "patriotic democratic front". In 1946 when he had to 
leave the KMT area because the negotiations between the CCP and the 
KMT broke down, Zhou En-lai wrote to Guo Mo-ruo,
to isolate the reactionary dictator [Chiang Kai-shek], we need to strike from 
both within and without, and it is you [Guo Mo-ruo] who strikes from 
within.44
Guo Mo-ruo's revolutionary career made him so outstanding amongst 
China's left-wing intellectuals that in 1949, when the People's Republic 
was established, he, still as a non-party personage, became one of the four 
vice premiers under Zhou and one of the chairmen of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference next to Mao and Zhou.
43 Cf., Mao Ze-dong, 1956: 169; 1983: 221, 241-242; Zhou En-lai, 1988: 205-209; 
216-217.
44 Zhou En-lai, 1988: 371-372.
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After 1949, however, Guo Mo-ruo became more like a symbolic "piece of 
furnishing" than a functional ideologue for the CCP. Unlike Zhou Yang 
and Lu Ding-yi, Guo Mo-ruo did not get involved in organising political 
campaigns to criticise intellectuals, though he should be considered a 
committed intellectual. He wrote volumes of poems to sing the praises of 
the CCP, in which the slogan of "Long Live Chairman Mao!" could be 
frequently read. Until 1974, every time the Party launched a political 
campaign, Guo would speak out to justify it.
Guo Mo-ruo was the person who wrote the article Reading A Report on 
Wu Xun's History in the Criticism of The Life o f Wu Xun. and he was 
also the man who made his Three Suggestions in the Criticism of Hu Shi. 
In 1955, he participated in attacking Hu Feng. At first, he wrote a lengthy 
article to criticise Hu Feng's 300,000-word Report, in which Guo argued 
with Hu more or less reasonably. For instance, Guo refuted Hu's 
complaint that the Party put five daggers over writers' head, by arguing 
that, as a matter of fact, none of the Party men had ever said that writers 
must have already obtained a perfect Communist world outlook, or 
successfully remoulded themselves into Communists, before they could 
create literary works.45 But when Mao identified Hu and his friends as 
counter-revolutionaries, Guo changed his tone, describing Hu Feng as a 
wolf and asking to punish him more severely than those in the Suppress 
Counter-revolutionaries Campaign in 1950 46
Guo Mo-mo also actively got involved in the Anti-Rightists Campaign in 
1957. At the beginning of the Campaign, he justified the punishment of
45 Guo Mo-ruo , 1955a.
46 Guo Mo-ruo, 1955b, 1955c.
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intellectuals who were asked to speak out by the CCP during the Hundred 
Flowers period, punning upon Mao's famous slogan "Do not blame 
speakers". His own revision was: "Do not blame innocent speakers". He 
also added that, in spite of Mao's request for "gentle wind and mild rain" 
in the Campaign, the targets had to be soaked, and even if the wind and 
rain were not gentle and mild, they should endure them.47 Along with the 
Campaign, Guo Mo-ruo appeared everywhere. As chairman of the All- 
China Federation of Literary and Artistic Circles, he made a caustic 
speech about Ding Ling and Feng Xue-feng. Guo told his audience that as 
early as the 1940s he had already felt something wrong in Ding Ling's 
literary writing, and in the 1950s he found that Feng Xue-feng’s self­
declaration of being a disciple of Lu Xun was actually a falsehood. As 
president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, he systematically criticised 
the Several Suggestions drafted by Hua Luo-geng, Fei Xiao-tong, and 
others, naming it an out-and-out anti-Party and anti-socialist proposal. 
Guo accused its drafters of driving a wedge between the CCP and 
scientists by concocting the proposal. As director of the Social Science 
Section at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, he called for carrying on the 
Campaign thoroughly within social science circles.48
After the Campaign, the CCP required China’s intellectuals to be both red 
in politics and outstanding in profession. Guo Mo-ruo was chosen as the 
number one amongst the good examples and his double personality ended 
with the CCP's declaration that Guo Mo-ruo was to be recruited as a 
member of the CCP. But in fact, as I have shown, Guo had been a secret 
member of the CCP since 1927.
47 Guo Mo-ruo, 1957a.
48 Guo Mo-ruo, 1957e, 1957b, 1957d.
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All of this should not be superficially interpreted to mean that Guo Mo- 
ruo had been simply the CCP's parrot. As we have seen, he was the first 
well-known intellectual who made a self-criticism in the Campaign to 
Criticise the Film The Life o f Wu Xun in 1951. In the campaign to 
criticise Hu Shi, Guo admitted that he did not care about the ideological 
struggle, and could not apply Marxism-Leninism correctly. As a result, 
he was "sluggish at struggling against bourgeois idealism, let it pass 
unchecked, and even encouraged it, being its ideological captive." 
Surprisingly, Guo concluded that to stmggle against bourgeois idealism, 
there should be freedom of academic research:
Historical experiences tell us, whenever there is a living atmosphere of free 
discussion, there is flourishing academic development, otherwise there is 
not.49
In January, 1956, Guo Mo-ruo joined Zhou En-lai in praising China's 
educated people as members of the working class, and, earlier than Hua 
Luo-geng and others, Guo complained that since 1949, some high 
intellectuals left their professional jobs and became civil servants. But, 
Guo Mo-ruo went on, because what they did was not what they learned, 
they could not give full play to both their professional knowledge and 
their administrative skill. Many experts could not concentrate on their 
professional work because of too many posts, too many social activities, 
too many public meetings, and too many short-noticed tasks. Some of 
them got very unsuitable jobs, others were transferred too frequently; 
some had professional posts but no work to do, others had no post at all. 
Following Zhou En-lai, Guo Mo-ruo insisted that in a six-day week an
49 Guo Mo-ruo, 1954.
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intellectual should spend five on his job and not have to spend more than 
one on political study, social events and meetings.
Guo criticised some people as dogmatists who used quotations from Marx 
and Lenin as a sort of panacea, and who read only a few books by Marx or 
from the Soviet Union, but seldom or never read anything else. Guo Mo- 
ruo claimed that Marxism-Leninism was no substitute for hammering out 
a conclusion on any given academic question. Instead, such a conclusion 
could only be reached by letting a hundred schools of thought contend. 
Therefore, free discussion should be encouraged, different opinions 
should be fully expressed, and independent thinking should be promoted. 
"Of course," Guo continued, "idealists opposed to Marxism-Leninism can 
voice their ideas too — they have every right to say what they like." As to 
scientific development in the West, Guo thought that in those years, 
science in the capitalist countries had made new progress, and China's 
scientists should learn from the West gladly. They should also study the 
classics and contemporary writings in the capitalist world, including 
idealist theories and so on.50
In 1956, it was Guo Mo-ruo who asked Lu Ding-yi, director of the 
Central Propaganda Department of the CCP, to make the lengthy speech 
in which Lu fully elaborated the policy of "Let a hundred flowers bloom, 
let a hundred school of thought contend". Being asked why he required Lu 
Ding-yi to make that speech, Guo Mo-ruo answered: the progress of 
science and literature was badly affected by commandism, dogmatism, 
and formulism, which intervened in the work of scientists and writers too 
much. For instance, some Chinese local operas were banned, traditional
50 Guo Mo-ruo, 1956a, 1956b. Cf., Zhou En-lai, 1988: 524-525.
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Chinese painting was despised, traditional Chinese medical science was 
labelled as "feudalist medicine", and Chinese biologists could not disagree 
with the Soviet experts. According to Guo Mo-ruo, both artistic creation 
and scientific research were the result of voluntary and independent 
thinking, and there should not be too much intervention from the 
authorities. However, since the CCP put forward the slogan of "Let a 
hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred school of thought contend", many 
scientists and writers still had some misgivings, thus Guo thought it was 
necessary to have a speech made by an important person such as Lu Ding- 
yi.51
It could be argued that, in fact, all of this was carefully engineered by the 
CCP behind the scenes, and Guo Mo-mo was, at most, a good actor. If it 
was the case, there will still be some difficulties to explain the fact that 
almost every time Guo Mo-ruo was asked to play his loudspeaker role, he 
explained himself to his readers and listeners. In 1954, for example, he 
said that, as a matter of fact, he had never read Yu Ping-bo's works on 
The Dream of the Red Chamber, nor had he read Li Xi-fang's article and 
Feng Xue-feng’s editorial note until Mao got angry. Another example is 
that, in 1955, when he attacked Hu Feng, he admitted that he had not 
realised that Hu Feng was a counter-revolutionary, instead, he had treated 
him as a friend for more than twenty years. In 1957, he also told people 
that he was shocked every time he read newspapers in which some writers 
and artists were announced as newly-found members of the "Rightist", 
and he always thought that Ding Ling and Feng Xue-feng had no problem 
in their ideological ideas and political stand.52
51 Guo Mo-ruo, 1963: 318-321.
52 Cf., Guo Mo-ruo, 1954, 1955b, 1955c, 1957e.
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What is more, Guo Mo-ruo's complex personality, mixed feelings, and his 
relatively independent thinking could be further seen in his literary 
creations. In Guo's play Madam Cai Wen-ji,53 Guo Mo-ruo portrayed her 
as a patriot who, on the one hand had been missing her country and 
dreaming of going back all the time; while on the other hand, she was a 
virtuous family member who suffered too much when she was asked by 
the Premier Cao Cao to leave her husband and children and return to the 
Han. When Guo Mo-ruo saw his play in performance, he shed tears, 
saying that in the play, "the Premier Cao Cao was the CCP and Cai Wen-ji 
was me!"54 As we can see, Guo Mo-mo not only had to be a exile in Japan 
for ten years, but also did have the experience of leaving his wife and 
children when the Sino-Japanese War broke out. Furthermore, we can see 
here, he not only had been a secret CCP member among the intellectual 
circles, playing the part of a non-party personage for decades while 
hoping that one day he could "go back to the Party", but also felt lost when 
he left his non-party intellectual friends and did go back to the Party in 
1958, a year before he wrote Madam Cai Wen-ji.
Without doubt, from his private talking or writing, we can more easily 
penetrate his heart of hearts. In Guo Mo-ruo's personal letters to 
unknown friends in the 1950s, he wrote:
In recent years I threw my pen away altogether. I wrote almost nothing.
Other people still consider me both ’literary writer’ and 'scholar', but I, as
an amphibian, really feel ashamed. ...Making a self-examination, I have
actually achieved nothing. To look at my literary works, I find not even
53 Cai Wen-ji was a Chinese woman during the Han Dynasty, who wandered destitute
far from her homeland and was then married off to a member of the Hun Nationality.
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one single piece satisfactory; as to my academic research, I do not have a 
good grounding in it. I feel terribly aimless since the Liberation. I can do 
nothing in politics, while academic research has been totally left aside too. 
Facing the passing of time, I cannot help but feel dumbfounded and lost 55
Only in 1958, when Mao published some of his old-style Chinese poems, 
could Guo Mo-ruo dare to say that "I am a romantic!” And then he 
restarted his romantic literary creation, as a result, Madam Cai Wen-ji, 
Empress Wu Ze-tian, and other dramas were written and put on the stage. 
From 1959 to 1964, Mao even asked Guo Mo-ruo to examine Mao's 
poems and, if necessary, to revise them.56 During this period, Mao and 
Guo also wrote old-style Chinese poems in reply to one another, using the 
same rhyme sequence.
However, as we have seen, after the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Great 
Leap Forward, especially after 1962, Mao became more and more 
sensitive about the differences within the CCP and gradually decided that 
they were the reflection of the life-and-death class struggle between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie. He specifically emphasised the problems 
in literary and historical circles. In December, 1963, when he criticised 
the "dead” (Zhou Yang and Xia Yan, Tian Han, Yang Han-sheng) who, 
according to Mao, "still dominate in many units of the literary and artistic 
circles”, Mao added specifically that "there are more problems in 
dramatic circles".57 As a result, as we have shown in Chapter Four, two 
outstanding play wrights, Tian Han and Xia Yan, were purged, and Mao
54 Guo Mo-ruo, " Preface of Madam Cai Wen-ji ", in Guo Mo-ruo, 1959a; Cf. Cao 
Yu, 1978.
55 Guo Mo-ruo, 1979.
56 Guo Mo-ruo, 1958a; Mao Ze-dong, 1983: 566.
5?Mao Ze-dong, in HQ, 1967, Vol. 9, pp.8-9.
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Dun, the foremost Chinese novelist since the 1930s and the Culture 
Minister of the State Council since 1949, was dismissed. In the meantime, 
Mao started engineering the Cultural Revolution by sending his wife Jiang 
Qing secretly to Shanghai where she organised Zhang Chun-qiao and Yao 
Wen-yuan to draft the article On the Newly-written Historical Play The 
Dismissal ofHai R u i. a play written by the historian Wu Han.
In 1966, when talking about academic and educational circles, which, Mao 
judged, had been dominated by the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie, 
he unequivocally said that
Guo Lao [Guo Mo-ruo] and Fan Lao [Fan Wen-lan] were members of the 
'Emperor, King, General, and Official School' too. Fan Lao is interested 
on emperors, kings, generals, and officials. They object to talking big, but 
insist in examining historical details.... It is a serious class struggle, and in 
future, it will be these people who practise revisionism. Wu Han, Jian Bo- 
zhan are both CCP members, but oppose the Communist Party and 
materialism. 58
It was the first time that Mao had located Guo Mo-ruo among the 
bourgeois or petty bourgeois intellectuals who had Communist 
designation but practised revisionism, although Mao's words were not 
made to the public. Guo Mo-mo would nevertheless had felt nervous if he 
had been informed of what Mao had said about him. About a year earlier, 
Guo received a letter from Mao in which he was told that Mao approved 
the academic criticism of Guo Mo-mo from some other intellectuals.59
58 Mao Ze-dong, 1969: 634-635.." Lao " in Chinese is a respectful form of address, 
thus " Guo Lao " means " the Venerable Guo ". The " Emperor, King, General, and 
Official School " ( Di Wang Jiang Xiang Pai) means those historians and writers who, 
it was said, exclusively wrote about members of the ruling class rather than common 
people. Jian Bo-zhan is another historian.
59 Mao Ze-dong, 1983 : 602-604.
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It seemed that Guo Mo-ruo felt that there would be another political 
campaign following in which he might be involved as a target. In January 
1966, Guo wrote a letter to the Party chief of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences, asking to be allowed to resign all his posts there: President of the 
Academy, Director of the Social Science Section, Head of the History 
Institute, and President of the China University of Science & Technology. 
The reasons Guo listed in the letter were "private" and "pure": deafness 
and poor eyesight.60 Guo even considered going down to the local areas 
and being a middle-school teacher.
From April 1966, academic criticism developed into political accusation, 
more and more scholars, writers and artists were labelled as the 
"reactionary bourgeois leading scholars". In both private and public, Guo 
told his friends, listeners, and foreigners that all that he had written in the 
past should be burnt because it was worthless.61 It turned out that Guo 
Mo-ruo worried too much. Indeed, Guo Mo-ruo might have been 
criticised or attacked without the protection of Mao and Zhou En-lai, as 
Zhou Yang later pointed out. Mao ordered the publishing of Guo's speech 
about burning his works, and when one of his letters of the 1940s on the 
matter of literature and art in 1967 was republished, Mao deleted his 
original judgment that "Guo Mo-ruo has done very well in his historical 
plays". But nevertheless, it was Mao who told others that Guo and Fan 
Wen-lan should be protected from being criticised, when he named them 
as members of the 'Emperor, King, General, and Official School'. In 
Zhou En-lai’s list of those who should be protected, Guo's name appeared
60 Cf., Chen Ming-yuan, 1982.
61 Guo Mo-ruo, 1966a, 19666; Chen Ming-yuan, 1982; Wang Ting-fang, 1986: 423- 
425.
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second, just next to Madam Sun Yet-sen.62 Guo Mo-mo thus survived in 
those days whilst a great number of others, including two of his sons, did 
not.
From 1966 to 1972, Guo Mo-mo mainly played a symbolic role of a well- 
known personage in the leadership instead of an outstanding intellectual in 
academic and artistic circles. Despite several poems written but fewer 
published, which were mostly occasional verses to please the leadership 
including one praising Jiang Qing, Guo's name appeared in the press often 
when he received foreign visitors from Japan or other countries. Guo 
Mo-mo nevertheless took advantage of this opportunity to let some 
scientists who were under attack in their units show themselves in public, 
and Guo’s appearances also encouraged some writers, for example, Ba 
Jin, who lost their personal freedom in those years to keep hopes of 
survival.63 From 1972, partly because of the fall of Lin Biao, Mao's legal 
successor since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Guo Mo-mo got 
involved in scientific policy-making under Zhou En-lai, who was in 
charge of the Party, State, and Army matters then. Unfortunately, this 
lasted only a short period.
In 1973, Mao criticised the Foreign Ministry, which had been supervised 
by Zhou En-lai since 1949 and was even a little shaken during the 1966- 
1969 period. Mao said that it ignored class stmggle in ideological fields 
and instead, only paid attention to daily affairs. He warned that if such a 
tendency went on, there must be revisionism. Zhang Chun-qiao then 
displaced Zhou En-lai as the man in charge of the Political Bureau. In the
62 Mao Ze-dong, 1980: 257; Zhou En-lai, 1984: 450-451; Cf., Zhou Yang, in Jiang 
Qing-fu, 1990; Sun Dang-bo, 1987: 537.
63 Guo Mo-ruo, 1967; 1977: 346-387; Cf., Li Yi-mang, 1985; and Ba Jin, 1978.
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meantime, as he had done before the Cultural Revolution, Mao called in 
Jiang Qing, reciting his new poem for Guo Mo-ruo exclusively to her:
Guo Lao was a Communist in name, but who worships Confucius.
...Gentleman, I advise you [Guo Mo-mo] not to blame the First Emperor
of Qin so much,...The highly-praised Confucianism is in fact equal to
worthless chaff, ...Your Ten Critical treatises are not great works.... 64
Acting on the orders of Mao or, as she declared, on behalf of Mao, Jiang 
Qing went to Peking University and Qinghua University where she 
organised the later notorious LIANG XIAO (the Critical Writer Team of 
Peking University and Qinghua University) to prepare another campaign, 
the "Criticism of Confucius", and to select and print Guo’s works and 
articles as negative materials. From August 1973, the CCP's Red Flag 
and other newspapers such as the Guangming Daily began publishing 
critical articles written by Liang Xiao or others including Feng You-lan, 
and just after New Year's Day of 1974, a nationwide political campaign, 
the "Criticism of Confucius and Lin Biao", was launched.
Departing from his normal behaviour since 1949, if not 1938 or even 
1927, Guo Mo-ruo kept silence this time. Guo's attitude provoked Jiang 
Qing and others among the leadership. On 25 January, 1974, in front of 
thousands of Party and State officials, including Zhou En-lai and Guo's 
family members, she ordered Guo to stand up, declared that Mao judged 
that Guo's attitude towards Confucius was exactly the same as Lin Biao's. 
She and Zhang Chun-qiao also called at Guo's house and asked him to 
criticise Confucianism or make self-criticism several times. Guo realised 
that the Campaign was actually aimed at Zhou En-lai, and therefore 
refused to write anything. He even told them that his Ten Treatises were
64 Mao Ze-dong, in Jin Chun-ming, 1985: 200.
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written in the 1940s to allude to Chiang Kai-shek. That is to say, there was 
nothing wrong with them.
It cannot be denied that it must be very hard for a person who lived under 
the "Soviet-type Communist" one-party state with the specific unit system 
(as described in Chapter Two) to act entirely freely, not to speak of Guo 
Mo-ruo, who, in his eighties then, had been following the CCP and 
obeying Mao's order all the time. In fact, with a few exceptions, for 
instance, Liang Shu-ming, China's established intellectuals had to make 
self-criticism whenever they were asked by the CCP since 1949. Guo Mo- 
ruo thus wept at home, saying that he had implicated Zhou En-lai because 
of his attitude towards Confucius in his Ten Treatises, which were first 
published in Chongqing in the 1940s when Zhou was in charge of CCP 
and Left-wing circles in that area. Furthermore, after being visited by 
Jiang Qing who stayed for more than three hours, Guo contracted 
pneumonia, and was sent into hospital. It was said that Mao limited the 
criticism of Guo Mo-mo, and Zhou En-lai told Guo not to make any self- 
criticism before carefully examining his works, it was also said that Guo 
Mo-mo in the end admitted that his Ten Treatises was "obviously 
wrong".65 Nevertheless, Guo Mo-mo was not criticised in the press, nor 
was his self-criticism, if there was any, published.
After the fall of the Gang of Four, Guo Mo-mo was again considered as 
the first amongst China's revolutionary intellectuals and he enjoyed a 
high position in the state. The CCP declared that it wanted to put 
scientific, educational, and economic development above other matters. In
65 Wang Ting-fang, 1980.
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March, 1978, several months before he died, Guo claimed with a high 
spirit that the "spring for sciences" had come at last:
From all of my experiences, I awaken to an absolute truth: only socialism 
could free the development of sciences, but also, only based on sciences 
could we build up socialism; sciences need socialism, but more importantly, 
socialism needs sciences. 66
Shortly after Guo's death, the CCP dramatically changed its attitude 
towards intellectuals, which again became a part of the working class. The 
Cultural Revolution was then officially declared completely negative, 
nearly all the former political campaigns were considered either wrong 
or unnecessary, and those people who were put into gaol or sent down to 
labour camp such as Hu Feng, Ding Ling, and Zhou Yang, were released 
and given important posts and/or a high reputation.
III. Conclusion
For Feng You-lan, the question was how to get the trust from the ruling 
party, how to be recognised as a leading philosopher by the authorities, 
and how to find his place under the new "Communist" system. He always 
tried to please the CCP and its leaders, especially Mao, but in the end, he 
failed.
Unlike Feng You-lan, Guo Mo-ruo got his place and knew his status: he 
was a secret CCP member pretending to be a "non-party democratic 
personage", and he was also set up by the CCP in the 1940s as the "leading 
revolutionary intellectual of China's Left-wing writers and artists". For
66 Guo Mo-ruo, " The Spring for Sciences", in Guo Mo-ruo, 1978.
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Guo Mo-ruo, the question was, bound to such status, how to be an 
intellectual who could have and express his own ideas.
Unlike Feng You-lan and Fei Xiao-tong, who were criticised or even 
purged, also unlike Zhou Yang and Hu Feng, who were further arrested 
and sent to jail for years, Guo Mo-ruo had never been criticised in any 
political campaign (in public, at least). To repay the CCP’s kindness, Guo 
Mo-ruo abided by the authorities all the time.
In China, as a matter of fact, not only Guo Mo-mo, but all the so-called 
"revolutionary intellectuals" as well, had such a double face in varying 
degrees: members of the mling party and members of the intelligentsia. 
Unlike other kinds of intellectuals, for instance, the old-type intellectuals, 
they were party members; but unlike other Party members, for instance, 
the peasants in uniform, they were intellectuals. Had there not been 
contradictions between the Party and their intellectual ideals, they would 
have experienced their lives differently.
Of course, they were not exactly the same in the political campaigns. As 
we have said, intellectuals can be either conservative, liberal, critical, and 
radical. Some are Left-wing members, some are in the middle, and some 
others can be on the Right. In our case studies, we saw Hua Luo-geng as a 
natural scientist was politically passive in those campaigns, but Fei Xiao- 
tong was the social scientist in the democratic parties who tried to show 
his independence if it was possible. We also found that Feng You-lan as a 
traditional scholar hardly obtained as important a position as Guo Mo-mo 
and even Zhou Yang, while Guo Mo-mo as a CCP-appointed intellectual 
leader could have little opportunities to express his real feelings and ideas. 
Their problem cannot be simply explained from their personal
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characteristics, but instead, their structural positions forced them to act as 
they did.
From these case studies, we have to conclude that simply to consider them 
the same is wrong. Even amongst one kind of intellectuals, for instance, 
the revolutionary intellectuals, there are still some differences. Hu Feng 
was the most unorthodox Left-wing writer in this period (1949-1976), 
while Zhou Yang changed from conservative to critical, and Guo Mo-ruo 
always suffered from being a double-speaker.
Above these differences, one question arising from our research is: under 
the "Soviet-type Communist" system, in which the ruling party replaces 
the state and the party's (and leader's) ideas become the only allowed 
ideological views, how could intellectuals as producers of ideas play their 
part in social life, and how could critical intelligentsia exist and continue 
to criticise the "dark side" of society?
From Guo Mo-ruo's experiences, we can realise that such a question in 
practice torments the intellectuals (who used to be critical towards the 
status quo and thus joined the Communist Party in order to change the 
status quo) all the time as long as the System itself is unchanged. Another 
way of getting rid of such torment for this kind of intelligentsia is: give 
up. Do they want to do so?
If we go on further with our research on China's established intellectuals 
in the post-Mao period, we will find the answer is not simple. But that 
would be another piece of work.
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CHAPTER 7:CONCLUSION
Having explored the historical background of China's intellectuals, 
analysed the social conditions in which they lived and worked, examined 
the whole process of the political campaigns Mao and the CCP launched to 
criticise intellectuals, and having considered those established intellectuals 
who were targets of the campaigns, and further presented detailed case 
studies of four of the top established intellectuals, and demonstrated their 
various roles in the campaigns, from activists to targets, now we can draw 
our conclusions. The aim is to decide whether China's intellectuals should 
be considered to belong to a certain single class, whether they can freely 
move, or "float", up and down, and whether the number of their posts 
limited their political orientation and ideological expression, that is to say, 
whether it is true that the more and higher posts they occupy, the more 
passive they are.
I.
In this research, I have deliberately written no special chapter on Mao, 
one of the greatest intellectuals in modem China since 1919. The reason 
is not rooted in the fact that, in spite of publishing five volumes of works 
carefully chosen from his massive writings and speeches, Mao spent most 
of his time engaged in practice rather than in theory, he was more of a 
revolutionary than a scholar, more of a politician than a political scientist, 
as Dick Wilson points out.1 Neither have I excluded him because there 
have already been plenty of specific research studies on his ideas and
1 D. Wilson, 1980: 446.
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practice, for example, a great and detailed work about the development of 
his thought by Stuart Schram.2 In fact, I have written no special chapter on 
Mao because he, like many other great figures in history, is so 
complicated and controversial that without being giving considerable 
attention he can hardly be understood. However, if it had not been for 
Mao, the history of the PRC, if indeed such a republic had ever been 
established, would have been written in different words. The political 
campaigns, if they had existed, would have proceeded differently, and the 
research on China's intellectuals during this period, sociologically or 
non-sociologically, would have been done in another way, if indeed it was 
still necessary. Accordingly, to draw conclusions from the above 
research, I shall simply give some brief critical analyses of Mao's ideas on 
intellectuals and the practical implementation of these ideas.
In a country such as China where for thousands of years the majority of 
the population had no opportunity for an education, it was quite 
reasonable for that majority to consider the minority of educated "elites" 
as a privileged class or stratum, especially when these educated "elites" 
were the exclusive legal members of the officialdom, as it was in China 
before 1904.
A closer study of these people, however, would show a very different 
picture. Mao recognised this and correctly asserted that, before 1949, 
rather than forming a single class, China's educated people attached 
themselves both economically and politically to various social classes in
2 S. Schram, 1989.
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general and to the ruling ones in particular.3 Mao also found that the 
greatest weakness of China's educated "elites" was their isolation from, 
and contempt for, the masses of Chinese people.4 As we have said in 
Chapter Three, Mao as the man who tried to lead his people, of whom 
more than 80 per cent were peasants without the capacity to read or write, 
to change the face of their nation and hence themselves within a few short 
decades, needed the educated people to aid in watering his so-called "poor 
and blank" garden. But in the meantime he demanded that educated people 
remould themselves into a new type of "intellectual workers with socialist 
consciousness". Without doubt, Mao’s original attempt was not simply to 
criticise or punish China's educated people, but to win them over 
politically and further to change them into a new type of individual. He 
recognised that it would take a long time, and therefore asked his 
comrades in the CCP to be patient and to spare no pains in helping the 
educated people to remould themselves gradually.5
3 According to Mao, these classes were: Western capitalists, Chinese landlords, 
Chinese bureaucrat-capitalists, Chinese national capitalists, and Chinese small 
producers. Mao, 1977: 469- 470; 506-507.
4 In this sense, Mao paradoxically considered that the more books people read, the 
more stupid they are. He even once said that "it is intellectuals who are most ignorant", 
and that "it is those who can hardly read and write that know better", and claimed that 
"only laymen can lead experts". Mao, 1954^: 10-11; 16-19; 1956: 32-34; 66- 
68; 1974:204-211; 1969:210-211; 1977: 468-470.
5 Mao, 1977: 404-405. Even when he decided to launch the Anti-Rightist Campaign 
Mao insisted that the transformation of intellectuals would take quite a long time, and 
most of them should be considered kind-hearted, honest persons and hence 
ideologically changeable. And as late as December, 1958, he still tried to correct a 
widespread feeling in the CCP that" intellectuals are objects of the socialist revolution" 
because they were members of the bourgeoisie. Mao, 1969: 269-271; 1977:443-444, 
457-458; 1983: 554-555. Cf., Schram, 1989: 126-127.
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The reason why Mao was sure that the educated people could be 
transformed into his new "intellectual workers" was because all those 
classes to whom they had attached themselves had been socially destroyed. 
In other words, "with the skin [old classes] gone, to what can the hair [the 
educated people] attach itself?"(PI ZHIBU CUN, MAO JIANG YAN FU) 
Mao therefore believed that there was no other way for China's educated 
people except to remould themselves into the "new intellectual workers 
with socialist consciousness" under the supervision of the CCP.
However, Mao recognised that this would never be easy for these educated 
people. They came over from the old society, and were nostalgic for their 
old habits, old orbits, and ways of life. They still looked with disdain on 
the "new skin" (new system) and had a very low opinion of the workers 
and peasants. Because of this, Mao labelled these educated people 
"gentlemen in mid-air" for the time being: on the one hand, they were 
unable to go back because their "old home" (those old classes) were 
already gone; on the other hand, they were still unwilling to attach 
themselves to the new system. But without a social basis, they could not 
fly in the air for ever. This was why Mao was confident that China's 
educated "elites" would eventually be transformed.
The problem is not that there are contradictions here. It was obvious that 
Mao needed these educated people but they could not be used without 
changing their world outlook; or that they would have to attach 
themselves to the new system in the end but it would take a long time for 
the CCP to win them over politically and ideologically. Mao indeed 
realised such contradictions. But the problem is that, when Mao realised 
these contradictions, he treated them in a very simplistic way. Firstly, he 
named all those who had received secondary or higher education,
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"intellectuals" (ZHI SHI FEN ZI). For the sake of statistical analysis, all 
educated people can be categorised together, but it is dangerous to treat 
them as members of the same social group. Indeed, Mao always tried to 
differentiate the right-wingers from the left-wingers among intellectuals 
very carefully, but this was more of a political strategy to win them over. 
Secondly, after 1957, Mao further located them in the same class, or more 
strictly, the bourgeoisie, no matter if they were considered left-wing or 
right-wing. According to Mao, even those who came from the families 
of the working class and poor peasants, or those who joined the 
Revolution before 1949, were also members of the bourgeoisie, or at 
least, shared a bourgeois world outlook. This was because the former 
received a bourgeois education when they were at school, and the latter 
were mostly members of rich families before they got involved in the 
Revolution.6
It seems that Mao used the concept of "bourgeoisie" too widely. A possible 
explanation for this is that Mao had his own understanding of class. For 
instance, in the 1950s, when he considered Chinese educated people 
members of the bourgeoisie, he did not pay much attention to their socio­
economic position, but talked about their family background and the 
education they had received. And further, in the 1960s, he shifted his 
approach to class from combining family background and education to 
emphasising political power and social privilege, which were seen as the 
key factors in the creation of the newly-born bourgeoisie from CCP 
cadres and intellectual "elites".
6 Mao, 1977: 424-427; 1989: 225, 228, 312, 354.
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According to Mao, these people, among whom the so-called 
"intellectuals" were numerous, were called members of the CCP but were 
in fact members of the KMT. In his late years, Mao even declared that 
"the bourgeoisie are within the Communist Party indeed".7
Another explanation for Mao's wide use of the term "bourgeoisie" was 
that Mao, as a politician, always realised that the the majority of the 
supporters of, and participants in, his revolution were actually peasants 
and the "peasants in uniform" who could hardly read and write. Mao 
attempted to popularise scholarly knowledge and make it simplified and 
thus understandable for the common Chinese who could then apply it in 
practice.8
The third explanation, which is held by many scholars, both within and 
outside China today, is that Mao, again as a politician who declared his 
revolution "socialist" or "communist", used the label of "bourgeoisie" as 
the easiest weapon against those intellectuals and cadres who did not share 
his ideas. As a result, no matter what social group they belonged to, 
whether they were old-type intellectuals, the democratic personages, 
revolutionary intellectuals, or whatever, if they did not agree with him, 
they could be labelled members of the bourgeoisie and thus, sooner or 
later, be criticised or punished in the political campaigns.9
7 Mao, 1969: 424-426; also Mao, in HQ, No.5, 1976. Cf., Schram, 1989: 158-171.
8 Ding Ling, after having suffered from political punishment for two decades, insisted 
that Mao maintained that literature and art should be understandable and enjoyable for 
the masses of Chinese peasants and workers not because Mao himself could not 
appreciate the so-called "pure literature and art", but rather because he knew very 
clearly that his revolution was mainly made by and for the common people. Ding Ling, 
1984b: 251, 262-266. Also Cf., D. Wilson, 1980: 446.
9 Cf., Schram, 1989: 169-171.
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All these explanations are in some degree reasonable and correct, but 
through examining the whole process of those political campaigns I would 
consider that the first is the strongest, and Mao's practice of launching 
political campaigns to criticise intellectuals is really based on his idea of 
class and class stmggle.
The problem is that Mao's concept of "class" is too simplistic and at the 
same time ambiguous. When I say it is too simplistic I mean that, when he 
denied that intellectuals could be members of the petty bourgeoisie, and 
when he declared that in fact there are only two schools of thought among 
the so-called "hundred schools of thought"(the proletarian, or the 
bourgeois),10 it seemed that he forgot or, perhaps more precisely, did not 
pay enough attention to, the fact that Chinese society before 1949 was pre­
capitalist. He also ignored the fact that many educated people actually lost 
their positions due to the abolition of the Civil Examination System. Some 
became self-employed, and thus independent, writers and artists.11
Mao's concept of "class" is also ambiguous because, when he labelled all 
the educated people members of the bourgeoisie, he considered their 
family background, education, political behaviour, and ideological 
orientation as key factors without examining their relation with, and their 
position in, production. The concept of the bourgeoisie can hardly be 
applied to the educated people in a state such as China where the mling 
party controls all the means of production, including educated people 
themselves.
!0 Mao, 1977: 427; 1989: 228,286, 301, 332, 369.
11 Asa matter of fact, even in an advanced capitalist society there are plenty of social 
members who fall between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.
325
As to the officials ("cadres”) within the CCP, Mao never made it clear 
whether all of them should be seen as members of the newly-born 
bourgeoisie because of their privileged positions, or whether just some of 
them should be seen so because of their political stand. From his practice, 
it seemed he meant the latter, which theoretically is more confusing.
The failure of Mao's practice to win China's educated people over is, of 
course, partially because his aim was too ambitious: to entirely transform 
their world outlook within a comparatively short period. Mao clearly 
realised that an educated person who lost his/her former location and was 
given a new job in a unit run by the state would not necessarily "share 
socialist consciousness with the proletariat". His way of dealing with this, 
that is, launching a series of political campaigns to criticise and punish 
them, was contradictory to his aim, however.
And worse, he became more and more impatient, and accordingly his 
political campaigns were more and more tense. The number of targets 
increased, attention shifted from unknown to distinguished figures, from 
non-Party to Party intellectuals. And what is more, every time, 
ideological criticism turned out to be political attack, and theoretical 
difference was resolved through disciplinary punishment. As a result, 
many educated individuals including established ones were labelled as 
"bourgeois individualists", "elements of the Rightist", "members of the 
Hu Feng Clique", "followers of Zhou Yang", etc., and then criticised and 
punished. This partly explains the fact Mao was complained against so 
much and widely by China's intellectuals after his death.
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Nevertheless, Mao is considered the greatest among Chinese politicians 
and intellectuals. His theory of Chinese society and Chinese revolution 
was generally considered the most profound idea to emerge this century 
in China and was widely received as the guiding ideology of the CCP in 
1942 and of the PRC in 1949. As a politician in a "Soviet-type 
Communist" one-party state, Mao’s power needed to be justified and 
legitimised ideologically by so-called "Mao Ze-dong Thought". In the 
meantime, as an intellectual who tried to change that society according to 
his ideas, Mao needed to preserve and protect his ideas from any suspicion 
and challenge by his authorised position. Such an intellectual-political 
hegemony is practically possible only if the man who enjoys it is both 
intellectually pre-eminent and politically superior.
II.
The first conclusion we can draw from this research is that, after 1949, as 
well as before that time, China's educated people were in fact not in the 
same position and thus should not have been treated as members of the 
same social group. As to the established intellectuals, it is also difficult to 
locate them in the same social stratum. In the period of 1949-1976, as we 
have seen, these people belonged to at least three different strata: the 
"revolutionary intellectuals" who were ruling officials, the "democratic 
personages" who were the privileged group without real power, and the 
"old-type intellectuals"who were the state-employed professionals. It is all 
right to call these three kinds of people "intellectuals", but socio- 
politically they were in different positions and thus had different 
functions or roles.
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As far as their ideological orientations are concerned, Zhou Yang and 
Ding Ling were, or at least claimed to be, Marxists, while Fei Xiao-tong 
and Zhang Bo-jun were, to a certain extent, Westem-style democrats and 
liberals, and Feng You-lan and Liang Shu-ming were traditional 
Confucians. If we divided them ideologically in general, the difference of 
"intelligentsia" to "intellectuals" would be more convincing. But a simple 
and one-sided theoretical approach to China’s educated people only makes 
the matter more confusing.
As we have seen in Chapter Two, China’s traditional literati used to attach 
themselves to the state institutionally because of the Civil Examination 
System, but lost their privileged access to officialdom at the beginning of 
this century. From 1904 to 1949, there appeared a new kind of educated 
man and woman: the revolutionary intellectuals, who became the 
vanguards of both the KMT and the CCP. This kind of intellectuals should 
be considered more members of critical, or even radical, intelligentsia 
than just intellectuals in general.
In the meantime, there was another kind of educated people: the 
individual intellectuals who kept a distance from politics. Though I call 
them "old-type intellectuals" in this research, they were in fact not just the 
traditional Chinese literati, for they were no longer tied to officialdom 
due to the abolition of the Civil Examination System, and most of them 
were, in varying degrees, Westernised through either going abroad or 
studying modem Western natural and social sciences. Most members of 
this group can be seen as Gramsci's "traditional intellectuals".
Both the revolutionary intellectuals and the old-type intellectuals in this 
period (1904-1949) shared one thing in common: unlike both their
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ancestors and descendants they were neither members of the officialdom 
due to the expiry of their ’’privileged pass" (the Civil Examination 
System), nor employed by the state unit under which it was hard to 
transfer from teaching to researching, to move from the north to the 
south, and to express their own independent opinions through the official 
press. Living in the society ruled by the KMT, intellectuals could be 
arrested or murdered, but they could also organise their own intellectual 
societies or publish their academic and even political works. Chinese 
society under the KMT was never as well-organised as under the CCP. 
Therefore, after publishing Please Look at Today's Chiang Kai-shek Guo 
Mo-ruo could escape to Japan. While they were on KMT’s "blacklist", 
Zhou Yang and Feng Xue-feng could travel to Yan’an or other "Red 
Areas". Even in KMT areas, Ding Ling and Xia Yan could publish their 
Left-wing magazines or newspapers, Feng You-lan and Fei Xiao-tong 
could do their "pure academic" research.
After 1949, the situation in China was changed institutionally. The 
educated people, like the commoners, lived in a specific, if not unique, 
system in which they were no longer considered as "free professionals", 
and less considered as "intellectuals" than they had been before. While 
they were scattered over all levels of society and therefore should not be 
seen as members of one specific class, they were all tied both socially and 
individually to their units.
And moreover, people's political positions were largely decided 
according to their "revolutionary" or "non-revolutionary" or even 
"counter-revolutionary" experiences before 1949 and their relations to 
the CCP before and after. And their specific role in political campaigns 
was accordingly predetermined by their position rather than their will or
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choice. As we have shown, Hua Luo-geng took almost thirty years to join 
the CCP, and he was at most considered a red scientist in the end. Feng 
You-lan who tried his best to follow the CCP’s policy all the time, but 
when he died in December, 1990, he was remembered as no more than 
an outstanding philosopher, a title which he had already been honoured in 
the 1940s. Guo Mo-ruo suffered from not being an independent writer 
for decades, while he could only express his desire in private. And Hu 
Feng tried to challenge the dominating post of the Party men, but after 
being in jail for nearly thirty years, he won the title of Left-wing Writer, 
which he had already obtained in the 1930s.12 From here we reach the 
second conclusion: China’s intellectuals in the PRC( 1949-1976), no 
matter how established, could not freely move, or "float”, up and down. 
As social members, they were bound to their specific social relations.
This should not be understood to mean that they were all passively given 
their fate in the same degree. As we have shown, the CCP quite easily and 
relatively mildly carried on its Thought Reform Campaign to deal with 
the old-type intellectuals, but only by launching a stormy Anti-Rightist 
Campaign could it make the democratic personages recognise that the 
CCP’s dictatorship could in no sense be challenged. As to those established 
revolutionary intellectuals within the CCP who had their own independent 
thinking, a series of campaigns including the Cultural Revolution could 
only force them into silence for the time being. For the CCP, it was much 
easier to lead people like Hua Luo-geng than those like Fei Xiao-tong, to
12 Another example is Ba Jin, one of China’s foremost novelists since the 1930s. In 
his widely-read Collected Random Thinkings, he said that he did not play an active 
role in the Cultural Revolution not because he did not want to, but because he was not 
qualified. Cf., Ba Jin, 1987: 468, 785, 841.
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control those like Feng You-lan rather than those like Guo Mo-ruo. 
People like Zhou Yang were the most difficult ones to deal with.
Generally speaking, we can say that, for the CCP, the old-type 
intellectuals were the easiest ones to educate. Then it was the democratic 
personages who were not so easy to deal with. And finally the 
revolutionary intellectuals were the most difficult people to control. More 
specifically, it is old-type intellectuals in natural sciences and technology, 
such as Hua Luo-geng, who were the easiest established intellectuals to 
"win over”. The old-type intellectuals in the humanities, such as Feng 
You-lan, were less easy than Hua Luo-geng and Hua-type natural scientists 
and technicians. It was getting more and more difficult when dealing with 
the following kinds of established intellectuals one after another: from the 
democratic personages in social sciences, such as Fei Xiao-tong, to the 
democratic personages in the state organs, such as Luo Long-ji; and then 
to the revolutionary intellectuals in social sciences, such as Guo Mo-ruo. 
The revolutionary intellectuals in the CCP hierarchy, such as Zhou Yang, 
were the most difficult intellectuals because they held real power.
In other words, under the specific "New System" in China, intellectuals 
could be more active in political campaigns as well as in other social 
activities if they do obtain high posts in state/Party organs. From here, we 
get our third conclusion. It is that, contrary to our hypothesis, the more 
and the higher posts China's intellectuals occupy, the more active and 
influential they are.
The key to explain this phenomenon is deeply rooted in the fact that in 
China, since the 1950s, everything including individual life has been 
institutionally organised and politicised, and there is no "civil society"
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where intellectuals could enjoy some sort of individual freedom. In 
contrast, China's educated people, whatever they were called and 
whatever group they belonged to, were all employed by the state-run or 
collective units in which, without being politically recognised by the CCP, 
one can achieve few things.13 Hence the more posts they were given, the 
more "freedoms " they obtained. For the CCP, no matter how Confucian 
Feng You-lan's ideas, they were never as problematic or dangerous as Hu 
Feng's, even though Hu was undoubtedly a left-wing writer; no matter 
how distinguished Hua Luo-geng was in his professional research, he was 
by no means as influential as Zhou Yang in intellectual as well as political 
circles, though Zhou's creative talent was acknowledged to be lower than 
Hua's.
The leading figures of the Democracy Movement in China since 1979, 
including Fang Li-zhi, now simply blame China's intellectuals during the 
period of 1949-1976 for seeking posts in officialdom rather than forming 
an independent stratum, and for justifying the official ideology rather 
than developing their own consciousness.14 It seems that these figures 
forget that, in a "Soviet-type Communist" society in general, and in China 
under Mao in particular, educated people have no socio-economic basis to 
form an independent stratum, let alone their own intellectual 
consciousness. In a "Soviet-type Communist" society, where the ruling 
party replaced the state, and the state replaced the society, the more
1  ^ As we have said, amongst hundreds of thousands of literary men and women 
(writers, artists, and literary critics), Ba Jin is the unique exceptional one who has not 
received any salary from any unit. But it should be noted that Ba still had to register as 
a professional novelist at Shanghai Branch of China's Writers Association, and in 
literature he achieved little during the period of 1949-1976. Cf., Ba Jin, 1987: 585.
l^ Fang Li-zhi, 1989.
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identified the established intellectuals were with that party the safer they 
were. For them, it is more realistic to identify themselves with the 
establishment or the ruling party than to be independent or even critical. 
This is why every time there were so many established intellectuals who 
became political and ideological supporters of the CCP when it launched a 
political campaign.15
This also explains why nearly every established intellectual got at least one 
post in the Party/state organs or semi-official units, such as All-China 
Federation of Literary & Art Circles. Amongst these posts, the strongest 
ones are, of course, those within the CCP. Comparatively, those of 
China’s established intellectuals with CCP membership were more 
qualified to speak out on politics in various ways. As Hu Feng in the end 
realised from his own painful experience: "Feng Xue-feng used to think 
that, without being recognised as an important figure in literary circles, a 
writer cannot be an influential man in the CCP. But in fact, if you have no 
power in the CCP, your position in literary circles is not stable, and can be 
easily displaced."16
Intellectuals with CCP membership or recognised by the CCP have more 
opportunities to show themselves, both politically and socially, and they 
endure greater pressure, both psychologically and physically. It would be 
naive to conclude that in a "Communist" one-party state like China, 
membership of the ruling party is a sort of guarantee by which 
intellectuals can happily play their intellectual role as they pleased. As
15 The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was different because, as we have shown, at 
that time, China's established intellectuals as a whole were not qualified to be 
supporters of the establishment, even they wished to be so. Cf., Chapters Four, Six.
16 Cf., Xiao Shan, 1990.
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intellectuals they dreamed of being realised as the so-called ’’engineers of 
the nation’s soul” by the public, but as Party members, they must always 
submit to the CCP leadership. Such a position makes those "revolutionary 
intellectuals” have a double face and play a double role in social life: in the 
eyes of the ”old-type intellectuals" and "democratic personages", they, 
like those"peasants in uniform", are official cadres; but in the eyes of the 
"peasants in uniform", they, like those "old-type intellectuals" and 
"democratic personages", are bourgeois intellectuals. As Guo Mo-ruo 
said: “I am an amphibian.”
Without doubt, it is more difficult for an intellectual within the ruling 
party. He should not only abide by the Party’s mles if he wants to keep his 
political position, but also follow the standard of the intellectual 
community if he tries to retain his intellectual identity. When there is 
conflict between them, he will really be in trouble: if he abides by the 
Party, the intellectual will blame him; if he follow the intellectual, the 
Party will punish him; and if he is wandering about between the Party and 
the intellectual, he will displease both.
Such is the case especially in political campaigns. As a party man, he 
should get actively involved in criticising other intellectuals who were 
chosen as targets; but as an intellectual, he should protect his colleagues 
who may be his teachers, students,and friends. Undertaking such a 
thankless task, the "revolutionary intellectuals" in the end became the ones 
Mao disliked most and, after Mao's death, people accord them less 
sympathy than is given to the "old-type intellectuals" and "democratic 
personages".
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Comparatively, both democratic personages and old-type intellectuals 
bear less responsibility. If democratic personages know their place, that 
is, if they enjoy their high posts without real power, and if old-type 
intellectuals behave themselves, namely, if they follow the Party, in most 
cases they will not be in trouble. Only if they try to obtain actual power, 
or speak out in their own voices, will they be criticised and punished. 
Unlike these two kinds of intellectuals, revolutionary ones are by instinct 
trouble-makers and trouble-sufferers because of their double position.
Unless one day the ruling party becomes practically intellectualised, or 
the intellectual becomes almost officialised, this conflict could not be 
fundamentally resolved, no matter who was in charge of the ruling party 
and who was playing the double role of the revolutionary intellectuals. 
Our fourth conclusion is: it is inexorable that intellectuals within the 
establishment have to experience or even suffer from conflicts between 
the roles of the official and of the intellectual, or more strictly, between 
the role of a member of the ruling party and a member of the critical 
intelligentsia.
III .
After Mao’s death, the CCP changed its policy towards China's educated 
people dramatically back to that promulgated at the beginning of 1956 by 
Zhou En-lai: educated people in China are members of the working class. 
This change shows that, after a series of failures to win educated people 
over through political campaigns, the leadership became more realistic 
and pragmatic. But it also shows that CCP still treated educated people in a 
very simplistic way: they were members of a specific class. The only
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difference is, instead of being members of the bourgeoisie, this time, they 
were officially located in "members of the working class". The question 
is: if all the educated people should not have been considered members of 
the bourgeoisie, how could they subsequently be considered members of 
the working class? The theoretical problem here remains more or less the 
same.
In practice, since 1978, China’s intellectuals, especially established ones, 
have been recruited in great number into the officialdom rather than into 
the working class. As a result, the CCP started its intellectualisation again 
while intellectuals restarted its officialisation. It is however still an open 
question as to who in the end will assimilate whom, or whether the two 
will combine into one.
Ironically, shortly after the promulgation of the decision that located all 
educated people in the working class, the CCP started criticising 
intellectuals. Firstly in 1979, some young intellectuals, including several 
poets who belonged to the "New Generation of Intellectuals", were in 
trouble: some were arrested, others lost their jobs, and their intellectual 
societies such as "Today", together with the famous Democratic Wall, 
were banned in Peking. Then in 1981 the CCP launched the Criticism of 
"Bourgeois Liberalisation" in the circles of literature, art, education, and 
propaganda, in which some well-known intellectuals, including a 1957 
"Rightist" Bai Hua (poet, play-writer, and novelist), were severely 
criticised.
Furthermore, in 1983, a nationwide campaign to "Clear out the Spiritual 
Pollution" was carried out. This time, Zhou Yang became the number-one 
target for his lengthy address at the centenary of Karl Marx. Zhou Yang
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in his address argued that Marx's humanist approach and his alienation 
theory should not be excluded from Marxism. Next, in 1987, the CCP 
once more launched another Criticism of "Bourgeois Liberalisation" in 
both intellectual circles and in the CCP itself, which resulted in the 
resignation of Hu Yao-bang, the Party's General Secretary, and the 
elimination of several leading intellectuals, including journalist Liu Bin- 
yan, novelist Wang Ruo-wang, and scientist Fang Li-zhi from the CCP. 
Finally, in 1989, the conflict between the CCP and the intellectual, 
including intellectuals in general and intelligentsia in particular, 
developed into one of the key factors of the June Fourth event, and many 
members of intellectuals and intelligentsia had to escaped from China, 
taking exile in the West.
In today's China, not only the leadership of the CCP is losing its 
intellectual-political hegemony, but also intellectuals both within and 
outside the establishment are becoming more and more open-minded and 
critical towards the status quo. But the CCP still can not be legally 
challenged and educated people as well as others remain men and women 
living under the specific "Unit System". The fate of China’s intellectuals 
in the future largely depends upon the development of Chinese society and 
the change of social relations.
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